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In 2014, the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) became the Executive Agent 
Office of Primary Responsibility (EA OPR) for Personnel Recovery (PR) for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces. This capstone project is sponsored by the commander RNoAF 
PR and SERE School to support the development of a whole-of-department approach to 
PR by answering this question:  
How can we design a Personnel Recovery (PR) system for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces that enables Norwegian commanders and staffs, forces and 
isolated personnel to collaborate and operate in a combined joint PR 
mission environment? 
This capstone project explores PR for the Norwegian Armed Forces through an 
inquiry of design and design thinking. As an initiation of the design process, the capstone 
begins the discovery phase with an examination of archival records centered on PR from 
WWII to the present and in-depth discussions with national and international PR subject- 
matter experts. This capstone describes the results from the design thinking process, its 
prototypes, and recommendations to the RNoAF.  
In brief, the capstone project recommends that the Norwegian Armed Forces, with 
the RNoAF as the EA OPR for PR, develop a network organization that coordinates the 
main actors in the PR system into well-functioning communities of practice.  
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No matter what era, area, or circumstance, rescue has always been one of 
the great human interest stories. … There is no saga quite as inspiring, as 
exhilarating, or as dramatic as that of man risking serious injury or death 
itself to help his fellow man in trouble. Rescue is a compelling, all-
encompassing human instinct. In crisis people pull together as never 
before, often performing deeds far beyond their normal capacities when a 
life is in the balance. So it has always been and will always be. Such is the 
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from the Army PR and SERE School. I would also like to thank Brigadier General (Ret.) 
Øyvind “Beachman” Strandman for the opportunity to attend NPS. In addition, I would 
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RNoAF and the PR community have always received. Finally, and most importantly, I 
thank my family, my wife, Tone, and my children, Håkon and Henrik, for their support 
and the joy they bring to my life. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PERSONNEL RECOVERY FOR VALUE OR VALOR 
Learning about Personnel Recovery (PR) has been a truly humbling experience. 
Incredible effort and self-sacrifice are needed to organize people and organizations to 
deal with the challenges of rescuing one’s fellow brother-in-arms, isolated and on the run 
from the enemy, or suffering in captivity. From World War II to the present day, there are 
many instances of PR. The four proceeding examples illustrate the courage and heroism 
of people who came to the aid of others (see Figures 1–4).  
The first example of Personnel Recovery centers on the story of Andree de Jongh, 
who was a Belgian Resistance fighter during World War II. The following is an excerpt 
from The Compleat Anglo in the Pays Basque blog. 
 
Figure 1.  Andree de Jongh1 
 
Among the prisoners who emerged from the concentration camps of 
Germany at the liberation of France in 1945 was Andree de Jongh, the 
Belgian girl who had created an escape route for Allied servicemen from 
Brussels to Bilbao. Known as the Comet Line, it was the greatest escape 
route in the Resistance Movement and its three years of life saved over 
800 Allied airmen and soldiers from captivity and returned them to 
England. “Little Cyclone” was a suitable pseudonym for the girl whose 
enterprise and energy inspired all who met her, for though she had many 
brave and forceful personalities to help her, she was always the leader. 
After her arrest, she suffered dreadfully in Ravensbruck and Mauthausen 
concentration camps, but her example inspired her successors in the line. 
                                                 
1 Piperade, “72. Villa Voisin,” The Compleat Anglo in the Pays Basque (blog), July 21, 2010, 
http://piperade-thecompleatanglo.blogspot.com/2010/07/72-villa-voisin.html.   
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In 1945, she was freed, and in 1946, she came to England to receive the 
George Medal from the King.2  
The second example of Personnel Recovery involves retired U.S. Navy SEAL 
Thomas Rolland Norris, who served in two tours of duty in Vietnam. The following 
excerpt illustrates Norris’ fierce determination and perseverance. 
 
Figure 2.  Thomas Rolland Norris3 
 
During the period 10 to 13 April 1972, Lt. Norris completed an 
unprecedented ground rescue of 2 downed pilots deep within heavily 
controlled enemy territory in Quang Tri Province. Lt. Norris, on the night 
of 10 April led a 5-man patrol through 2,000 meters of heavily controlled 
enemy territory, located 1 of the downed pilots at daybreak, and returned 
to the Forward Operating Base (FOB). On 11 April, after a devastating 
mortar and rocket attack on the small FOB, Lt. Norris led a 3-man team on 
2 unsuccessful rescue attempts for the second pilot. On the afternoon of 
the 12th, a forward air controller located the pilot and notified Lt. Norris. 
Dressed in fishermen disguises and using a sampan, Lt. Norris and one 
Vietnamese traveled throughout that night and found the injured pilot at 
dawn. Covering the pilot with bamboo and vegetation, they began the 
return journey, successfully evading a North Vietnamese patrol. 
Approaching the FOB, they came under heavy machine gun fire. 
Lieutenant Norris called in an air strike which provided suppression fire 
and a smoke screen, allowing the rescue party to reach the FOB. By his 
outstanding display of decisive leadership, undaunted courage, and selfless 
                                                 
2 Airey Neave, Little Cyclone (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954), front and back cover. 
3 “Thomas R. Norris,” NavySeals.com, accessed April 14, 2016, http://navyseals.com/ns-
overview/notable-seals/thomas-r-norris/.  
 3 
dedication in the face of extreme danger, Lt. Norris enhanced the finest 
traditions of the United States Naval Service.4 
The story of Master Sergeant Gordon provides the third example of personnel 
recovery and a display of an altruistic act in an effort to rescue a fellow soldier. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Gary Ivan Gordon5 
 
Master Sergeant Gordon, United States Army, distinguished himself by 
actions above and beyond the call of duty on October 3, 1993, while 
serving as Sniper Team Leader, United States Army Special Operations 
Command with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia. He and 
another sniper unhesitatingly volunteered to be inserted to protect the four 
critically wounded personnel … then went back to the wreckage, 
recovering some of the crew’s weapons and ammunition. Despite the fact, 
that he was critically low on ammunition, he provided some of it to the 
dazed pilot and then radioed for help. … After his team member was 
fatally wounded and his own rifle ammunition exhausted, Master Sergeant 
Gordon returned to the wreckage, recovering a rifle with the last five 
rounds of ammunition and gave it to the pilot with the words, “good luck.” 
Then, armed only with his pistol, Master Sergeant Gordon continued to 
fight until he was fatally wounded. His actions saved the pilot’s life. 
Master Sergeant Gordon’s extraordinary heroism and devotion to duty 
                                                 
4 For the Medal of Honor information, see “Congressional Medal of Honor Society,” last modified 
April 14, 2016, http://www.cmohs.org/recipient-detail/3374/norris-thomas-r.php, and for a detailed account 
of the rescue, see Darrel D. Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998). 
5 “MSG Gary Ivan Gordon,” Battle of Mogadishu, accessed April 14, 2016, 
http://battleofmogadishu.com/in-memoriam/died-in-somalia/gary-gordon.   
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were in keeping with the highest standards of military service and reflect 
great credit upon his unit and the United States Army.6 
The last example of Personnel Recovery takes place in a Norwegian military 
context and brings PR closer to home, as these brave acts of the courageous Alexander 
Hesseberg Vikebø illustrate. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Aleksander Hesseberg Vikebø7 
 
In 2014, the then 28-year-old Aleksander Hesseberg Vikebø, a member of 
the counter-terrorism unit Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) received 
the Norwegian military’s highest recognition of valor for his conduct and 
performance during a 2012 hostage rescue operation in Afghanistan while 
mentoring the Afghan Crisis Response Unit (CRU) during a spectacular 
attack in Kabul. As he was awarded the medal “Krigskorset med sverd” 
[War cross with sword] and also the second highest medal the “St. 
Olavsmedaljen med ekegren” [St. Olav’s medal with oak leaf], he became 
the highest decorated soldier in the Norwegian Armed Forces since WWII. 
His medals were awarded for his display of professional skills, courage, 
                                                 
6 For the Medal of Honor citations, see “Congressional Medal of Honor Society”; for a detailed 
account of the event, see Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1999). 
7 “I dag blir han Norges nye ‘Kjakan’” [Today he becomes the new “jaw”], Dagbladet [Daily 
Magazine], May 8, 2014, 
http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/05/08/nyheter/innenriks/forsvaret/afghanistan/krig/33184656/.   
 5 
and bravery during two missions where one was a nine-hour fight against 
the Taliban, which saved numerous hostages.8  
These acts of personal courage, heroism, and self-sacrifice in coming to the rescue 
of fellow human beings were awarded with the highest military honors. They set the 
stage for this capstone project on Personnel Recovery in Norway: what PR has been in 
the past and how it could be redesigned to meet Norway’s future needs. 
B. WHY THE NORWEGIAN PR SYSTEM? 
From WWII until the end of the Cold War, the focus of Norwegian PR was along 
the lines of the work started by the WWII Escape and Evasion (E&E) organization 
Military Intelligence 9 (MI9), and survival training of aircrew and Special Operations 
Forces (SOF). The survival training focused on surviving and evading in Norway among 
a friendly population. The Norwegian Intelligence service established, along with other 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, a secret stay-behind (SB) escape 
and evasion network designed to return aircrew shot down over NATO “overrun” 
territory. This secret stay-behind network was established as a continuation of the lessons 
learned from WWII.9  
The end of the Cold War created a change in the dominant policy of defending the 
homeland and transitioned in the 1990s to engagement and participation in international 
coalition operations. The fighting in the Balkans in the 1990s and the decade-long 
involvement in Afghanistan have highlighted the need for proper Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape (SERE) training and the education of SERE instructors according 
to NATO standards. Initially, most nations relied on the United States military for all 
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) efforts, but early in 2000, a focus emerged on the 
role of PR-capable forces and their support for PR operations. In the 1990s, there was a 
shift from homeland operations to international operations, which included expanded 
                                                 
8 For a public reference to the event, see Sveinung Berg Bentzrød, “I dag ble Alexander (28) Norges 
høyest dekorerte etter andre verdenskrig” [Today Alexander (28) became the highest decorated soldier 
since WWII], Aftenposten [Evening Post], May 8, 2014, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/I-dag-ble-
Alexander-28-Norges-hoyest-dekorerte-etter-andre-verdenskrig-7559385.html.   
9 Olav Riste, “With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 (November 2007): 997–1024.  
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roles and capabilities for Norway’s SOF. Today, citizens of Norway, no matter where 
they are, can rest assured SOF provide the capability and will to rescue them from any 
worldwide hostage situation.10 At the present, a well-structured program for individual 
PR and SERE training has been established for Norwegian aircrews and SOF. An 
increased capability for educating select army units is evolving. 
I have been involved in PR as the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) Office of 
Primary Responsibility (OPR) for PR from 2007 until 2014, when I joined the Defense 
Analysis program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Given my last assignment and 
the Norwegian Armed Forces move toward a whole of Department of Defense (DOD) 
approach to PR, I chose to use my time as an NPS student to gain in-depth knowledge of 
PR. I continued my work as the OPR for PR, which offered me an opportunity to support 
the ongoing PR developments in Norway. 
C. CAPSTONE APPROACH 
Personnel Recovery was the obvious subject for me to study, and I was fortunate 
to come across an interesting way to study it. Early on in the NPS Defense Analysis (DA) 
program, I participated in a practical seminar on design thinking (DT) championed by Dr. 
Nancy Roberts. The experience of the seminar triggered my interest in design as a culture 
of inquiry for change, and shortly thereafter, I also participated in a three-quarter-long 
strategic design challenge sponsored by the Norwegian Special Operations Command 
(NORSOCOM) that explored how Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 
could be designed to meet the challenges of 2025.11 Design thinking is a process of 
problem-solving that is human centered, and with the experience of the NORSOF design 
challenge, I found design well suited for a capstone approach to my study of PR. 
                                                 
10 Nils Johan Holte, “Norske spesialstyrker i støpesjeen—hva innebærer reformene?” [Norwegian 
Special Forces in Development—What are the Implications of Reform?] (speech, Oslo Militære Samfund 
[Oslo Military Society], Oslo, March 31, 2014), http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/files/speech_files/457-
2014-03-31-Holte.pdf. 
11 Espen Berg-Knutsen and Nancy Roberts, Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025, Naval Postgraduate 
School Technical Report no. NPS-DA-15-001 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 
2014). 
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D. CAPSTONE PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE 
This capstone project uses design and design thinking as a process of inquiry to 
model a Norwegian PR system. The 2014 initiative by the Norwegian Chief of Defense 
(CHOD) designates the RNoAF as the Executive Agent Office of Primary Responsibility 
(EA OPR) for PR. The goal of this capstone project is to assist the RNoAF in creating a 
new whole of government approach for the Norwegian PR system. 
The remainder of this project is organized as follows. Chapter II describes design 
as a culture of inquiry for change, and design thinking as a five-step process and method 
of generating creative ideas and prototyping them to produce innovation. The sponsor’s 
design challenge and the key personnel and stakeholders involved in the project are also 
introduced. 
Chapter III details the first step of design thinking, the discovery phase. Archival 
records provide the history and context of PR and the foundation for an assessment of the 
current Norwegian PR system. Discussions with PR actors and participant observations 
also provide a rich understanding of the many viewpoints on PR and the context of the 
design challenge. The general themes drawn from the discovery phase conclude the 
chapter and set the stage for the problem definition phase.  
Chapter IV describes the existing challenges of the PR system. It offers a refined 
problem definition that guides the subsequent chapters on ideation, prototyping, and 
testing. Chapter V describes the ideation phase and the ideas to be developed into 
prototypes. Chapter VI offers prototypes of the Norwegian PR system judged to be the 
most important elements in the redesign of the existing PR system. Finally, Chapter VII 
summarizes the findings of the capstone project.   
 8 
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II. DESIGN AND DESIGN THINKING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Personnel recovery in the Norwegian Armed Forces is an activity that must be 
conducted during peacetime, crisis, and war. The establishment of the RNoAF as the EA 
OPR for PR by the Norwegian CHOD in 2014 has triggered changes in PR.12 It led to the 
question that launched this project: How could the Personnel Recovery (PR) system for 
the Norwegian Armed Forces be designed to enable Norwegian commanders and staffs, 
forces, and isolated personnel to operate in a Combined Joint Personnel Recovery 
mission environment? 
Design as a culture of inquiry is best suited for this capstone, as it provides for an 
assessment of the current Personnel Recovery (PR) system, “that-which-is,” by systems 
analysis and synthesis, and through systems critique, reveals “that-which-ought-to-be,” 
and by taking prudent action provides the change to “that-which-needs-to-be” or “that-
which-is-desired-to-be.”13  
This chapter provides an introduction to design as a third culture of inquiry and 
design thinking (DT) as a specific design process.  
B. DESIGN 
According to Harold Nelson and Eric Stolterman, “design is a natural and ancient 
human ability, the first tradition among many traditions of human inquiry and action.”14 
In their book The Design Way: Intentional Change in an Unpredictable World, Nelson, 
and Stolterman define design as “the ability to imagine that-which-does-not-yet-exist, 
                                                 
12 Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], Direktiv for luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for air 
operations] (Oslo: Forsvarssjefen [Chief of defense], 2014).  
13 Harold G. Nelson and Erik Stolterman, The Design Way: Intentional Change in an Unpredictable 
World (London: The MIT Press, 2014), 77. 
14 Ibid., 1. 
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and to make it appear in concrete form as a new, purposeful addition to the real world.”15 
They expand on design as a core human activity: 
When we create new things—technologies, organizations, processes, 
environments, ways of thinking, or systems—we engage in design. To 
come up with an idea of what we think would be an ideal addition to the 
world, and to give real existence—form, structure, and shape—to that 
idea, is at the core of design as a human activity.16 
Design is a third way, distinct from the arts and sciences.17 According to Herbert 
Simon, the difference between science and design is straightforward: “The natural 
sciences are concerned with how things are; design, on the other hand, is concerned with 
how things ought to be.”18  
Klaus Krippendorff identifies four points that distinguish scientists: 
 Scientific research is essentially re-search, a repeated search for patterns 
within available data.  
 Data always are of past happenings, whether they are found or generated 
for a purpose, for example, by counting a population or designing a 
controlled experiment. The patterns that data analysis is presumed to 
“find” have always existed prior to their analysis. 
 Theories generalize what permeates the data—common properties, stable 
patterns, and underlying causalities. By definition, generalizations omit 
details that are irrelevant to intended theory. The law of falling bodies, for 
example, concerns theoretical bodies. Truly unique events, being not 
generalizable, are of little interest to natural scientists who would rather 
believe they do not exist. Predictions from past to future always presume 
that the theorized properties are stable and unchanging within theoretical 
limits. 
 To preserve the idea of nature as an undisturbed object of study, scientific 
observers are not allowed to enter their domain of observation, are 
required to remain detached, spectators of happenings, and certainly must 
not affect the data they intend to analyze. This is to assure that scientific 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 12.  
16 Ibid., 1.  
17 Ibid., 1.  
18 Klaus Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design (Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2006), 26.  
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findings, theories, and laws are about an observer-uncontaminated 
nature.19  
Designers, on the other hand, pursue other motivations, Krippendorff describe 
these as follows:  
 Designers are motivated not by a quest for knowledge for its own sake but 
by challenges, troublesome conditions, problems, or conflicts that have 
escaped (re)solution; opportunities to change something for the better—
not recognized by others—to contribute to their own or other 
communities’ lives; possibilities to introduce variations into the world that 
others may not dare to consider, creating something new and exciting— 
just as poets, painters, and composers do—aimlessly and for fun. 
 Designers consider possible futures, worlds that can be imagined and 
could be created in real time. They are concerned less with what has 
happened, what already exists, or what can be predicted by extrapolation 
from the past than with what can be done. Designers’ most outstanding 
ability is not being afraid to explore new ideas, to challenge theories that 
claim that something cannot be done, or to question what is commonly 
taken for granted. Thus conceived, the futures that designers envision are 
inherently unpredictable from laws of nature, though not necessarily 
contradicting them. 
 To choose among them, designers evaluate the desirability of these 
futures. Desirable worlds must make sense and be of benefit to those who 
could realize these worlds and might come to live in them. Developing a 
consensus on the desirability of a possible future calls for deliberations 
among its stakeholders, using a language that is capable of going beyond 
data or facts. 
 Designers search the present for variables, things they are able to vary, 
move, influence, alter, combine, take apart, reassemble, or change. These 
variables define a space of possible actions, a design space, as Phil Agre 
(2000) calls it. Designers need to know the efforts required to alter these 
variables and how likely they are in bringing forth desirable futures (and 
avoiding undesirable futures).  
 Designers create and work out realistic paths from the present toward 
desirable futures and propose them to those who can bring a design to 
fruition. Successful designs depend on designers’ ability to enroll 
stakeholders into their projects, even if these stakeholders pursue their 
own interest as well. The paths that designers invite stakeholders to take 
must be presented as realistic, affordable, of benefit to those whose effort 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 27.  
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is required, and above all, open valuable opportunities to those affected by 
a design.20  
Nelson and Stolterman advance “the case for design as its own tradition, one that 
reintegrates sophia rather than following the historical Western split between science and 
craft or, more recently between science and the humanities.”21 The word philosophy 
means “love of wisdom” from its two roots philo (love) and sophia (wisdom). The 
original definition of sophia is the knowing hand. The knowing hand is an integration of 
thinking and action, as well as reflection and production.22 Sophia signifies the skill of a 
craftsman. This integrated meaning of sophia would later split into theory and practice, 
where thinking gained a higher value or status than practice, and this split is evident and 
present today.23  
The philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce argues that “no new idea could be proved 
deductively or inductively using past data.”24 There has to be a third kind of logic. Peirce 
named the third type of reasoning, abductive logic, that does not have a goal of declaring 
a conclusion true or false, but to infer what could possibly be true. Relating this to design 
means “the ability to imagine that-which-does-not-yet-exist.”25  
Thus, Nelson and Stolterman view design as an integration of reason and 
observation, reflection, imagination, action, and production. It includes not only creative 
thinking but also innovative, productive, and compositional activities.26 They further 
state that “design is realized through the manifestation and integration of ideal, if not 
always creative, concepts into the real world,” that design is, “a compound of rational, 
ideal, and pragmatic inquiry,” and as such “is constituted of reflective and critical 
thinking, productive action, and responsible follow-through.27  
                                                 
20 Ibid., 28.  
21 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 1. 
22 Ibid., 14.  
23 Ibid., 14–15. 
24 Roger Martin, The Design of Business (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009), 64. 
25 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 12. 
26 Ibid., 4.  
27 Ibid., 5. 
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Nelson and Stolterman also claim that “the process of design is always the most 
effective and efficient means of getting organizations and individuals to new places. 
Design is therefore about leadership—and leadership is therefore an essential element of 
any design culture.”28 Today’s complex world demands that leaders possess the ability to 
act, despite an overload of incomplete “information within restrictive limits of resources 
and time,”29 and calls for the use of sound judgment, not necessarily just traditional 
problem-solving. Nelson and Stolterman argue that leaders and designers are often one 
and the same. Leaders’ challenges are to determine the direction and destination of the 
organization via the design tradition.30  
As seen in Figure 5, design drives change by an assessment that describes and 
explains that-which-is through systems analysis and synthesis, followed by a systems 
critique that identifies that-which-ought-to-be, as well as that-which-should-be.  
 
Figure 5.  Assessment, Change, and Design31 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 5.  
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Ibid., 5. 
31 Ibid., 77.  
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The assessment sets the stage for change and design that can be a systems 
restoration, a repair to that-which-needs-to-be; or a systems redesign, a design that 
reforms, transforms, or forms that-which-is-desired-to-be.32 That-which-is-desired-to-be 
is, therefore, the specific end outcome of design. If the recommendations of this capstone 
are accepted by the PR community and survive additional follow-on testing and 
implementation, the result will be a new, innovative PR system for Norway.33 
C. DESIGN THINKING 
No common definition of design thinking (DT) exists, but the definition that 
informs this capstone is one offered by Professor Nancy Roberts of the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA: DT is “a cross-disciplinary, human-centered, 
collaborative process for the purpose of creating designs—new products, processes, 
services, strategies, organizations, and systems.”34 As the Stanford d.school elaborates, 
DT is a “methodology for innovation that combines creative and analytical approaches, 
and requires collaboration across disciplines,” and that DT “draws on methods from 
engineering and design, and combines them with ideas from the arts, tools from social 
sciences, and insights from the business world.”35 
DT was selected to guide this capstone project due to its focus on human-centered 
design that searches for solutions that are desirable, feasible, and viable. By starting with 
humans and their hopes, fears, and needs, one can discover what is most desirable. Then the 
question becomes what is technically feasible to implement and what is financially viable in 
the long term.36 These three lenses of human desirability, technological feasibility, and 
32 Ibid., 6.
33 Innovation is the adoption of a new practice in a community as defined in Peter J. Denning and
Robert Dunham, The Innovator’s Way: Essential Practices for Successful Innovation (London: The MIT 
Press, 2010), 6. 
34 Nancy Roberts, “Strategic Design” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February
25, 2016). 
35 d.school, “Our Point of View: Our Way of Working,” last modified April 25, 2016,
http://dschool.stanford.edu/our-point-of-view/. 
36 Ideo.org, The Field Guide to Human-Centered Design (San Francisco: Ideo.org., 2015), 14.
15 
financial viability, as seen in Figure 6, represent the initial constraints that are visualized as 
three overlapping criteria for turning successful ideas into design solutions.37  
Figure 6.  Stanford d.school Human-Centered Design38 
All of these elements must be carefully balanced to develop design solutions that 
are successful and sustainable.39 
The five-phase model of DT, as seen in Figure 7, was developed and continues to 
evolve at Stanford’s Hasso Plattner Institute of Design (d.school), which was founded in 
2005 by David Kelley.40  
37 Ibid.; Tim Brown, Change by Design: How Design Thinking Transforms Organizations and
Inspires Innovation (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 18. 
38 d.school, “Our Point of View.”
39 Ideo.org, The Field Guide to Human-Centered Design, 14; Brown, Change by Design, 18.
40 Literature on Design as a culture of inquiry and design thinking is evolving and an overview of this
literature can be found in Appendix B.  
16 
Figure 7.  The Design Thinking Process I41 
1. The Design Challenge
A design challenge launches the DT process. The designer, working with a 
sponsor or client, decides on an issue, question, or problem of interest. In this instance, 
the design challenge is how the PR system could be designed or redesigned to enable 
Norwegian commanders, staff, forces, and isolated personnel to operate in a Combined 
Joint PR mission environment. 
2. Discovery Phase
The discovery phase initiates the design thinking process. The intent of discovery 
explores the military, economic, political, and social context in which the design 
challenge resides, with an emphasis on the stakeholders who are part of the PR system. 
This phase constitutes the cornerstone of the human-centered design process.42 The 
objective is to “understand the way they [people] do things and why, their physical and 
emotional needs, how they think about their world, and what is meaningful to them.”.43  
There are numerous ways to make sense of and learn about the context and the 
specific design challenge: examination of archival records, observations of people in their 
41 Stanford d.school’s design thinking process, as modified by Nancy Roberts. Nancy Roberts, “The
Design Thinking Process” (PowerPoint presentation, Design Thinking course, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, California, 2014). 
42 See section on Empathy in d.school, “The Design Process Mini-Guide,” d.school, August 2, 2012,
https://dschool.stanford.edu/groups/designresources/wiki/36873/Design_Process_MiniGuide.html.  
43 See section on Empathy in d.school, “Design Process Mini-Guide.”
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design environment, and discussions with the key stakeholders. The goal of the discovery 
phase is to observe, listen to, and learn from the people involved in the PR system to 
understand their perspectives and to gain a deep understanding of their experiences. 
3. Problem Definition Phase 
The define phase of the design process reframes the design challenge based on the 
synthesis of the various findings from the empathy work in the discovery phase. Based on 
the insights gained, the define phase brings focus and clarity to the collected data, 
observations, and discussions, and identifies a key issue or problem the design team will 
leverage in ideation.44  
4. Ideation Phase 
The ideate phase of the design process generates new ideas. By launching 
brainstorming sessions with “how might we” questions, the objective is to encourage new 
and different ideas to address the problem or issue identified in the define phase. The 
underlying premise is that participants defer judgment by separating idea generation from 
the evaluation of ideas. From brainstorming, one moves to assessment where the design 
team selects some of the best ideas to go forward into the prototyping phase.45 
5. Prototyping Phase 
The design team launches this phase by selecting one idea they believe merits 
prototyping. The prototyping phase can range from making simple physical models of a 
new product to a storyboard for a process or an operation or a simple “rock drill” or a 
simulation. The idea is to make it quick, cheap, and rough, so that if it fails, one can fail 
early and fail often to learn faster.46 The prototypes for this capstone have been 
developed in the form of a storyboard that visualizes a possible future PR journey for the 
main stakeholders within the Norwegian PR system and how these stakeholders will act 
                                                 
44 See section on Define in d.school, “Design Process Mini-Guide.”  
45 See section on Ideation in d.school, “Design Process Mini-Guide.” 
46 The concept of cheap and rough prototypes lowers the cost of failure and provides an opportunity to 
learn from mistakes early in the process and to change direction before the consequences and commitments 
become too big and costly. 
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and function within that framework for the preparation, planning, execution and 
adaptation phase.  
6. Testing Phase 
The last step in the DT process is testing. The goal is to get stakeholder feedback 
quickly to find any flaws in the prototype and then, just as quickly, come up with new 
ideas to correct or further develop the prototype. Based on user feedback, the design team 
will be able to find out what works, what can be improved, what additional questions 
users have, even some new ideas they may generate. Testing is one more chance to 
understand the user’s need and often offer new unexpected insights.47 
The Norwegian design team will “test” the future Norwegian PR system 
prototype with identified key stakeholders in the different service branches to gain 
insights and feedback on the desirability, feasibility, and viability of the suggested 
prototype. This will be an iterative process that seeks to improve the prototype. The idea 
will be further developed to design a new prototype that will be sustainable with the 
restraint and constraints of a small nation’s armed forces. 
D. DESIGN THINKING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING 
The DT process, from discovery to testing, is, for simplicity, articulated as a 
linear progression. In reality, the process continually goes back and forth between and 
among the phases as new understanding and insights appear from a continuous synthesis 
of the design challenge and potential future solutions. Figure 8 provides another 
illustration of the DT process that visualizes its non-linear attributes and also includes an 
implementation process. 
                                                 
47 See section on Testing in d.school, “Design Process Mini-Guide.”  
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Figure 8.  The Design Thinking Process II48 
 
DT also captures the way individuals tend to think. Western thought and problem-
solving tend to prioritize logic and deduction, where people are prone to take a series of 
inputs, analyze them, and converge on a single answer. “Convergent thinking is a 
practical way of deciding among existing alternatives,” but not so effective for exploring 
new possibilities.49 By contrast, “the objective of divergent thinking is to multiply 
options to create more choices.”50 The idea then is to create many ideas, ultimately 
settling on a good idea.51 
As shown in Figure 9, both processes are necessary and are captured in DT.  
                                                 
48 d.school.fr, accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.dschool.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/DesignThinkingProcess.png.   
49 Brown, Change by Design, 66. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 7. 
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Figure 9.  The Design Thinking Process III52 
 
There is a constant exchange between divergent and convergent thinking, where 
divergence begins with discovery, converges with the define phase, diverges again with 
Ideation, and converges with Prototyping and Testing. If the prototypes are not viable or 
accepted, the process repeats itself.53 
Thus divergent thinking complements convergent thinking just as analysis 
complements synthesis. Analysis uses inductive and deductive logic to derive an efficient 
solution from past data, while synthesis is the creative process. The team’s collective 
action is to make sense of the data and draw inferences to that-which-does-not-yet-exist 
and could be.54 Synthesis is, according to Tim Brown, the creative “act of extracting 
meaningful patterns from masses of raw information.”55 Like divergent and convergent 
thinking, synthesis and analysis are equally important to DT in the process of creating 
options and making choices. 
                                                 
52 “How Does the d.school’s Framework for Design Thinking Map into IDEO’ s?” Ux.stackexchange, 
accessed April 25, 2016, http://ux.stackexchange.com/questions/73630/how-does-the-d-schools-
framework-for-design-thinking-map-onto-ideos.   
53 Brown, Change by Design, 68. 
54 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 132. 
55 Brown, Change by Design, 70. 
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E. THE NORWEGIAN PR CAPSTONE PROJECT 
1. Key Personnel 
There are several people with different roles and responsibilities who are involved 
in this capstone project and whose contributions and perspectives have shaped the 
outcome of the design project. The main contributors and actors are as follows. 
a. Design Team 
The design team was initially planned to be a core team of representatives from 
the PR community of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Due to the difficulties of gathering 
everyone at one physical location, and thus adhering to a pure design thinking process of 
physical collaboration, a hybrid model of a design team has been used. The core members 
have been the RNoAF PR and SERE school instructors and staff that were available to 
meet when I traveled to Norway. Most often, the team meetings have been with one or 
two of them at a time, and as the designer, I have assumed the responsibility for the 
overall synthesis of our meetings. The RNoAF instructors and staff have provided input 
from the many other actors and stakeholders in Norway and made the essence of their 
discussions available for me to gather as a whole. Communication has been conducted 
through Skype and similar means to clarify important issues.  
b. Sponsor 
The commander of the RNoAF PR and SERE School, Lieutenant Colonel 
Christian “Spirit” Waldermo, has been the formal sponsor of the project, as he is tasked 
by the inspector general of the Air Force to develop the RNoAF as the EA OPR of PR for 
the Norwegian Armed Forces.  
c. Designer 
As a novice student of design myself, I have had the full support of Dr. Nancy 
Roberts who, as an expert in strategic design, has provided invaluable direction and 
insight to this capstone project. 
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d. Stakeholders 
The perspectives of the various actors and stakeholders in the PR system depend 
very much on their location in the PR system. The difficulty of seeing the whole of a 
situation has been recognized for thousands of years as the famous tale of the blind wise 
men and the elephant warns of the limits of a single point-of-view.56 As each of the wise 
men touches the elephant for the first time, and from different positions, they all come up 
with a different answer as to what an elephant is, as seen in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.  Seeing the Whole of Systems 
 
The famous tale of the blind wise men and the elephant demonstrates the limits of 
the positional, or a singular point-of-view perspective to explain the whole.57 The same 
challenge of seeing the whole has been the case for PR as it has evolved from WWII to 
the present. As an example, there are many actors from all services who talk about PR 
with similar but still different terms, and the various services differ in how they label and 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 66. 
57 Ibid., 65; Willard Cope Brinton, Graphic Presentation (New York: Brinton Associates, 1939), 13; 
“Graphic Presentation by Willard Cope Brinton,” Archive.org, accessed April 25, 2016, 
https://archive.org/details/graphicpresentat00brinrich.  
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conceptualize the PR system. The Air Force and Navy use the term CSAR; the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) calls it tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP), 
and SOF does hostage rescue.58 
There are also several actors and stakeholders in the PR system, and the most 
obvious ones are found in the roles of isolated personnel, rescue forces, and commanders 
and staffs. There are two types of rescue forces, those that have PR as a primary mission as 
a dedicated force and those who provide support and rescue efforts as a capable force.59 
Commanders and staffs can also be said to belong to two categories: those in the 
PR C2 architecture with dedicated PR roles and training, or those in the command chain 
as unit and higher headquarters leaders and staffers who set the stageor PR from the 
preparation phase through the planning, execution, and adaptation phases of the model. 
The preparation phase of the PR model also indicates that there are numerous 
supporting actors involved who “own” policy and doctrine, and education and training 
institutions, and those who provide the essential PR and SERE equipment. 
A very important stakeholder in the system is the family of the involved actors, 
especially the isolated personnel in distress, as the model also emphasizes the support 
task where both isolated personnel and their families are addressed in the doctrine. 
At one end of the spectrum, the isolated personnel is the primary reason for PR. 
At the other end are the national leaders. They have responsibility for sending people into 
harm’s way and are concerned for the political consequences of “failed” rescues,60 and 
the media attention to “tactical” PR incidents. They also bear the moral responsibility to 
the society for doing their best to recover those who serve on behalf of others.  
                                                 
58 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Personnel Recovery, JP 3-50 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 
2011), I-4. 
59 Examples of Norwegian dedicated forces are Norwegian Special Forces (Hostage Rescue) and the 
330 Search and Rescue (SAR) Squadron (SAR). Examples of capable forces are F-16 fighters providing 
Close Air Support to isolated personnel and C-130 transport aircraft providing resupply to isolated 
personnel.  
60 Examples of “failed” rescues are the Son Tay Raid in the Vietnam War, the Mayaguez incident, and 
Operation Eagle Claw, the rescue attempt in Iran.  
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As one can see when adopting multiple perspectives, the “sponsor” of the 
capstone is just a proxy client for a more varied group of stakeholders. If one assumes a 
broader perspective, one can also argue that the PR system not only serves the present but 
is also designed for future clients and past clients who learned their PR lessons at the cost 
of both blood and treasure.  
2. Design Challenge 
Every nation that engages in armed conflict has a moral responsibility and 
commitment to leave no man behind. “PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts 
to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.”61 As a small 
nation, Norway must be able to prepare its soldiers for PR and be able to participate in PR 
operations during national operations or as part of a multinational coalition. 
a. PR Executive Agent Office of Primary Responsibility  
In 2014, the CHOD of the Norwegian Armed Forces delegated the equivalent of 
an Executive Agent Office of Primary Responsibility (EA OPR)62 for PR to the Inspector 
General of the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF).63 Within the RNoAF, the service 
OPR for PR is the RNoAF PR and Survival, Escape and Evasion, Resistance and 
Extraction (SERE) School, which is organizationally placed as an entity under the 
commander of the RNoAF Tactical Flying School. Good sponsorship and support are 
essential factors in establishing a design challenge. This capstone project has been 
fortunate to have the commander of the RNoAF Tactical Flying School, Lieutenant 
Colonel Christian “Spirit” Waldermo, as the sponsor. The support from the RNoAF 
                                                 
61 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, ix. 
62 A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the secretary of defense or deputy secretary of 
defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the secretary of defense. Also called EA. EA OPR is the closest 
translation to the Norwegian term fagmyndighet. 
63 The definition of fagmyndighet translates to “the responsibility and authority to establish 
requirements and specify disciplinary frames within a given area of activity for the entire military, 
including developing the area of activity, be the subject matter professional consultants in this area of 
activity, as well as carrying out checks and issue orders to resolve any discrepancies. Parts of authority may 
be further delegated as professional responsibility.” Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], Direktiv for 
luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for air operations], 4. 
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SERE School Commander Major Frode “Bilbo” Martinsen, the chief SERE instructor 
Captain Frode Sjaastad, and his instructor staff has been most valuable and appreciated. 
b. Sponsor Guidelines 
The sponsor provided support to the Capstone Project to assist in the development 
of a comprehensive Department of Defense approach to PR in Norway, with the RNoAF 
as the EA OPR for PR. They also requested that the capstone be aligned with current 
organizational and economic constraints broadly experienced by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces and address the needs of the personnel involved in PR.  
After consultations, sponsors agreed to the following design challenge: 
How can we design a PR system for the Norwegian Armed Forces to 
enable Norwegian commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel 
to collaborate and to operate in a PR mission environment during peace, 
crisis, and war? 
3. Design Constraints 
The biggest constraints to the design project have been the physical distance and 
the nine-hour time zone difference, both of which have challenged the traditional design 
team face-to-face configuration and caused me to act for the most part as the lead 
designer, responsible for coordinating input from the other design team members. 
4. The Norwegian Armed Forces Personal Recovery Network Design 
Thinking Process 
a. Discovery 
The discovery phase began with archival research on the PR system as the model 
is described today by the United States and NATO. The vast history of PR was examined 
from the perspectives of the individuals rescued, the rescue forces, and their 
organizations to demonstrate the strategic impact of PR. Research on PR policy and 
doctrine also provided valuable insights about PR’s evolution. The discussions and 
participant observations with the PR actors supplemented the archival research to provide 
a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian PR system. 
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b. Problem Definition 
This phase opens with a critique of the current PR system. It concludes with the 
reframed design challenge and offers questions to initiate ideation. 
c. Ideation 
Based on the results of the systems critique and problem definition, ideation 
generates new ideas on how we might go about restoring or redesigning the future 
Norwegian PR system. The ideas judged to have the most potential for stakeholders were 
selected. 
d. Prototyping 
The prototyping phase expanded on the initial ideas that were found the most 
prudent and developed them into viable options to consider for the stakeholders and PR 
change agents, with focus on specific options that would directly support the ongoing 
efforts of the RNoAF PR and SERE school in their efforts to develop a DOD-wide 
approach to PR  
e. Testing 
The low-resolution prototypes were “tested” with the design team and a limited 
number of Norwegian key PR actors; they were tested as to their viability, feasibility, and 
desirability in supporting the RNoAF OPR for PR’s continuing development of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces PR system. The prototype-testing phase is expected to continue 
from August to December 2016 as a sponsored project of the RNoAF EA PR. 
The next chapters guide the reader through a linear illustration of what has been a 
challenging and most non-linear real life process of design.  
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III. DISCOVERY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The discovery phase of the design thinking (DT) process utilized a mixture of 
archival research, discussions, and participant observations with the principal actors and 
stakeholders currently involved in PR. It involved what Neustadt and May call “thinking 
in time.”64 Neustadt and May argue that by looking back to the past, one can better 
understand the present and make better decisions today about the future.65 Thinking in 
time offers ways to use experience—both one’s own and that of hundreds of others from 
the historical past—to determine how best to make decisions now, in a real and imperfect 
world. By looking back to look forward, thinking in time enables insights about what can 
be accomplished in the future. Thinking in time is therefore “about how to use 
experience, whether remote or recent, in the process of deciding what to do today about 
the prospect for tomorrow.”66 In this manner, the discovery phase sought to identify and 
understand the experiences of people involved in PR from WWII to the present. Taken 
together, their experiences provide a thorough understanding of the human needs and 
desires that guide this DT project.67 
1. Overview of Sources 
Design thinking, especially in the initial discovery phase, calls for a human-
centered approach to design that explores the needs of the people involved in PR. In 
particular, I focused on isolated personnel who have had to survive, escape and evade the 
enemy, and in many cases endure captivity and resist interrogation when the rescue 
forces were not able to get them out of harm’s way. I also have sought insights from the 
                                                 
64 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-
Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986), xxii. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Appendix A lists all the literature used in the initial discovery phase in chronological order from 
WWII until the present day. By grouping the literature according to wars and operations with as many 
perspectives as possible, it was possible to recognize patterns and evolutions within the development of PR 
that serve as a solid foundation of knowledge and lessons from the past, thereby enabling progress toward 
building the future Norwegian PR system through the rest of the design thinking process. 
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wide variety of rescue forces involved in PR and when their perspectives were available, 
relied on the commentary of commanders and staffs of rescue operations. In addition to 
the education and training effort of PR forces, I explored their technology, organizational, 
and doctrinal descriptions as they evolved over time.68 
My exploration of the western PR archival records tapped into many sources. 
 I explored the current doctrinal view of PR from the perspective of the 
United States, NATO, and non-NATO nations to understand how the 
various nations describe and define PR and identify the key actors and 
stakeholders. 
 After identifying the key people and actors involved in PR, I read 
background material about their experiences from WWII to the present. 
 Additional explorations of key stakeholders in PR led me to understand 
the link between the development of the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) and the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), which highlighted PR’s strategic importance. 
 I then reviewed the historical record of PR doctrine and its evolution from 
WWII to the present. 
 Against the backdrop of western PR development, I then turned my focus 
to Norway’s PR history. 
 Based on the insights gained during these first five steps, I began to 
explore the connections between the current Norwegian PR actors. 
Ultimately, I came to understand their connections from a network 
perspective.  
After exploring PR archival records in depth, I turned to discussions and 
participant observations: 
 I held discussions with current participants engaged in PR from the 
RNoAF PR and SERE School, the Army SERE School, and the 
Norwegian Conduct after Capture training unit, and from the SOF 
community.  
 As a long time participant at various levels in the PR system, I also 
summarized my own experiences in PR. 
                                                 
68 An exhaustive chronological list of this literature is found in Appendix A. In addition to the 
education and training effort of these groups of people, technology, organizational, and doctrinal 
description and development are also examined as PR has evolved over time. 
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B. ARCHIVAL RECORDS 
1. Doctrinal Overview of PR: United States and NATO 
The core tasking of the capstone project is to design a PR system for the 
Norwegian Armed Forces that enables Norwegian isolated personnel, forces, and 
commanders and staffs to function in a PR mission not only within Norwegian territory 
but also as a part of a multinational coalition. Interoperability with coalition forces to 
solve a PR mission is critical to a successful outcome since Norway, as a small nation, 
has limited resources. Therefore, Norway must look to the larger nations and allies and 
adapt closely to a standard concept and model of PR. Most Norwegian military 
international operations will be under a NATO or a U.S.-led coalition of nations, as has 
been the case for the last two decades. When it comes to PR, the United States has been 
the leading nation, and NATO has carefully adopted its doctrine and aligned with the 
U.S. model. From WWII to the present day, the origins of PR that grew out of the British 
MI9, Military Intelligence Service–X (MIS–X), and Special Operations Executive (SOE) 
have been further developed by the United States through lessons learned in Korea, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, Somalia, Iraq, the Balkans, and the last decade of fighting in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The literature indicates that there has been a 
continuous innovation of PR, which seems to have shifted in cycle with the ongoing 
conflicts and the post-conflict force reductions and build-ups. 
As a baseline for the discussion on PR, this capstone looks at the development of 
the U.S. and NATO PR that could influence and drive the development of the Norwegian 
system. It recognizes the challenges, disadvantages, and advantages a small nation like 
Norway will face in building a sustainable PR system. The review of the current and 
historical literature on PR shows that the most mature PR system, not surprisingly, is the 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) PR system model. The latest DOD and NATO 
doctrine on PR are used as references to frame the evolution of PR.  
The U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-50 Personnel Recovery of December 20, 2011, 
defines PR as a system: 
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Personnel Recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to 
prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated 
personnel.69  
Isolated Personnel are those U.S. military, Department of Defense (DOD) 
civilians, and DOD contracted employees and others designated by the 
President or SecDef who are separated from their unit, as an individual or 
group, while participating in a U.S. sponsored military activity or mission 
and who are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, 
resist, or escape.70  
Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape consists of actions performed 
by isolated personnel designed to ensure their health, mobility, safety, and 
honor in anticipation of or preparation for their return to friendly control. 
Also called SERE.71  
In 2007, U.S. joint doctrine was updated for consistency with DOD policy on the 
joint PR system.72 The new JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery, January 5, 2007, consolidated 
relevant guidance: JP 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, January 26, 
1996; JP 3-50.21 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and 
Rescue, March 23, 1998; and JP 3-50.3 Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery, 
                                                 
69 UK definition: “The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or 
recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, 
missing, or isolated. JPR includes SAR, DSAR, CR, CSAR, Unconventional Assisted Recovery (i.e., 
hostage rescue) and associated Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Extraction (SERE) training, and Care 
After Recovery (CAR).” Ministry of Defence, Joint Personnel Recovery, JWP 3-66 (London: Ministry of 
Defence, 2003). 
70 The U.S. definition differs slightly from the NATO definition: “Military or civilian personnel who 
are separated from their unit or organization in a situation that may require them to survive, evade, resist 
exploitation, or escape while awaiting recovery.” 
71 The NATO definition is slightly different with an emphasis on extraction. “Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Extraction: Defines the set of tactics, techniques, and procedures that will give isolated 
personnel the tools to survive in any environment and to evade capture where such a threat exists. Failing 
that, to resist exploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to finally support their 
own or assisted recovery and return with dignity.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The NATO 
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) Training Standard (STANAG 7196 SD 05) 
(Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2014). 
72 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, iii. 
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September 6, 1996.73 The concept of addressing PR as a system is introduced in joint 
doctrine and further expanded on in JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery, December 20, 2011.74 
The 2002 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) -12, U.S. Citizens 
Taken Hostage Abroad and its Annex 1, U.S. Policy on Personnel Recovery and the 
Prevention of Hostage Taking and Other Isolating Events, provided presidential level 
guidance that expanded the PR responsibilities. It included all United States government 
(USG) department and agencies and created a whole of government approach to PR.75 
The NSPD-12 was replaced and revoked by the 2015 Presidential Policy Directive 
(PPD)-30, U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts.76 
The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) introduced the visual of the DOD 
Personnel Recovery System adopted by NATO.77 The JPRA PR system model serves as 
a framework for this capstone and is seen in Figure 11.78  
                                                 
73 Ibid. See also CJCS, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, JP 3-50.2 (Washington, DC: 
CJCS, 1996); CJCS, Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery, JP 3-50.3 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 1996); 
and CJCS, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue (JP 3-50.21) 
(Washington, DC: CJCS, 1998). 
74 CJCS, Personnel Recovery. 
75 George W. Bush, United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad, NSPD-12 (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2002); William J. Rowell, “Whole of Government Approach to Personnel Recovery” 
(master’s thesis, United States Army War College, 2012). 
76 Barack Obama, U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts, PPD-30 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2015); White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential 
Memorandum: Presidential Policy Directive—Hostage Recovery Activities,” The White House, June 24, 
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/presidential-policy-directive-hostage-
recovery-activities.  
77 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment, AJP-3.7, Edition 
A, Version 1 (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2016), 2-2. 
78 The DOD PR system model is explained in CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-3. NATO has introduced 
the same JPRA PR System Model with a slight modification to the SERE acronym where the last E for 
evasion is replaced by extraction. 
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“PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated personnel to duty, sustain 
morale, increase operational performance, and deny adversaries the opportunity to 
influence our military strategy and national will by exploiting the intelligence and 
propaganda value of isolated personnel. It is a system comprised of four functions: 
preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation.”79  
Figure 11.  PR System Model80 
 
Preparation Function. PR history illustrates that success in PR is far more likely if 
the people involved have received proper training on equipment, techniques, and 
procedures, and are organized and employed in a manner that enables a common 
operational picture and situational awareness. The key force elements involved in a PR 
mission are isolated personnel, rescue forces, and commanders and staffs. Each of these 
force elements must be equipped, trained, organized, and provided with sound doctrinal 
guidance to be able to execute the five PR execution tasks of report, locate, support, 
recover, and reintegrate.81 Depending on where an individual actor is located in the PR 
system, perspectives range from the strategic national, strategic theater, and operational 
levels to the tactical levels. Figure 12 illustrates the preparation function of the PR system 
model. 
 
                                                 
79 To maintain clarity in description, the exact description of PR found in CJCS, Personnel Recovery, 
I-2, is used to describe the model and each of its functions.  
80 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel.  
81 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-3–I-4. 
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“The system prepares three elements: commanders and staff, recovery forces, and 
isolated personnel, through education, training, and equipping to plan and execute PR.”82 
Figure 12.  PR System Preparation Function83 
 
Sound policy and doctrine are critical for PR as they provide guidance, direction, 
requirements and best practices, from the strategic national to the tactical levels. The 
evolution of PR policy and doctrine is further addressed in Chapter III. 
PR education and training supports the knowledge found in policy and doctrine 
and is aimed at providing isolated personnel, forces and commanders and staff with the 
“ability to take appropriate action in a given [PR] situation based on one’s knowledge, 
skills, physical capability, confidence, will, and courage.”84 
PR essential equipment enhances the isolated personnel’s SERE capacity and 
facilitates the five PR execution tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and 
reintegration.85 
                                                 
82 Ibid., I-2. 
83 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
84 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-3. 
85 Ibid., I-4.  
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Policy and doctrine, education and training, and proper equipment are aimed at 
providing isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staff with the ability to 
perform their responsibilities and interface effectively to accomplish the five PR 
execution tasks of report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate.86  
Planning Function. Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and their planners are 
expected to consider all available PR options when making their concept of operation 
(CONOP) for PR as part of their war planning.87 Based on an analysis of how the 
environment influences PR operations, and how the adversary can counter any friendly 
PR capability, a sound military PR plan can be laid out and coordinated with any 
diplomatic and civilian options available.88 Figure 13 illustrates the planning function of 
the PR system model. 
                                                 





“Planning and execution consider three recovery options: diplomatic, military, and civil 
across all phases of operation, and then it examines the capabilities within each of those 
options. Within the military option, there are five categories of capabilities that can be 
drawn upon: the isolated individual, component, joint, multinational forces, and other 
government departments and agencies.”89  
Figure 13.  PR System Planning Function90 
 
An example of a successful civil option can be found in the recovery of Black 
Hawk pilot CW3 Michael Durant during Operation Restore Hope (ORH) in Somalia 
1993. Michael Durant was captured after he was shot down on a U.S. Special Operations 
mission to arrest key members of warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed’s command 
structure. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) negotiated his release 
after the U.S. military rescue effort failed, costing 18 soldiers their lives and leaving 83 
wounded in total for the whole arrest and rescue operation.91 
An example of the diplomatic option can be seen in the solution to a detainee 
situation caused by a mid-air collision between an EP-3E maritime patrol aircraft and a 
Chinese fighter. The patrol aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing on China’s 
                                                 
89 Ibid., I-2. 
90 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
91 For the Michael Durant recovery efforts, see Bowden, Black Hawk Down, and Michael J. Durant, In 
the Company of Heroes (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2003). 
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Hainan Island. All 24 crewmembers were detained and later released after diplomatic 
negotiations.92 
An example of the military option ranges from the capabilities of the individual to 
self-recover,93 through the use of component, joint, multinational, or other government 
agencies (OGA) methods, as seen in Figure 14.  
 
The military options available for PR range from the individual to other government 
agencies and encompass all service methods into one concept of PR.94  
Figure 14.  PR Options, Capabilities, and Methods95 
 
                                                 
92 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-4. 
93 For two extraordinary accounts of individual self-recovery, see Chris Ryan, The One That Got Away 
(London: Century, 1955); and Astrid Karlsen Scott and Tore Haug, Defiant Courage: A WWII Epic of 
Escape and Endurance (New York: Skyhorse, 2010).  
94 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-4. 
95 Ibid. 
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CSAR,96 Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP),97 Search and 
Rescue (SAR),98 Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR),99 Retasking of Maneuver 
Forces,100 and Hostage Rescue (HR)101 all represent various methods available for PR by 
the different services and are encompassed by the PR system. 
Execution Function. When an isolating incident takes place, isolated personnel 
will have to execute applicable SERE tasks and attempt to evade the enemy, facilitate 
rescue by properly reporting the incident, providing an accurate location, receiving and 
utilizing support given, and finally accomplishing the tasks in the recovery phase before 
being reintegrated to the unit and family.102 
Figures 15–20 define the five execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and 
reintegrate. 
                                                 
96 For classic accounts of CSAR, see Whitcomb, Rescue of Bat 21; Ross W. Simpson, Stealth Down: 
The Loss of the First F-117 Stealth Fighter in Combat and the Dramatic Rescue of the Pilot (Charleston, 
SC: Narwhal Press, 2003); and CJCS, Personnel Recovery, E-1–F-6. 
97 For two successful TRAP missions conducted by the USMC, see Scott O’Grady and Michael 
French, Basher Five-Two: The True Story of F-16 Fighter Pilot Captain Scott O’Grady (New York: 
Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1997); and Lee Pera, Paul D. Miller, and Darrel Whitcomb, “Personnel Recovery: 
Strategic Importance and Impact,” Air & Space Power Journal (November-December 2012): 83–112. For 
doctrine on TRAP, see CJCS, Personnel Recovery, D-1–D-7. 
98 To appreciate the early development of Search and Rescue, see WWII tales of the RAF Air Sea 
Rescue Service in Jon Sutherland and Diane Canwell, The RAF Air Sea Rescue Service 1918–1986 
(Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005). For accounts of the United States Aerospace Rescue 
and Recovery Service in Vietnam, see L. B. Taylor, That Others May Live: The Aerospace Rescue and 
Recovery Service (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1967). 
99 For DOD NAR, see Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in 
the Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 2310.6 (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, October 13, 2000), 20. 
100 See United States Army Personnel Recovery in CJCS, Personnel Recovery, C-1–C-9. 
101 For examples of Hostage Rescue by JSOC, see Dilip Joseph and James Lund, Kidnapped by the 
Taliban: A Story of Terror, Hope, and Rescue by Seal Team Six (Nashville: W Publishing Group, 2014); 
and Richard Phillips and Stephan Talty, A Captain’s Duty: Somali Pirates, Navy SEALs, and Dangerous 
Days at Sea (New York: Hyperion, 2010). For their British counterpart, the SAS, see Will Fowler, Certain 
Death in Sierra Leone: The SAS and Operation Barras 2000 (Oxford: Osprey, 2000). 
102 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-8–I-9. 
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“Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, 
achieve economy of force, and enhance situational awareness (SA) to enable those most 
capable of executing the five PR execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and 
reintegrate. To perform these tasks requires an organization fully networked to respond to 
an isolating event. The system addresses the debriefing and care of recovered personnel 
through the reintegration process.”103  
Figure 15.  PR System Execution Function104 
  
                                                 
103 Ibid., I-2. 
104 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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“The report task begins with the recognition of an isolation event and ends when 
appropriate C2 authorities are informed.”105 
Figure 16.  PR System Report Task106 
                                                 
105 Ibid., VI-I. 
106 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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“The locate task involves the effort taken to precisely find and authenticate isolated 
personnel. It starts upon recognition of an isolation event and continues until the isolated 
person is recovered. An accurate location and positive authentication are normally 
required prior to committing recovery forces.”107 
Figure 17.  PR System Locate Task108 
                                                 
107 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, VI-5. 
108 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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“The support task involves providing support to both the isolated person and to the 
isolated person’s family, with specific objectives for each. The forces used to support the 
isolated personnel should know the objectives and be capable of executing the TTP to 
achieve them. Decision makers should properly assess and mitigate risks in order to 
successfully execute the support task.”109 
Figure 18.  PR System Support Task110 
                                                 
109 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, VI-14. 
110 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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“The recover task involves the coordinated actions and efforts of commanders and staffs, 
forces, and isolated personnel to bring isolated personnel under the physical custody of a 
friendly organization. The recover task begins with the launch or redirection of forces or 
the engagement of diplomatic or civil processes, and ends when the recovery element 
hands off the formerly isolated person to the reintegration team. The recover task is 
accomplished through PR operation and mission planning, and individual and synergistic 
actions of commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. Operational flexibility 
and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. No single 
recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all 
requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional 
and nonconventional recovery capabilities should be available for employment. Failure to 
establish and test multiple recovery capabilities or to adapt standardized recovery 
capabilities to local conditions invites failure. The decision-making process, established 
early during planning and preparation, will greatly assist decision makers and PR mission 
coordinators to launch and execute a timely and successful recovery effort.”111 
Figure 19.  PR System Recover Task112 
                                                 
111 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, VI-16–VI-17. 
112 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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“Reintegrate is a critical task that allows DOD to gather necessary intelligence and SERE 
information while coordinating multiple activities and protecting the health and well-
being of returned isolated personnel. In their planning, CCDRs establish a reintegration 
process, to include locations, teams, and responsibilities. The reintegration process should 
also be included in combatant command PR directives. Two key components of this 
process are qualified SERE and intelligence debriefers who gather information from 
recovered isolated personnel and SERE psychologists and others who assist the recovered 
isolated personnel to decompress and reintegrate to their unit, family, and society.”113 
Figure 20.  PR System Reintegrate Task114 
  
                                                 
113 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, VI-29  
114 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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a. Isolated Personnel SERE Skills 
An isolated person’s ability to perform SERE skills is essential in the execution 
phase as it complements the five execution tasks. The isolated personnel must be able to 
survive the environment, the threat, and the theater.115  
Surviving the environment includes basic land and maritime survival and the use 
of survival equipment. To survive the threat means that the isolated personnel must be 
able to evade a hostile force, survive in captivity as a POW or as a hostage if captured, 
resist exploitation, including interrogation, escape captivity if possible and prepare for 
extraction by recovery forces.116 To survive the theater includes specific theater training 
based on the area of operation that includes understanding of the geography, cultural 
aspects, topography and climate, and the motives and modus operandi of hostile elements 
that may force captivity on individuals.117  
The level of SERE training the isolated personnel receive depends on their risk of 
capture and ranges from only theoretical training, labeled SERE level-A; a combination 
of theoretical and practical training, labeled SERE level-B; to the advanced level-C that 
includes the SERE-A and B-level training in a realistic field exercise simulating the 
combat environment in which personnel are likely to find themselves. These SERE 
training levels also require constant updating to include theater specific, pre-deployment 
training. 
The Adaptation Function and Risk Mitigation. The last element of the PR system 
is the mitigation of risk. It speaks to future PR preparation, planning, and execution 
functions and the need to make the necessary changes as seen in Figure 21.118  
                                                 
115 SERE “defines the set of tactics, techniques, and procedures that will give Isolated Personnel the 
tools to survive in any environment and to evade capture where such a threat exists. Failing that, to resist 
exploitation by captors and, if the situation permits, escape captivity to finally support their own or assisted 
recovery and return with dignity.” NATO, NATO Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) 
Training, 2.  
116 NATO, NATO Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) Training, 4. 
117 Ibid., 4. 
118 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-10. 
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“The entire system continually improves and learns from its mistakes and successes 
through adaptation.”119  
Figure 21.  PR System Adaptation Function120 
 
The PR system is visualized as a linear model, but as JP 3-50 states, the four 
functions can all happen at once or in any sequence.  
Although the functions are presented in the apparent sequential order of 
preparation, planning, execution, and adaptation, it is important to 
understand that these functions can occur simultaneously or in any 
sequence. The PR system is iterative and the individual activities are 
interdependent; a change occurring in one function can affect what is 
happening in the other three. The functions are not discrete steps, but 
rather activities that continuously interact with one another and adjust or 
adapt to maintain a relevant and effective system.121 
2. The History of Personnel Recovery 
This section on the historical perspective and development of PR from early ideas 
and efforts is limited to the span from the beginning of WWII and until the present day, 
including the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The historical review revealed insights 
on how PR as an idea has developed, been retained, or forgotten, and how military 
innovations in technology have influenced PR doctrine and organizations.  
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a. WWII  
Escape and Evasion (E&E) did not orginate in WWII, but the technological 
innovation of the airplane used by the Allies during WWII resulted in high numbers of 
aircrews downed behind enemy lines. SOF and agents of the SOE122 and the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS)123 were also inserted behind enemy lines and shared a common 
interest in being able to escape and evade if needed. As a result of their missions behind 
enemy lines, both SOF and aircrews since have had the incentive to develop a PR 
capability and both have been the predominant users of it. 
Even if isolated personnel have been forced to escape and evade through all 
military history, WWII generated a formidable rise in numbers of isolated personnel 
behind enemy lines. The consequence of this rise in numbers was unprecedented 
innovation regarding PR covering doctrine,124 organization,125 and technology.126 Two 
secret organizations were created to prepare personnel for escape and evasion and to 
organize escape networks: the British MI9 and the American MIS-X.127 Additional Air 
Sea Rescue units128 performed critical over-water rescues of Allied pilots in the English 
Channel, the Mediterranean Ocean, and the American areas of operation in the Pacific 
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Ocean. The aim of MI9 and MIS-X was to “educate and train” high risk personnel in the 
art of survival, escape, and evasion and “conduct after capture.”129 The head of MI9 also 
believed that the pain and suffering of POWs and evaders would be lessened by the 
knowledge that there were a distant staff that cared intensely about them and worked hard 
for their cause.130  
Thanks to feedback from returning survivors, innovations in equipment to survive 
a shoot down included the use of parachutes,131 flotation devices to prevent drowning, 
and survival tools for all climates and situations. Aircrew survivors of isolating events 
created official and unofficial clubs to recognize the success of their struggles and boost 
morale for the rest of the flying force.132 Early efforts of “reintegration” were conducted 
through the medical treatment of pilots with severe burns, called “Guinea pigs.”133 MI9 
also conducted extensive E&E debriefing of returning aircrew who had escaped from 
behind enemy lines and integrated their knowledge in future aircrew “SERE” 
briefings.134 
At the end of the war, the official account of MI9 estimates the total numbers of 
people returning to friendly lines by the effort of the networks to be a total of 35,190.135 
The importance of having a competent PR organization led by highly qualified 
commanders and the staff is emphasized, and a PR organization to back them up is 
highlighted by the authors of MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939–1945. 
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Anyone who has to embark on such an adventure will be lucky if he has a 
staff to back him in secret that is in hands a tenth as capable as Norman 
Crockatt’s.136 
Our greatest debt, which we owe jointly with the rest of the free world, is 
almost too large to fit into print. It is owed not only to those who 
attempted escapes and evasion, and thus made the Axis powers’ attempt to 
control the world more troublesome to the Axis; but also to those 
uncounted thousands of people, ordinary in appearance, extraordinary in 
courage and devotion, who made the work of the escape networks 
feasible. They were of many nationalities, of all ages; of both sexes, of all 
classes; rich and poor, learned and plain, Christian and Jew, Marxist and 
mystic. Without the work they did, for which a large proportion of them 
paid with their lives, the world today would be a meaner place, and we 
write this book lest they be quite forgotten.137  
The high number of people in need of PR during WWII led to a rapid advance in 
technology, organization, and PR doctrine to assist the reintegration to friendly forces and 
to mitigate the risk of PR operations. To prepare the allied forces for PR, policy was put 
in place to direct the establishment of MI9 and MIS-X to secretly educate and train high-
risk personnel in the art of Escape and Evasion. Both UK and US Air Sea Rescue units 
were increased in numbers, and improved doctrine for their use was developed. MI9 
initially educated and trained most aircrew, commandos, and SOE agents on E&E topics, 
but the increased need for briefings and numbers of people that required their training led 
to the development of the MI9 “B-Course” to expand local instructor capability.138 Both 
equipment needed for pure survival in the different climates of the world and escape and 
evasion aids were continuously developed. The planning for recovery of own personnel 
increased and led to pre-staging of rescue units and development of escape networks in 
France. The execution of recovery options was primarily done by the Air Sea Rescue 
units and the different escape and evasion networks. A few evaders were also evacuated 
by the same airplanes that inserted SOE agents into France, by the SOE “Shetlands Bus” 
operating in and out of Norway, and by rescue operations conducted by OSS nits like the 
Long Range Desert Group (LRDG). Numerous people also managed to survive, escape, 
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and evade back to friendly lines on their own. MI9 and MIS-X debriefings of thousands 
of rescued personnel made it possible for planners to adapt continuously and improve the 
PR efforts of preparation, planning, and execution of PR operations.139 To sum it up, the 
United States began WWII with hardly any PR capability and ended the war with a 
robust and dedicated capability in the Navy rescue squadrons and the Army Air Force 
emergency rescue squadrons. After the war, the same capabilities disappeared under 
massive cutbacks, and the combat part of rescue was deleted from the ERS portfolio as 
the nuclear scenarios that quickly developed did not leave any room for combat 
rescue.140 
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b. End of WWII to Korea and Vietnam  
After the war, MI9 was succeeded by an interservice that had both an intelligence 
capacity and a rescue capability in the Intelligence Corps and the Special Air Service 
(SAS).141 The United States MIS-X was disbanded, and the OSS developed into the 
current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and led to the initial Special Forces Groups 
(SFG).142  
In addition to the Air Sea Rescue capability already developed by the Allies in 
WWII, the need for an overland capability became apparent. The introduction of the new 
technology of the helicopter became the option to rescue personnel behind enemy lines. 
When the Korean War broke out, the helicopter became a crucial tool in the PR game. 
Still limited to daytime rescues, all services deployed and improved their tactics, 
techniques, and procedures through hard lessons learned during the Korean War. Despite 
the heavy losses, the USMC, USN, and the USAF conducted a total of 737 rescues, 203 
which were behind enemy lines, 282 from disputed waters, and 252 “benign” rescues.143  
Lessons learned from these events stressed the importance of proper reporting of 
an incident, accurately locating the survivors, and the need for fixed-wing aircraft Rescue 
Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) to support and protect the vulnerable helicopters. The need 
for appropriate authenticating of downed aircrew led to the development of individual 
authentication procedures. The lessons learned in Korea would unfortunately be relearned 
in the next major conflict in Southeast Asia. The Korean War did, however, result in 
more robust and dedicated rescue capability and CSAR development during the U.S. 
engagement from 1961–1975.144 
The Vietnam War resulted in vastly improved joint command and control over the 
rescue efforts and standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and 
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communications between survivors and rescue forces. In January 1966, the Air Rescue 
Service became the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group (ARRG)145 and was a 
significant organizational change to improve joint rescue efforts. In the summer of 1967, 
several fundamental changes would shape combat rescue: improved protection of 
helicopters by outfitting them with machine guns; in-flight refueling capability; and the 
arrival of the HH-53 helicopter.146 For a thorough understanding of the PR capability 
evolution, the rescues of “Bat 21” and “Streetcar 304” can serve as two examples. “Bat 
21” was shot down during a massive North Vietnamese offensive, and the following 12 
days of rescue efforts and sacrifice by the involved forces paint a vivid picture of the 
efforts of all actors. “Streetcar 304” was a 40 hour long rescue where the Air Force flew 
189 sorties to rescue a Navy A-7 pilot.147 At the end of the Vietnam War, as the Joint 
Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) closed in 1975, more than two-thirds of the 4,120 
isolated personnel had been rescued.148 
c. Desert Storm 1991 
During Operation Desert Storm, the majority of rescue missions were performed 
by SOF since the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) was not yet ready for 
the wartime mission of CSAR.149 SOF forces had better training equipment and readiness 
as a result of the lessons learned from Operation Eagle Claw. SOF did not have the 
CSAR mission as a primary mission, but they were the ones providing the best capability 
and the best option for the Joint Force Commander (JFC). During the 43-day short war, 
the USAF Central Command (USCENTAF) Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) 
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log shows 20 missions attempted. Overall, the coalition lost 43 aircraft and 87 
crewmembers (49 were killed, 38 survived the shootdown, eight were rescued, and 38 
became POWs).150 Of those who became POWs, an analysis shows that eight of those 
were rescuable and did not face immediate capture by Saddam Hussein’s ground 
forces.151 In his book Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm, Darrel D. Whitcomb 
provides an in-depth analysis of the conflict and provides the following concluding 
highlights.152 First, the area of operations was challenging for CSAR as it was barren 
with no place to hide, isolated personnel faced a hostile population, and enemy air 
defenses were lethal. Second, the best CSAR strategy is still not to be shot down. Third, 
the Air Force CSAR capability was low; its CSAR helicopters, the HH-53, were 
transferred to SOF, and the remaining HH-3 were not suitable for the high threat area. 
Fourth, CSAR expectations were high among aircrews based on the history from 
Vietnam. Fifth, the failed rescue of an F-15E crew early on took a toll on morale within 
the F-15 E community. Sixth, the capability for accurately locating and discreetly talking 
to downed aircrew was lacking. Despite the difficulties, SOF conducted numerous joint 
CSAR missions, as well as SAR. SOF aircraft were never “not available.” Leaving 
CENTAF responsible for CSAR without control over necessary rescue assets violated 
unity of command.153  
Overall, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the fact that PR is a joint mission 
and that, in a denied area, the importance of a precise location of isolated personnel is 
crucial. GPS systems were just becoming available but not all had access, and the Air 
Force still had the old handheld PRC-90 radios with two fixed international known 
frequencies.154 In their chronicle of nearly 100 years of rescues, Galdorisi and Phillips 
highlight the status of CSAR in Desert Storm. “Doctrine was theoretically solid, and 
technology was blooming, but the rescue structure just was not there to properly support 
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the commanders in executing the doctrine with aggressive but practical audacity. More 
rescues could have happened within acceptable risk to rescue personnel.”155 
In 2008, Galdorisi and Phillips summed up their chronicle of CSAR history with 
the following statement and questions: 
The United States now seems to be confronted with an entirely new 
situation where the importance of one prisoner as a propaganda pawn 
outweighs the sum of prisoners from previous wars. … Now, any one 
prisoner, military or civilian, can be that dreaded publicity nightmare, 
beheaded by hooded fanatics bereft of humanity. … In the GWOT, can 
America any more suffer the loss of even one potential rescuable, isolated 
person killed and hung from a bridge or dragged through the streets, or 
captured because rescuers can’t get them in time? … From the traditional 
and honored justification for CSAR because of the worth of men, the 
argument has transitioned to the increasing importance of a single man, 
military or civilian, in the unnatural barbarity the world now faces. Dare 
we leave even one man behind?156  
3. The Strategic Impact of Personnel Recovery 
PR is not only important to the most obvious stakeholder, the isolated personnel 
with friends and family, but tactical PR events can quickly become a matter of strategic 
importance and national interest. One historical example is the importance of rescuing 
enough fighter pilots from the English Channel that they could continue the Battle of 
Britain during a critical phase of WWII. Another examples is the potential political and 
social effects of the current fight against ISIS who, by burning a Jordanian pilot to death 
and by spreading their well-rehearsed propaganda video of this grusome act on global 
social networks, can create fear among participating coalition nations, while at the same 
time boosting their own recruitment of foreign fighters to their cause. 
Archival records illustrates the strategic importance of PR. This section highlights 
two themes that support this notion. First, failed United States strategic PR events have 
led to the development of highly capable military units like the Joint Special Operations 
Command, USSOCOM, and similar international units as tools for a nation’s strategic 
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leadership. Such units have been proven to have valuable response capabilities for 
recovering isolated personnel in peacetime, crisis, and war. Second, the enemy often has 
tried to influence the will of an opponent by exploiting captured personnel as propaganda, 
using human shields on important targets, exploiting hostages in negotiations, and 
threatening severe harm or death to anyone captured.  
The Son Tay raid, the Mayaguez incident, and Operation Eagle Claw, pictured in 
Figure 22, highlight the strategic impact of PR and the stakes involved for national 
leadership.  
 
Figure 22.  The Strategic Impact of PR157 
 
a. The Son Tay Raid 
Approved by President Nixon, and executed on November 20–21, 1970, by U.S. 
special operators from the Army Green Berets and Air Force Special Operations, the 
operation aimed to rescue about 70 POWs inside Son Tay prison close to Hanoi, 
Vietnam.158 The camp was located in the most heavily defended area of the country and 
required meticulous planning and precise execution. The operators had prepared and 
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rehearsed the mission more than 170 times. Although flawlessly executed, the mission 
was too late. The POWs had been moved, although when they learned about the attempt, 
they found great strength and support in the effort, as they understood their government 
had not forgotten them. Because of the raid, North Vietnamese shifted from keeping 
POWs in camps scattered all over the country to keeping most of the POWs in the Hanoi 
Hoa Lo Prison, which did have an advantage: 
Occupants for the first time consequently could converse, care for each 
other, hold church services, and occupy endless hours with educational 
classes that included math, foreign languages, even culinary arts. Those 
improvements immeasurably boosted morale and, in some cases, 
preserved sanity until freedom finally arrived two years later.159 
The Son Tay raid had a strategic effect even though it failed in its immediate goal 
of rescuing the POWs, as the efforts and capability displayed in the attempt sent a 
strategic message: 
The raid received well-deserved publicity. The world learned that 
American soldiers were not pushovers—they continued to resist their 
captors in spite of inhumane treatment and torture. It also served notice to 
those who would hold U.S. soldiers in captivity in future conflicts that 
they could not dismiss the likelihood of a daring rescue of American 
prisoner by their dedicated comrades.160 
b. The Mayaguez Incident  
The Mayaguez incident at the very end of the Vietnam War further illustrates the 
challenges of command and control and the need to act on a short notice. It started with 
the seizure of an American merchant vessel, the Mayaguez, off the Cambodian coast by 
the Khmer Rouge. President Gerald Ford ordered military intervention, and within three 
days the crew were recovered, but not without loss of life to the rescue forces.161 The 
quick response to the incident was most likely influenced by the 1969 North Korean 
capture of the Navy Intelligence ship USS Pueblo, which was a humiliating experience 
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for the United States.162 It took 11 months of negotiation, a U.S. expression of “regret” 
for the Pueblo’s activities, and the ship’s seizure when the crew was released.163 To 
prevent a new Pueblo incident, both the administration and President Ford felt a great 
need to act in the Mayaguez incident.164  
A short time after the Mayaguez was captured, the U.S. Air Force sank Khmer 
Rouge patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam, and U.S. Marines invaded Cambodian territory 
with a beachhead on the island of Koh-Tang. The Marines engaged in a 14-hour-long battle 
before disengaging. Other Marines boarded and recaptured the Mayaguez, while the Navy 
bombed targets on the mainland of Cambodia.165 What made this operation different from 
previous operations was the new technology of worldwide communication that enabled 
national leaders to have immediate control of military forces globally.166 “This capability, 
coupled with sophisticated methods of technical intelligence gathering and analysis (made) 
possible the precise management of military forces under tight control from the top.”167 As 
Guilmartin highlights, however, this capability is a double-edged sword as “no amount of 
communication can replace a competent and responsible commander on scene.”168 The 
tactical fiasco reduced the strategic merits of the operation.169 The recovery of the ship’s 
crew “obscured the fact that eighteen Americans died landing at the wrong location to 
rescue prisoners the Cambodians had already decided to free.”170 Guilmartin makes a point 
of the inability to learn from the event and states: 
In fact, serious errors were made within the military command structure, 
but no service had a monopoly on them, and there was plenty of 
embarrassment to go around. The net result was silence, which is 
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unfortunate because there was a great deal to be learned from these 
operations.171 
To sum it up, the national leadership was in a hurry to resolve the incident. Lured 
by the technology that enabled detailed command and control of the involved forces, they 
rushed to solve the problem without a joint force that could keep up with the speed of the 
operation, which resulted in loss of life. Vice Admiral Steele commented on the price of 
such haste: “I just feel those men died in vain. … It was just a terrible rush to get it 
done.”172 
c. Operation Eagle Claw 
The command and control challenges that interservice units experienced in the 
Mayaguez incident surfaced in the next strategic PR event in April 1980. The Iranian 
hostage taking of the U.S. embassy personnel in Iran and the following rescue attempt 
ended in a desert debacle with a smoking wreckage and an aborted mission. Even with 
the highly trained Delta Force as the ground assault force, the operation demanded a true 
interservice trained force. The interservice training had been superficial and as the 
operation launched, they quickly ran short of assets, as several helicopters had to abort en 
route. When eight men died in a crash between a hovering helicopter and a C-130 at the 
first staging area, Desert One, the failure was complete.173  
Lucien S. Vandenbroucke summarizes the Son Tay raid, the Mayaguez incident, 
and Operation Eagle Claw and concludes that: 
Recurrent problems have plagued U.S. strategic special operations. Faulty 
intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation and 
coordination, provisions of inadequate advice to decision makers, wishful 
thinking, and overcontrol of mission execution by officials far removed 
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from the theatre of operations have repeatedly jeopardized the ability of 
the United States to conduct such missions successfully.174 
For President Carter, the failure was a military, diplomatic, and political fiasco, and his 
national approval ratings dropped from 75 percent to 20 percent during the hostage 
ordeal.175 
The series of events and their failures were two major reasons why JSOC and 
USSOCOM would rise out of the ashes of Desert One.176 The debacle in the desert 
would be a “defining moment for the American people and Special Operations.”177 As 
General Sam Wilson states, “That crushing failure at Desert One and its consequences 
told everyone, despite the enormous talent we had, we hadn’t put it together right and 
something had to be done.”178 
In addition to Desert One, the invasion of Grenada highlighted the need for SOF 
service components to talk to each other as a joint force. As a result of a long and hard 
process and the work done by senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn as the driving 
forces in the legislature, the “U.S. Special Operations Command was formed April 16, 
1987, with special responsibility to organize, train, and equip U.S. SOF from the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force.”179 
NATO nations have also developed similar hostage rescue units to respond 
rapidly to PR incidents, with units like the German Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9),180 
British SAS,181 and the Norwegian FSK for the most difficult or political sensitive 
missions.  
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A country’s capability to rescue its own personnel and prevent exploitation by the 
enemy have been important in every major operation. Successful recoveries have boosted 
morale as successful rescues like “Basher-52,”182 “Hammer-34,” and “Vega-31”183 in the 
Balkans during the 1990s. If they had failed, one could have experienced strategic 
political effects like the ones created by the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia 
1993.184 Figure 23 depicts news accounts of several of these personnel recovery attempts. 
 
From left to right, British Tornado pilot POW displayed on television by Saddam Hussein 
during Desert Storm 1991; Mike Durant, the captured pilot of the Black Hawk Down 
incident in 1993; Scott O’Grady after his recue by the USMC; Jessica Lynch after the 
JSOC rescue; and the ISIS magazine Dabiq that featured the graphic display of the 
burning of the captured Jordanian pilot in Syria.  
Figure 23.  PR Propaganda185  
 
In sum, the stakeholders in PR are diverse and range from the tactical, the IP and 
his family colleagues and friends, to the strategic national leadership and society. PR 
events have the potential to influence a nation’s will to pursue its national interest as well 
as its will to fight. The benefit of PR then is not just about recovering “tactical and 
valuable assets” but also to prevent or mitigate the costs to national interest, the will to 
fight, and the society’s support of the government.  
                                                 
182 O’Grady and French, Basher Five-Two. 
183 Simpson, Stealth Down. 
184 For the strategic importance and impact of PR, see Pera, Miller, and Whitcomb, “Personnel 
Recovery.  
185 Figure composed of images from Daily Mail (Nichols); Time magazine (Durant, June 14, 2013; 
O’Grady, June 19, 1995; People magazine (Lynch, April 21, 2003); and Dabiq magazine (Jordanian pilot, 
issue no. 7). 
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4. The Evolution of Personnel Recovery Doctrine 
This very brief section illustrates the PR system through a doctrinal lens that 
provides PR guidance to isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staffs. To put 
doctrine in context, the following definitions are needed: 
National policy is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of 
guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of 
national objectives.”186 
Doctrine is “fundamental principles by which the military forces or 
elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgment in application.”187  
Joint doctrine consists of “fundamental principles that guide the 
employment of the United States military forces in coordinated action 
toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, 
and procedures.”188 
Figure 24 illustrates doctrinal hierarchy from the individual to the strategic level, 
while Figure 25 illustrates the actual timeline, beginning in WWII, and visualizes the 
development of PR doctrine from the individual level through service component, joint 
doctrine, DOD directives and instructions, and all the way up to the presidential level and 
a whole of government approach to PR.  
                                                 






Figure 24.  PR Doctrine Hierarchy189 
 
Figure 25.  Timeline of the Evolution of PR Doctrine190 
 
                                                 
189 Dorl, “Personnel Recovery and the DOTMLPF Changes Needed,” 27. 
190 Figure created by the author. 
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In sum to understand policy and doctrine in greater depth, the reader should 
consult Appendix F, which traces the doctrinal evolution from WWII, from the individual 
to the strategic level, from the IP to the president of the United States. It also includes a 
brief overview of the evolution of NATO’s PR doctrine.  
5. The Evolution of Norwegian Personnel Recovery  
a. WWII–1989  
The evolution of the Norwegian PR system had its origins in WWII when 
Norwegian pilots and SOF, operating from bases in Britain, were at risk of capture by the 
enemy. Therefore, pilots and SOF had a need for training that would prepare them for 
survival, escape, and evasion, to resist interrogation and survive captivity. Training and 
equipment were provided by the British Escape and Evasion organization, MI9, and their 
instructor organization. Inspiring tales of Norwegians’ exposure to difficult survival 
situations, escape, and evasion and rescue efforts can be found in well-known books like 
The Heavy Water Raid, We Die Alone, and The Shetland Bus.191  
After WWII and through the Cold War, the MI9 concept of organizing secret 
Escape and Evasion networks were adopted by Norway. The WWII practice continued as 
a secret Stay Behind (SB) organization was run by the Norwegian intelligence service as 
part of a greater NATO effort to prepare for a potential evacuation of government 
officials and the return of downed Allied pilots in Norway and Europe.192 The SB 
organization was secret and not known to most of the Norwegian pilots who would be the 
users of the network. The education and training in Personnel Recovery for pilots and 
SOF were limited to and focused on individual survival skills and the ability to escape 
and evade in Norway among a friendly population.193 
The evolution of Personnel Recovery in Norway would not change much until the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. In general, NATO member nations 
                                                 
191 For the Norwegian stories, see Howarth, Shetland Bus; David Howarth, We Die Alone: A WWII 
Epic of Escape and Endurance (Guilford, CT: The Lyon Press, 1999), and Jens-Anton Poulsson, The 
Heavy Water Raid: The Raid for the Atom Bomb 1942-1944 (Oslo: Orion Forlag, 2009). 
192 Riste, “With an Eye to History.” 
193 Author’s discussions with former Norwegian military pilots on their PR education and training. 
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would be increasingly involved in expeditionary operations. Instead of fighting on a 
home turf with a friendly population, the focus shifted to conflicts abroad where one 
could expect a more hostile population. During Desert Storm, the images of badly treated 
pilots and SOF displayed on television by Saddam Hussein triggered a shift in training 
from individual survival in a well-known homeland environment to one of combat 
survival in a foreign theater where the ability to quickly communicate your position to 
rescue forces and facilitate a quick rescue became necessary.194  
b. 1991–2001  
The RNoAF’s participation in numerous operations in the Balkans highlighted the 
need for a change in training for its aircrews. Norwegian Bell-412 helicopters deployed to 
Bosnia from 1993–1996, and Norwegian F-16s participated in Operation Allied Force 
(OAF) in 1999. Norwegian Special Forces also deployed to the Balkans, as well as 
conventional forces. The nature of the conflict changed the traditional view on who was 
at risk and who would need combat survival training, as there was no longer a traditional 
forward line of own troops (FLOT). The scenario changed from one where only aircrew 
and SOF operated far beyond own lines in enemy territory and, therefore, were the ones 
who risked capture if shot down or compromised by the enemy. The new scenario 
exposed an increased number the conventional forces as well, since there the battlespace 
was less linear and more intermingled.  
c. 2001–2011  
The next distinct shift in operations and focus on CSAR came as a result of the 
9/11 attacks and the following decade of operations in Afghanistan. Norwegian SOF 
became a part of Operation Enduring Freedom from the beginning in late 2001 and since 
then have had an almost continuous presence in Afghanistan. The RNoAF deployed F-
16s in 2002–2003, and again in 2006. Norwegian C-130 transport aircraft participated in 
                                                 
194 For an account of aircrew and special operations forces who experienced capture and becoming 
prisoners of Saddam Hussein’s forces in 1991, see Andy McNab, Bravo Two Zero (London: Bantam Press, 
1993); and John Peters and John Nichol, Tornado Down (London: Signet, 1993). These stories coincided 
with Norwegian instructors participating in a combat survival instructor course held by the 22 SAS in the 
UK, which contributed to a momentum in changing the training from survival to combat survival starting in 
1995. 
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2002 and later deployed to Mazar-e-Sharif in 2012–2013. Bell-412 helicopters deployed 
to Maymaneh in 2008 and remained there until 2012. Conventional forces from the 
Norwegian Armed Forces also deployed several times throughout the Afghanistan 
campaign. The continuous, intermittent operations in Afghanistan have increased the 
awareness of the requirement for PR-educated and -trained personnel. The Afghanistan 
campaign also has increased the notion that PR education and training should extend not 
only to the individual, but must include commanders and staff, as well as the various 
forces’ capabilities to support PR.  
d. 2011–2016 
Coinciding with the war in Libya in 2011, U.S. and NATO PR organizations 
highlighted the need for education of commanders and staff on PR. After the initial 
campaign Odyssey Dawn led by the United States, the NATO alliance and its member 
nations became responsible for PR, as NATO continued the campaign as Unified 
Protector. Norwegian and NATO education on PR started to perceive PR as a system in 
which no single organization or unit, on its own, would have all the required PR assets. It 
became clear that the various forces in the operations area would have to take more 
responsibility for PR, depending on their inherent capabilities, not as a dedicated force, 
but as one that was capable of supporting PR. 
The emphasis on the role of commanders and staff in PR has started to change, 
probably coinciding with the fact that the bottom up–driven education of individuals, 
who now have reached squadron-level and unit-level command, has introduced greater 
knowledge and experience on PR into more of the leadership levels in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces. In 2014, the chief of defense also moved the responsibility for PR from 
the individual services to one where the RNoAF is now the Executive Agent Office of 
Primary Responsibility for PR in the Norwegian Armed Forces and has the authority to 
develop the overarching policy and doctrine for PR. 
In sum, Personnel Recovery has evolved from WWII until the present by a slow 
bottom up–driven education of the individual pilot or SOF operator to one where the rest 
of the military also recognizes the need for some level of PR training. Commanders and 
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staff have become more involved as they have been exposed to PR requirements, 
especially since the Afghanistan campaign started. Various forces that have the capability 
to support PR have begun to recognize this reality, as there are fewer dedicated PR forces 
available, and the burden must be shared. The establishment of the RNoAF as the EA 
OPR and the development of Norwegian PR policy documents and regulations will 
further establish and bring forward commanders and staffs’ responsibilities for more than 
just survival training of the individual. 
The trigger for change on Norwegian PR has been the establishment of the 
RNoAF as the EA OPR. The purpose of this Capstone is to support the development of 
PR as a whole of the Norwegian DOD approach. 
C. DESCRIBING THE NORWEGIAN PR SYSTEM AS A NETWORK  
The archival data has provided an overview of current U.S. and NATO PR doctrine, 
the history of PR, the evolution of PR doctrine, and an overview of Norwegian PR.  
As a result of synthesizing all this data, an important theme has emerged. 
Although PR is viewed in systems terms, there are no visuals that capture the system as a 
network. As JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery explained:  
The ability to complete all these tasks cannot be found in one single entity 
but requires an organization fully networked to respond to an isolating 
event as commanders and staff are involved at various levels of command 
and the forces required might be drawn from different units, services, joint 
assets or multinational coalition partners.195 
Therefore, I decided to view Norwegian PR using a network lens. 
The language and concepts I use to describe and analyze what I am calling the 
Norwegian PR Network (NPRN) are drawn from the writings of Patti Anklam196 and Dr. 
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Nancy Roberts’s Network Design course at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). I also 
employ Roberts’s Network Design Framework to describe and analyze the network.197 
The data used in creating the “Norwegian Armed Forces Personnel Recovery 
Network” was drawn from the author’s study of the current working relationships among 
organizations currently engaged in PR as of June 2015.198 A rough sketch of the 
relationships is found in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26.  Norwegian PR System Links as of June 2015199 
 
To help synthesize all of the data collected from the archival records and 
reframing it as a network, I am using Roberts’s Network Design Framework, which is 
shown in Figure 27.  
                                                 
197 Nancy Roberts, “Robert’s Network Design Framework” (PowerPoint presentation, Network 
Design course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2015). 
198 For any social network analyst, the data used represent all the actors that have ties, without 
necessarily answering the organizational analyst’s question of whether the actors recognize that they are 
participating in the network, or if they are committed to operating as a network and building an institutional 
basis for the network. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2001), 319; and Anne Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 33. 
199 Figure created by the author. 
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Figure 27.  Roberts’s Network Design Framework200 
 
a. The NPRN General Environment 
The external environment in which the NPRN network organization is embedded 
can be thought of as two distinctly different environments. Most of the time, the NPRN 
operates in a peacetime environment in Norway, where education and training of the 
various actors in the NPRN are the main efforts. The second environment, where lives are 
at risk, is the crisis or wartime environment where the NPRN actors must be able to 
perform in multinational coalitions, executing PR missions. The current Norwegian 
political trend indicates continuous Norwegian participation in the operations of various 
alliances that will require Norwegian Armed Forces to deploy outside of Norwegian 
territorial borders. 
In the first Norwegian environmental scenario, the NPRN will primarily face 
battles over resources and priorities within the Armed Forces to provide the education 
and training necessary to prepare and lay the foundation for a successful outcome of a PR 
                                                 
200 Nancy Roberts, “Robert’s Network Design Framework” (PowerPoint presentation, Network 
Design course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2015). 
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event during crisis or war. The second scenario will be in an international environment 
where the Norwegian Armed Forces are deployed as part of a coalition. There have been 
social and political trends that place increasingly high value on each soldier, and one 
could argue that some loss aversion exists in Western society in general. Such loss 
aversion and its consequences are linked to Western nations’ reactions to situations like 
the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, which some scholars say contributed to the 
slow response in providing ground forces in the Balkans and the late UN intervention in 
Rwanda.201 The technological advances in social media and its widespread use by 
opponents to support their narrative could also influence the enemy’s ability to exploit 
captured Western forces as part of their propaganda. The ISIS’s burning of the Jordanian 
F-16 pilot captured in Syria illustrates how the enemy might use captured personnel as 
propaganda and as a weapon to destroy the coalition’s morale.202 
In contrast to the NPRN’s general environment, the IP on the ground faces a more 
challenging physical environment. While waiting for the commanders and staffs in the 
network to organize the recovery efforts, the IP must be prepared to activate his/her 
SERE skills and knowledge to survive in three environments.203 First, he or she must 
survive the physical environment itself in a permissive or worse, in a non-permissive, 
environment by employing land, sea, and desert survival skills, as well as be able to 
employ the safety and survival equipment. Second, the IP must be able to survive the 
threat environment by evading a hostile force and, if captured, resist exploitation and 
interrogation, escape if possible, and prepare for extraction by PR forces. Finally, the IP 
must also survive the theater environment which implies that he must understand its 
geography, including cultural aspects, topography, and climate, and have an 
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understanding of how military, governmental, and criminal elements may enforce 
captivity upon the individual.  
b. Key Success Factors  
Ultimately, the success of the NPRN network lies in its ability to execute the PR 
mission in three scenarios: peacetime, during a crisis, and in wartime. The foundation for 
success is built on the continuous efforts to educate and train the NPRN actors during the 
preparation204 phase in peacetime, on a day-to-day basis. Key success factors for the 
network derive from both theory and practice. From a theoretical perspective, as 
described by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, the design and performance of any 
efficient network span five elements:  
 Organizational level: its organizational design. 
 Narrative level: the story being told 
 Doctrinal level: the collaboration strategies and methods 
 Technological level: the information system 
 Social level: the personal ties that ensure loyalty and trust205 
As a cost-effective network, the NPRN’s ability to continuously tell the story, the 
narrative, about its reason for being, would be a key success factor for the first scenario, 
the peacetime environment.206 A shared common understanding of how to execute the 
networks’ primary task, to recover personnel on a doctrinal level including how the 
NPRN information system supports this effort, would be crucial. Arguably the most 
important factor for a successful execution resides in the trust and loyalty developed 
between and among the different actors in the network, on a continuous basis, which 
allows or motivates them to accept the extra risks inherent in such a mission.  
                                                 
204 The preparation phase consists of having proper policy and doctrine that drives the training and 
education including equipment to create PR situational awareness for isolated personnel, commanders and 
staffs and forces, according to the PR System Model.  
205 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 324. 
206 The literature review on Personnel Recovery, covering the period from WWII to the present day, 
supports the importance of a constant need for the PR narrative to be told to maintain the awareness of why 
PR is critical. 
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The theoretical perspective resonates quite well with the practical experience of 
General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal, who highlights four areas of importance in which 
adaptive entities must excel, based on his personal experience of leading the U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Command in its fight against Al Qaeda.207 McChrystal describes 
these four areas as 
 Common Purpose: The way a group of free agents is transformed into a 
cohesive, orderly, and aligned team around a common set of objectives 
 Shared Consciousness: An emergent intelligence that is created by a 
holistic understanding of the operating environment and a high level of 
internal connectivity 
 Trust: Faith in the intent and competence of one’s colleagues 
 Empowered Execution: The decentralization of decision-making to the 
lowest appropriate level.208 
In his book Team of Teams, McChrystal argues that the outcome of implementing 
these principles is scaled excellence, in which an organization is capable of being the 
right thing at the right time, constantly.209 
For the actors in the NPRN, a key success factor will be the well-educated 
personnel who have a such a shared mental picture of how to operate as part of this 
network and the ability to communicate with a language that is understood by those 
involved. 
The PR challenges faced by isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and 
staffs are, not surprisingly, a complex matter involving many actors and stakeholders. 
The current PR system model is both influenced by and the aggregation of a long history 
of PR events, from WWII until the present. Comprised of lessons learned from both 
successful and unsuccessful rescues, the model illustrates the wide variety of involved 
                                                 
207 JSOC is in many ways the resulting joint force created as a result of a long history of failed PR 
events dating back to the Son Tay raid in Vietnam and ultimately the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission 
in Operation Eagle Claw. 
208 Stanley McChrystal, “What Is Crosslead?” The McChrystal Group, accessed June 14, 2015, 
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players who need to coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate to accomplish their common 
purpose of recovering an isolated person.  
c. The NPRN Purpose and General Direction 
The overarching purpose of the NPRN is broadly described in the following 
statement. 
Joint PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated 
personnel to duty; sustain morale; increase operational performance; and 
deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and 
national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of 
isolated personnel.210 
From a network theory perspective, purpose stands out as one of the key 
fundamental principles of networks. As network theorist Anklam states in her second 
principle of networks, “every network has an underlying purpose, and every network 
creates value.”211 She further states that “the purpose of a network is what animates it 
and causes its members to care about it.”212  
Depending on whose perspective one assumes, there are numerous ways to describe the 
purpose, as shown in Figure 28. Using Anklam’s description of purpose types, one can 
say that the NPRN most closely approximates a mission network. 
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Figure 28.  Network Purposes213 
 
d. NPRN Governance 
The NPRN consists of numerous organizations and actors with different 
capabilities to support the recovery of isolated personnel. The NPRN also relies on many 
individuals who have PR skills and competence. As such, the NPRN consists of a blend 
of units with a hierarchical structure and individuals within various locations in the same 
hierarchical system which creates a PR knowledge or competence network. The NPRN 
then is similar to what Arquilla labels a hybrid-combination of a hierarchy and a self-
organizing network of people and organizations.214 These actors are parts of the Air 
Force, Navy, Army, and SOF, and receive support from the Intelligence and Logistical 
services of the Norwegian Armed Forces. No overarching governance structure exists at 
the moment that spans all these services, but the Air Force and the Army have what could 
be labeled a lead organization, as well as the SOF community that has a significant 
dedicated PR force with a standing hostage rescue mission.215  
The new Norwegian PR mandate of 2014 designates the Air Force as the 
Executive Agent Office of Primary Responsibility (EA OPR) for PR and tasked with the 
                                                 
213 Ibid., 31. 
214 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 327–28. 
215 For the details of a lead organization, see H. Brinton Milward and Keith G. Provan, A Manager’s 
Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of 
Government, 2006), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/CollaborativeNetworks.pdf.   
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responsibility of PR as a whole.216 No further doctrine describes how and what this 
should look like regarding the collaboration and authorities needed for cross-services 
cooperation. The development of such doctrine is part of the ongoing work to which this 
report and its recommendations contribute. 
The argument can be made that, at the moment, the NPRN is more of a network 
of PR organizations, with ad hoc ties, without any governance or coordination that brings 
them together with a common purpose as a whole network.217 If one uses social network 
analysis to look for ties and relationships among and between the different PR 
organizations and people, one finds numerous ties among the network members that are 
sustained over time—the definition of a social network. But at this junction, the NPRN 
organization and individuals cannot answer the following questions affirmatively:  
 Do the actors recognize that they are participating in a particular network?  
 Are they committed to operating as a network? 
 Are they doing anything to build the institutional basis of the network?218 
For example, there is a network of SERE instructors from all services with ties to 
the Army SERE School. They are not, however, aware of one another and do not see 
themselves as a network. The SOF community has an organic network of actors who 
need to collaborate for the hostage rescue mission, but they are not necessarily known to 
the other services’ PR organizations. There are PR ties between the services, but no 
overarching network governance exists across the network. Both the Army and the Air 
Force have network ties to the European SERE schools, as well as SERE schools in the 
United States and Canada, but again, there is no overarching mechanism of coordination 
or governance.  
                                                 
216 Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], Direktiv for luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for air 
operations], 4. 
217 Anklam, Net Work. 
218 Paraphrased from Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 319; Holohan, Networks of 
Democracy, 33. 
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D. PERSONNEL RECOVERY DISCUSSIONS  
Discussions with personnel also have informed the discovery phase of this 
capstone. They provide insights and themes on what is important to the various 
stakeholders involved, primarily those in Norway. To add to the Norwegian perspective, 
discussions also been conducted with international PR partners. For example, discussions 
have been held with people who represent isolated personnel, forces and commanders 
and staffs, including those who educate and train personnel and those who provide PR 
equipment.  
They come from different organizations such as the RNoAF PR and SERE 
School, the Norwegian Army SERE School, and Norwegian SOF trainers who are 
responsible for PR and SERE training. Numerous participants in the RNoAF SERE C 
courses also have provided debriefs about their courses. Norwegian unit commanders and 
staffs that have deployed to Afghanistan in both ground and air scenarios, as well, 
participants in the 2011 air campaign as part of the U.S. Operation Odyssey Dawn and 
the NATO-led Unified Protector, have provided input on PR and SERE. Discussions also 
have been held with representatives from PR and SERE training institutions in Canada, 
Sweden, the UK, Netherlands, and the United States. In addition, discussions on PR have 
been held with students at NPS representing various units and nationalities. 
The insights and themes gained from these discussions will be framed and 
grouped by using the PR system model as a reference. Unless specifically stated, the 
insights and themes are related to a Norwegian actor’s perspectives. 
1. Policy and Doctrine 
The lack of an overarching NATO PR policy and doctrine, as well as an 
overarching national policy, creates an uncertain environment and leaves room for 
internal discussion on PR requirements and who is responsible for what. For the training 
institutions, this lack of clarity has created a situation that requires a constant education 
of especially higher levels of commanders and staffs on why PR is important and how 
much of it is necessary. Without a clear policy and doctrine that is available to all 
commanders and staffs, the education of higher command leadership has been a constant 
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struggle for PR and SERE trainers and service OPRs, as new people rotate through 
important leadership and budgeting positions in the military system that interacts with the 
PR system. In discussions with international PR partners, there seems to be a common 
concern for and a need to educate the higher leadership and to create an understanding of 
what the PR system demands of everyone to make it work. Higher leadership must set the 
doctrine and priorities needed to guide the network. 
2. Education and Training 
The PR and SERE education and training institutions are the main bearers of PR 
and SERE knowledge and competence. Due to their small community, these institutions 
find PR and SERE knowledge and competence to be very vulnerable, as most of the 
knowledge resides with the individual instructors, as well as the history of how to educate 
and train the larger and larger numbers of people that require it. 
3. Equipment 
The development of a PR and SERE survival kit adapted to the area of operation 
can include winter mountains and desert landscapes in the same sortie. It has been a 
challenge for pilots with limited space available to store gear. There is also a lack of PR 
policy and directives that designate responsibility for PR equipment to the various 
services and institutions, making coordination in the production and use of equipment 
frustrating and difficult. 
4. Isolated Personnel 
Potential isolated personnel represent the largest group of concern in the 
Norwegian PR system. Their interest in PR and SERE training seems to be directly 
linked to how likely they are to be exposed to a PR event. Those who find themselves 
likely to be in a position that could result in a PR situation are, for the most part, very 
motivated to undergo what is considered arduous training. Those who do not see 
themselves in the same scenario find less motivation for the same training. Moreover, the 
lack of clear overarching directives and instructions make it easier to avoid such training 
to keep them current. On the other hand, many of those who have deployed and seen the 
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potential for an isolating event have requested more than what continuation training 
requires of them, viewing training as their life insurance. This need for additional training 
is reflected in both the individuals and their commanders and staffs who have the 
responsibility of leading and sending their people into harm’s way. 
5. Forces 
Norwegian aircrew who have been through SERE level-C training and 
experienced the ground perspective as isolated personnel, and who have enjoyed the 
support that capable air assets can provide, later find it very meaningful to support such 
training and exercises. Their experiences have provided them with a new perspective, on 
not only what their airframes can provide as a capable PR platform to isolated personnel, 
but also how much empathy and willingness exist to effectively support and return 
isolated personnel. 
6. Commanders and Staffs 
PR education has primarily been focused on the isolated personnel, especially for 
the RNoAF. The commander and staffs have benefited from training they have received 
as isolated personnel. But as Norway has deployed more and more forces to international 
operations, several discussions have highlighted the need for a more specific education in 
command and staff roles in planning and executing PR. In those operations that have 
involved people with some form of previous experience with PR, important questions 
were raised and addressed early in the planning phase. In other situations where none of 
the planners had previous experience in PR, the same type of PR questions were not 
addressed, and important PR issues were not raised until much later in the planning 
process, leading to a much shorter time for proper PR preparation by operational forces. 
Some commanders and staffs have felt the need for prior education and training, but the 
lack of national policy and doctrine and specific responsibilities have hampered the 
budgeting and prioritizing of staff PR planning education and training. 
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E. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATIONS  
Participant observations are valuable in the discovery phase of design thinking to 
gain an understanding of people within the context of the design challenge. Observing 
people and how they interact with the environment reveals clues about what they think 
and feel, which also helps one learn about what is important to them and what they need 
and desire. To understand and share the feelings of another is a centerpiece of a human-
centered design process as the stories people tell and things that they say and do are 
strong indicators of their deeply held beliefs and values.219  
For this capstone project, my background has served me well and provided me 
with multiple engagements with various people in different roles, forces, and command 
levels in the PR system. I also have gained personal experiences in many roles and in 
engagements with a large number of actors and stakeholders in the PR system through 
education and training, exercises and operations, and in the role of the RNoAF OPR for 
PR for a number of years.  
First, I started as a long-range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) member in the 
Norwegian Army Special Forces. The training and education provided me with 
individual-level SERE training that primarily focused on being self-sustaining and, if 
isolated, the ability to ensure my own recovery with minimal assistance, if any. This 
training left me with an appreciation for the value of the SERE skills.  
Second, I had the opportunity to experience the complete opposite side of the 
spectrum as a member of Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) that trained for hostage 
rescue missions as a dedicated PR recovery force. During the years at the FSK, I also 
received the opportunity to participate in a Combat Survival Instructor Course in the UK 
in 1994. The course provided lectures by a series of UK special forces members who had 
endured capture and captivity by Saddam Hussein’s forces in Desert Storm 1991. The 
stories they told, combined with the level of realistic training, left their mark; I had no 
desire to experience this for “real” in the future, but hoped to be well prepared for the 
worst. 
                                                 
219 See section on Empathy in d.school, “Design Process Mini-Guide.” 
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Third, I became a pilot and participated in Operation Enduring Freedom flying an 
F-16. The experience of flying over a terrain that could vary from steep, snow-covered 
mountains to the dry, flat desert in one sortie highlighted the perspectives and challenges 
of SERE equipment and attempting to fit it into the very limited space of an F-16, while 
at the same time packing to deal with a range of environmental realities. Flying an F-16 
supporting ground forces also offered me a good idea of how to support a PR situation as 
a capable force. 
Fourth, after years of operational flying combined with my SOF and combat 
survival instructor background, I was assigned to the RNoAF SERE School and 
supported the development of the SERE level-C training and education within the 
RNoAF according to NATO standards. Eventually I was placed in charge of PR and, as 
the OPR for PR in the Air Force, gained valuable perspective in addressing PR and SERE 
in a broader sense, not as single training events but as a whole that included all training 
and continuation training for all aircrew as long as they were operational. This gave me 
an understanding of the challenges of keeping aircrew up to date on PR and SERE skills, 
as well as working with various deployments of Norwegian forces to provide appropriate 
SERE equipment for different airframes and environments.  
Fifth, being in charge of PR and SERE education and training gave me many 
opportunities to get a feel for the different attitudes towards the training. People’s 
attitudes toward education and training vary. Since the training is arduous and especially 
challenging for aircrews in an unfamiliar environment, people are often anxious about 
how they will perform before the courses. Some emerge confident in their SERE abilities 
and quite satisfied with their achievements. Others avoid the training if they can as long 
as they can, but change their attitudes after the training. They come to view it as a 
valuable lesson about themselves and good preparation for worst-case scenarios. At some 
point in the future, they could be the ones rescued.  
Sixth, the costs and resources needed for training produce tensions in the PR 
system. Balancing the demands between cost-conscious stakeholders who want cost 
reductions and PR personnel who want to maintain standards produces friction in the PR 
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system. There is a constant question about what standards should be and as costs rise, 
what training is needed to meet them.  
To sum up, I have had the opportunity to be a participant in many roles and 
functions of the PR system in addition to being an observer of others. These experiences 
have shaped my understanding of people’s needs and desires related to PR and SERE. I 
am, of course, influenced and biased by my own experiences as they shape my thinking 
and perceptions. As such, I need to be careful during the design process that I stay true to 
the process and not jump to conclusions based on my own biases and preferences. In an 
action-oriented community, the urge is to skip the listen and understand aspects of design 
and jump into problem-solving based on one’s expertise. My challenge is to keep an open 
mind when I am designing for others. 
F. GENERAL THEMES  
The goal of the discovery phase is to observe, listen to, and learn from the people 
involved in the PR system in order to understand their perspectives and to gain a deep 
understanding of their experiences. The PR system is complex, and no single perspective 
provides the whole picture. To understand the complexities of such a system, more 
perspectives must be combined to provide a rich and holistic view of the whole. Nelson 
and Stolterman compare the challenge as trying to see the whole of a building from the 
front door. It is just not possible. A building can “only be fully appreciated by moving 
around it, up and over it, below and through it—in other words, by moving between 
different station points.”220 Harold A. Linstone, in his book Multiple Perspectives for 
Decision Making,221 developed a model of multiple perspectives that, when combined, 
“provide a richer and more holistic picture of existing complexities.”222 Nelson and 
Stolterman expand on Linstone’s original three perspectives of technical, organizational, 
and personal to allow for design, political, economic, ethical, and spiritual perspectives to 
                                                 
220 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 68. 
221 Harold A. Linstone, Multiple Perspectives for Decision Making: Bridging the Gap between 
Analysis and Action (New York: Elsevier Science, 1984). 
222 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 67. 
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enable seeing the whole, not only its parts.223 A similar concept of perspectives is used 
by the military abbreviated to DOTMLPF-P that addresses doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.224 To 
extract and group the central themes that have emerged through the discovery phase, I 
use all of these perspectives in combination with the PR system model actors, functions, 
and tasks.  
1. Policy and Doctrine  
U.S. PR doctrine has evolved from the individual level to one of strategic policy 
level over almost seven decades. Beginning with WWII, PR lessons learned have been 
turned into written knowledge, in the form of doctrine, available to the isolated personnel, 
forces, and commanders and staffs all based on costly wartime experiences. With PR 
recognized as a whole of government approach, detailed responsibilities for the 
education, training, and equipment needed to support the five PR tasks (report, locate, 
support, recover, and reintegrate) have been clearly given to the key PR actors in the 
form of authoritative DOD directives and instructions clearly anchored in a strategic 
Presidential Policy Directive. As the United States has learned its PR lessons over many 
decades of war and conflict, these same lessons and their resulting doctrine are available 
for smaller nations like Norway to draw from in developing a PR system of their own.  
2. Organization 
PR created relatively large organizations as seen in WWII, Korea, and the 
Vietnam War with entities like the MI9 and MIS-X. Subsequently, both the UK and the 
U.S. Air-Sea rescue have evolved into much smaller entities dependent on other PR 
capable forces to support their mission. In today’s PR environment, no single 
organization holds all the assets required, and much more inter organization collaboration 
is needed to make the whole PR system perform its functions and tasks. The number of 
                                                 
223 Ibid., 67–69. 
224 CJCS, DOD Dictionary, A-52. 
 81 
actors involved in PR is expanding, and fewer standing PR forces are available. More 
diverse forces are expected to support PR events. 
3. Education and Training  
The education and training of personnel to enable survival in a hostile environment 
have been constant, while the forces, commanders, and staff responsible for organizing and 
executing the rescues often have been the focus of organizational and budgetary cutbacks 
between wars. Consequently, the same mistakes have been made and the same lessons 
rediscovered as previous PR knowledge and skills have been lost between conflicts.  
PR knowledge as a whole is vulnerable when the community experiences a loss of 
continuity of education and training, and often organizations have been forced to start all 
over again in building the necessary PR skillsets. There has been an enormous amount of 
PR knowledge learned throughout history at great cost of blood and treasure, but it seems 
hard to keep the knowledge alive over time as organizations experience budget cuts and 
reorganizations between wars.  
4. Equipment  
Despite the seven decades of PR evolution, survival equipment, for the most part, 
remains the same. Basic knowledge and equipment are still required for first aid, fire, 
shelter, signals, water, and food. The greatest development in equipment has been GPS 
technology that has enabled IP to communicate with rescue forces through handheld 
survival radios. For the rescue forces, technology has increased dramatically with the 
development of helicopters and their defensive suites, as well as sensor capabilities to fly 
in any weather, day or night. Commanders and staffs are able to execute real-time 
command and control of PR events, thanks to technology developments, although 
education and training in PR functions and tasks seems to be lacking for the general 
population of commanders and staffs involved with PR. 
5. Personnel  
The number of people in need for some kind of PR training has expanded rapidly 
since the late 1990s as operational areas have put more than just pilots and SOF in harm’s 
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way. Commanders and staffs in general seem to have too little understanding of PR 
unless they have “grown up” with being potential isolated personnel and received SERE 
training. In Norway, the level of leadership that has received more than a survival, escape 
and evasion experience in a national homeland defense scenario is just reaching the level 
of LTC and Col in the Air Force and even less in the other services. This highlights the 
need to spread PR knowledge to a wider audience. 
Isolated personnel have shown extraordinary will to survive and demonstrated an 
ability to go through hardship of survival, escape and evasion, even captivity. Rescue 
forces have demonstrated exceptional displays of altruism and acceptance of risk and cost 
to themselves in the efforts to save others, often towards a fellow soldier or pilot, but also 
towards total strangers. There are expectations for most individuals involved in PR, 
especially those who face the biggest consequences of isolation and rescues, that 
someone will do their best to bring them back and leave no one behind.  
6. Political  
PR events are tactical in nature but have the potential to become a matter of 
national interest very quickly. The ability of a nation or coalition to respond to a PR event 
before it becomes an event of enemy exploitation is important to preserve the will to fight 
and protect national security interests.  
7. Economics and Ethics  
The benefit and cost of conducting PR are very much dependent on what 
perspective is assumed. In a narrow economic perspective, it is very costly in monetary 
terms to conduct PR. But in the longer perspective and broader sense, the value of having 
a PR capacity is immeasurable, as it influences the will to fight and the morale of our 
forces, as well as the greater society’s support. In evolutionary terms, the groups that 
have had strong levels of altruism and will to accept risk for another group member have, 
at times, been critical for the group and society’s overall survival.  
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IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds on the discovery phase of design thinking in Chapter 3 to 
address the next phase of design thinking: problem definition. Drawing from the 
synthesis of the archival data, observations, discussions, and insights, problem definition 
creates a more refined statement of the design challenge. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The initial design challenge was this: 
How can we design a Personnel Recovery (PR) system for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces that enables Norwegian commanders and staffs, forces and 
isolated personnel to collaborate and operate in a Combined Joint PR 
mission environment? 
The discovery phase provided an extensive overview of PR: what is involved in 
PR, its evolution from WWII until the present, its governing documents and the PR 
system model in Figure 29, and the lessons learned by individuals and organizations over 
six decades of warfighting with both successful and failed recovery missions.  
 
Figure 29.  PR System Model225 
  
                                                 
225 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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A key insight from the discovery phase was that the broad range of PR actors, 
individuals, and units come from multiple organizations and see themselves as a 
collection of independent entities. They do not view themselves as part of a whole system 
or a network of actors and organizations that needs to work together and integrate their 
efforts. They are not, as JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery states they should be, “an 
organization fully networked to respond to an isolating event.”226  
C. THE PR NETWORK AS OF 2014 
A network is defined as two or more nodes that have a sustained connection over 
time.227 Social networks are the focus in this study—in particular, the networks of people 
and organizational units that make up the PR system. The Norwegian PR network as of 
2014 is illustrated in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30 depicts the overall PR network as of 2014 representing the services and their 
interorganizational ties or lack thereof, as well as the intraorganizational (within services) 
ties. 
Figure 30.  Norwegian PR Network at Capstone Initiation in 2014228 
                                                 
226 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-2.  
227 Professor Nancy Roberts, “Network Design” (PowerPoint presentation, Network Design course, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2015); and Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9. 
228 Figure created by the author. 
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By June 10, 2014, the formal authorities over the Norwegian PR system were as 
follows. In the Air Force, Luftforsvarets Flytaktiske Skole (LFTS) [The RNoAF Tactical 
Flying School] was designated by service regulation as the OPR for all SERE education 
and training in the Air Force. In the Army, Forsvarets Vinterskole (FVS) [The Norwegian 
School of Winter Warfare] was designated by service regulation as the OPR for their 
SERE education and training. The Intelligence service and Forsvarets skole i etteretnings- 
og sikkerhetstjeneste (FSES) [Norwegian Armed Forces School of Intelligence and 
Security Service] were designated as the OPR for conduct after capture education and 
training for all services. The Norwegian Special Forces were responsible for their SERE 
education and training.  
As Figure 30 illustrates, in both the Army and in the Air Force, there were formal 
ties from the service organization designated as the OPR for SERE to each service 
organization/unit that required SERE education and training. Figure 30 also illustrates 
that there were formal ties from FSES, the Intelligence service OPR for conduct after 
capture training, to both the Army OPR and the Air Force OPR, as well as to SOF. In 
addition to the formal ties, there were also some informal relations between the service 
organizations.  
The problem with this configuration is that each service OPR was designed to be 
a separate SERE education and training organization for isolated personnel and not for 
the overall PR and SERE structure. As such, no overarching governance structure existed 
for PR and SERE in the Norwegian Armed Forces that connected the services’ efforts. 
Currently, as show in Figure 30, the Air Force, Army, and SOF PR and SERE training 
organizations are separate components with some informal ties to each other. In each 
service, there are numerous isolates, organizations that are important to the PR system 
but not connected. Examples of isolates are the important PR command and control (C2) 
architecture, the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), Personnel Recovery 
Coordination Cell (PRCC), and the services’ higher headquarters.  
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D. THE REDESIGN OF THE NORWEGIAN PR SOCIAL NETWORK 
To assist participants in understanding how the PR network functions as a whole 
and to consider alternatives for reconfiguring the network, I use the model in Figure 31 as 
a general guide. 
 
Figure 31.  Roberts’s Network Design Framework229 
 
It describes the major elements that need to be considered in building or 
redesigning a network. Starting on the left-hand side, we find general political, economic, 
social, and environmental trends in a network’s external environment and the key success 
factors—what it takes to be successful in this environment. For the NPRN, both the 
general environment and key success factors were summarized in the Discovery chapter. 
The network’s purpose and direction follow. As recapped in the Discovery chapter, the 
NPRN’s purpose and mission are described below. 
                                                 
229 Nancy Roberts, “Roberts’ Network Design Framework” (PowerPoint presentation, Network 
Design course, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2015). 
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Joint PR is a system in which the objectives are to return isolated 
personnel to duty; sustain morale; increase operational performance; and 
deny adversaries the opportunity to influence our military strategy and 
national will by exploiting the intelligence and propaganda value of 
isolated personnel.230 
The specific design elements in the center of the network model describe how the 
network’s purpose and direction are executed. People (the network members) and their 
skill sets are an important part of any social network. In addition, people are assigned 
particular roles and specific tasks to do their jobs, as described in the Discovery chapter. 
Work processes describe how the network as a whole gets its work done. In the case of 
the NPRN network, work processes involve the reporting, locating, supporting, 
recovering, and reintegrating isolated personnel. The network’s structure describes how 
people are connected to other people and units. And the network processes keep the 
network integrated (e.g., communication; training and education of isolated personnel, 
commanders, staffs, and forces; planning and decision making). The network’s culture is 
the manifestation of the network’s values and beliefs that describe how people actually 
behave and treat one another. The network’s performance is measured in terms of its 
results measured in terms of its outputs and its longer-term outcomes. Both should be tied 
directly to the network’s purpose and direction in order to determine how well the 
network is executing its mission. 
All of the elements of the network’s design need to be congruent, meaning they 
need to “fit” together and be mutually compatible. However, through the Discovery 
process, there were some major incongruencies in the network: 
1. Doctrine 
No overarching joint PR doctrine existed in the Norwegian Armed Forces, or in 
NATO, until 2016 when the Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile 
Environment, was published.231 Prior to that document, the only Norwegian PR doctrine 
in place concerned service regulations for SERE education and training of isolated 
                                                 
230 CJCS, Personnel Recovery, I-2. 
231 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
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personnel, which is only one of the three core actors in PR. No Norwegian PR doctrine 
existed that included all actors and major stakeholders and addressed the PR system as a 
whole.  
2. Governance 
The 2014 CHOD Directive for Air Operations [Direktiv for luftmilitær 
virksomhet] established the RNoAF as the EA OPR for PR.232 The CHOD directive for 
the first time established the governance of PR at a joint level and embraced the PR 
system as a whole, and not limited to only the SERE education of isolated personnel. 
Actions are ongoing related to governance of the Norwegian PR system, but there exist 
incongruencies at three levels. First, there is no governance at the interorganizational 
level. Only the EA OPR for PR has been established for the RNoAF. Second, at the 
intraorganizational level within the services, there is governance of SERE education 
training at the SERE C level, but not for the whole service PR network that includes all 
actors like commanders and staffs, forces, and other supporting agencies. Third, there is a 
lack of a formal PR C2 architecture that is designated in each service and manned by 
fully educated and trained PR planners and operations officers.  
3. Network Processes 
There are incongruities in three network processes: there is no training of 
additional PR actors like commanders and staffs, capable forces,and isolated personnel at 
the SERE A and B levels; there is a lack of PR planning capability; and there is no PR 
communications system that enables the network to collaborate and coordinate its 
activities.  
4. Structure 
Most importantly, as shown in Figure 30, the network’s structure is not congruent 
or compatible with the network’s mission—to be integrated into a whole system with 
which the members can identify. Instead the members are grouped into separate 
                                                 
232 Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], Direktiv for luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for air 
operations]. 
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components with only weak ties among the components. According to congruence 
theory, the lack of congruence among a system’s elements will degrade the system’s 
performance parts.233 All efforts need some alignment into an integrated whole. 
In the summer of 2014, the CHOD established numerous new executive agent 
(EA) [fagmyndighet] responsibilities throughout the Norwegian Armed Forces to clarify 
which service was responsible for what. PR and SERE was one such area that needed a 
dedicated overall responsible service, and the Air Force was designated the EA for PR 
and SERE, formalized by CHOD directive on June 11, 2014.234 The designation as an 
EA implies the following authorities on behalf of the CHOD:  
 Authority to initiate, approve, decide, publish regulations, certify, 
authorize and control professional relationships within an assigned area of 
responsibility [PR and SERE] 
 EA activity [PR and SERE] must be coordinated with other relevant EA 
activities involved and their commanders.235 
Figure 32 illustrates the RNoAF as the EA for PR and SERE for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces as seen in a network perspective.  
                                                 
233 For a brief overview of congruence theory, see Mercer Delta Consulting, The Congruence Model: 
A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational Performance (New York: Mercer Delta Consulting, 2004), 
1–12, http://ldt.stanford.edu/~gwarman/Files/Congruence_Model.pdf.  
234 Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces], Direktiv for luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for air 
operations]. 
235 Forsvarssjef [Chief of defense], Direktiv for delegering av myndighet [Directive for delegation of 
executive agent responsibilities] (Oslo: CHOD, December 10, 2009), 3. 
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This figure depicts the RNoAF as the EA for PR and SERE for the services as depicted 
clockwise from the top center: the Norwegian Army, the Territorial Command, the 
Intelligence Service, the Royal Norwegian Navy, and NORSOF. 
Figure 32.  RNoAF EA of PR and SERE in a Network Governance 
Perspective236  
 
As the newly designated EA for PR and SERE, the RNoAF now became the lead 
service responsible for PR and SERE for the whole of the Norwegian Armed Forces. This 
new EA role follows the pattern outlined by Kenis and Provan when networks of a 
certain size grow so large that they require one node in the network to assume greater 
authority for network coordination and integration. Kenis and Provan outline three 
structural options: self-governed network, lead organization network, and network 
administrative organization, as seen in Figure 33.  
                                                 
236 Model made by the author, adapted from Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 23. 
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Figure 33.  Modes of Network Governance237 
 
These three forms of governance differ in what they can do well.238 The self-
governed network structure, also sometimes called shared governance network because 
its governance is shared by its participants, is the simplest one.239 This model has no 
central governance, as its members all share the responsibility for the network’s decisions 
and activities. Its strength resides with the inclusion and involvement of all its members 
and its flexibility and responsiveness to their needs.240 Kenis and Provan posit that this 
model is best suited “to small, geographically concentrated networks where full and 
active face-to-face participation by network participants is possible.”241 
The lead organization governance model is most often seen when one 
organization is the core provider of resources or services and central in the flow between 
resources and clients.242 In this network governance structure, members all share some 
common purpose and can maintain individual goals, but the key activities and decisions 
                                                 
237 Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 23. 
238 Patrick Kenis and Keith G. Provan, “Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network 
Performance,” Public Administration 87, no. 3 (July 2009): 446, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01775.x. 
239 Ibid., 446.  
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are coordinated through one of the members acting as a lead organization.243 The 
strength of the structure is its efficiency and legitimacy, and as Kenis and Provan state, 
“because of its capacity to take on most of the responsibilities of running and 
coordinating network activities, most of the complexity and messiness inherent in the 
self-governed model can be avoided.”244 
The network administrative organization (NAO) is a network governance 
structure that is set up to manage the network activities when coordination and 
integration become overwhelming for the lead organization. In this case, a separate 
organization is established, independent of the other organizations of the network, to take 
on the network’s coordination and integration activities.245 The strengths of the NAO are 
its efficient day-to-day management of a large number of actors—that is, the network as a 
whole—its engagement with strategic PR actors, and that it is sustainable.246  
Milward and Provan provide an overview of the three network governance design 
options in Figure 34. They describe their three structures, and their optimal number of 
members, their locus of decision-making, and their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
                                                 
243 Ibid. 





Figure 34.  Network Governance Structure Options247 
 
When the CHOD designated the RNoAF as the EA of PR and SERE, it created 
new challenges for the RNoAF. The RNoAF Tactical Flying School [LFTS], as the 
previous OPR for SERE in the RNoAF, now became responsible for the Norwegian 
Armed Forces PR system as a whole. In essence, it became a lead organization. Besides 
doing the education and training of RNoAF aircrew as isolated personnel, it now took on 
responsibilities for the coordination and integration of the NPRN.  
One year into the capstone project, feedback from those working on the 
development of the Norwegian PR system indicated that the lead organization model was 
quite demanding for the RNoAF. Discussion with the principal actors revealed that 
although the work was moving forward, the lead the organization model of governance 
needed fuller consideration.  
E. PROBLEM REFRAMED 
The initial design challenge was how to design a Norwegian PR system that 
would enable isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staffs, to operate in a 
coalition environment.  
                                                 
247 Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
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However, the design challenge had to be reframed in the light of the information 
collected in the discovery phase. The first problem was how to help the PR system view 
itself as a social network. As it was operating, network members identified with their 
organizations and were not aware of their connections as a network of organizations. 
Futhermore, members had little understanding of how a network could be designed to 
ensure network performance. Most importantly, there was little understanding of how the 
network’s design elements needed to be conguent with one another. Major mismatches 
were found in the network’s lack of overarching PR doctrine; educated PR planners and 
operations officers at the JPRC, PRCC, and higher headquarters levels; and in general, 
PR system knowledge outside the core training institutions. These mismatches required a 
a redesign of the network. 
A second problem emerged when the Air Force became the lead organization 
(EA) for the PR network. It quickly became apparent that taking on this responsibility in 
addition to its mission of education and training of isolated personnel was overtaxing its 
resources and capabilities. Thus, a second problem arose: How could the PR network be 
redesigned to correct some additional design tensions introduced with the new lead 
organization governance model? Both of these problems become the focus of Ideation in 
the next chapter—how to redesign the PR network to correct its misalignments and 
ensure better network performance. 
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V. IDEATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The ideation phase of the design process generates new ideas. By launching 
brainstorming sessions with “how might we” questions, the objective is to come up with 
solutions to the problem or issue identified in the problem definition phase. This section 
briefly highlights the ideation question asked, the ideas generated, and the criteria used to 
prioritize which ideas should be turned into prototypes. 
The ideation question was this: How might we redesign the PR network to correct 
the misalignments and to improve performance?  
Brainstorming centered around three major areas where incongruities surfaced: 
network governance, including the network structure; network processes; and doctrine. 
1. PR Network Governance and Structure 
Four options on how to address governance of the PR network were discussed: 
shared governance; lead organization governance; a network administrative organization; 
and a combination of all of the above, tailored to different levels of the PR system.  
Recognizing the span of the PR network from the strategic to the tactical, 
interorganizational to intraorganizational, from the joint level to an individual level, the 
following criteria were used: the ability to coordinate; the reach to all members; the 
expertise and leadership available at all levels; and the ability to build relationships in the 
network.  
Coordination is defined as bringing “different elements of (a complex activity or 
organization) into a relationship that will ensure efficiency or harmony.”248 Reach is the 
network leadership’s ability to connect with the greatest number of PR network members 
to provide input and to receive feedback. Expertise is expert skill or knowledge in a 
particular field, in this case, PR. Leadership at all levels is the ability to act and make 
                                                 
248 Google, “Coordinate,” accessed June 8, 2016, https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=coordinate%20definition. 
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prudent PR judgments, based on PR expertise, to facilitate the best outcome to a PR 
event, be it training, exercises, crisis, or war. Building relationships is the ability to 
enhance member interactions to gain trust, build social capital, and develop PR 
knowledge and skills. 
Based on this set of criteria, the fourth option, the combination of shared, lead, 
and administrative organization governance was found most promising and merited 
further prototyping. The idea was to provide not just one type of governance to fit the 
whole PR system but to leverage each form of governance, and its advantages, at 
different levels of the PR network, at both the interorganizational and the 
intraorganizational, and from there, build out all the subnetwork structures. The authority 
network that derives from the governance structure is illustrated in Appendix E. 
2. PR Network Processes 
To improve network processes, two main ideas surfaced. The first was to build a 
robust informal PR community of practice (CoP). The second was to establish a formal 
communications system and build a repository of PR knowledge gained through seven 
decades of PR history.  
a. PR Community of Practice 
The successful outcome of PR is dependent on practitioners who can make wise 
decisions and take actions. These practitioners can be thought of as a PR community of 
practice defined as  
a group of people who share a common concern, a set of problems, or 
interest in a topic and who come together to fulfill both individual and 
group goals. CoPs often focus on sharing best practices and creating new 
knowledge to advance a domain of professional practice. Interaction on an 
ongoing basis is an important part of this.249  
                                                 
249 Darren Cambridge, Soren Kaplan, and Vicky Suter, Communities of Practice Design Guide: A 
Step-by-Step Guide for Design & Cultivating Communities of Practice in Higher Education (Washington, 
DC: EDUCAUSE Learning Initiative, 2005), http://www.educause.edu/library/resources/community-
practice-design-guide-step-step-guide-designing-cultivating-communities-practice-higher-education. 
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A CoP is beneficial to the NPRN because it can accumulate the actions, thinking, 
and conversations among the members that form an important part of their ongoing 
experience. Knowledge of PR resides in the members’ skills and their relationships, as 
well as their artifacts—the documents, technologies and tools, and their formal processes 
that are the embodiments of their knowledge.250 
b. Formal Communications System and Repository of PR Knowledge 
The second idea was to develop a formal information and communication system 
and a repository of PR knowledge. The criteria used to choose from among the 
alternatives included the ability to develop a cohesive PR team around common PR 
objectives; the ability to build trust between isolated personnel, commanders and staffs, 
and forces; the ability to build PR situational awareness and an understanding of PR as a 
system for all actors; the ability to develop PR knowledge among PR actors; accessibility 
to stored PR knowledge; and the ability to execute decentralized decision making. 
After numerous iterations, the decision was made to combine the two ideas and to 
develop a prototype that created a CoP in combination with a formal information 
communication system that contained both a classified and an unclassified version to 
reach as many PR actors as possible, and at the same time provide required information 
security.  
3. PR Doctrine 
Regarding PR doctrine, two options were identified: write new PR doctrine for 
Norway because none existed, or modify and adapt existing U.S. and NATO PR doctrine 
to fit the Norwegian Armed Forces structure.  
Criteria used were the ability to create a shared understanding of PR within the 
Norwegian Armed Forces and coalition partners; interoperability between services and 
coalition nations; standardization of education and training, procedures, functions, and 
tasks.  
                                                 
250 Richard McDermott, “Why Information Technology Inspired, but Cannot Deliver Knowledge 
Management, “California Management Review 41, no. 3 (1999): 103–17. 
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During the capstone process, NATO published new PR doctrine built on the U.S. 
JP 3-50 Personnel Recovery,251 and the United Kingdom archived their JWP 3-66 Joint 
Personnel Recovery252 and replaced it with the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Recovery of 
Personnel in a Hostile Environment (AJP-3.7). These events revealed a clear priority for 
how to proceed with the Norwegian PR doctrine, and as the newly adapted British 
version of the AJP-3.7 states: “The need to achieve maximum coherence and 
interoperability within, and between, our closest allies and partners is vital. … We should 
use NATO doctrine wherever we can, and ensure coherence of UK doctrine with NATO 
wherever we cannot.”253 For Norwegian PR doctrine, the prototype therefore addresses 
the option to adapt U.S. and NATO doctrine and address approaches to operations 
particular to Norway as needed in national supplements and regulations, and it especially 
highlights the NPRN network approach to PR. Based on these developments, the design 
team decided not to write the doctrine itself, but provide guidelines and criteria for its 
development. The guidelines can be found in Appendix F. 
In sum, the ideation phase resulted in the pursuit of two prototypes: a network 
governance model that also includes an authority network based on the relationships 
among commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel and the services’ training 
institutions; and a multiservice PR community of practice that encourages participation 
among all PR members, including international actors, supported by a formal information 
communication system. 
  
                                                 
251 CJCS, Personnel Recovery. 
252 Ministry of Defence, Joint Personnel Recovery. 
253 Ministry of Defence, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment, 
Edition A, Version 1 with UK National Elements, AJP-3.7 (London: Ministry of Defence, February 2016), 
i. 
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VI. PROTOTYPE AND TESTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The prototyping phase can range from making simple physical models of a new 
product to a storyboard for a process or an operation, or a simple simulation. Having 
gone through the ideation phase, the design team selected the two ideas they believed 
merited prototyping: a multilayered PR network governance model, and a Personnel 
Recovery CoP. Prototyping on PR doctrine is currently underway in Norway and is not 
complete enough to be presented in this capstone.254 The development of the two 
prototypes and their testing and implementation are addressed in this chapter. 
B. PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
1. The NPRN Multilevel Governance Model 
The first idea is to provide not just one type of governance to fit the whole PR 
system but to leverage the advantages of each form of governance at different levels of 
the PR network, from the strategic to the tactical level. The first prototype, therefore, is 
the creation of such a governance structure that spans the whole PR system and addresses 
the collaboration and coordination among the services and other key organizations as 
well as the intraorganizational level within each service. The intent of the new 
governance model is to increase the ability to coordinate, expand the reach to all 
members, provide expertise and leadership at all levels, and increase the ability to build 
relationships in the network. 
2. The NPRN Community of Practice 
The second idea is to combine the idea of a PR CoP with a formal information 
communication system, with classified and unclassified versions, to reach as many PR 
actors as possible, and at the same time, provide required information security. The intent 
is to create a PR community of practice that serves as a repository of PR knowledge and 
                                                 
254 The development of PR doctrine from WWII until the present and recommendations on the 
development of Norwegian PR doctrine and regulations are available in Appendix F. 
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competence. As such, the CoP is responsible for keeping PR competence alive and 
making sure the NPRN learns from previous PR mistakes, draws benefits from best 
practices, and enables adaptations as conditions change. In other words, the prototype 
calls for a CoP that retains the learning that the PR network has paid in blood and 
treasure to aquire.  
C. THE NPRN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The NPRN governance prototype is designed to address the whole network from 
the strategic to the tactical, from the joint to the individual levels and adopt a governance 
model that includes all actors. The prototype exploits the advantages of each of the three 
types of governance introduced in Chapter 4, by designating each to its own level of the 
PR system model and network structure, as seen in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35.  NPRN Network Governance Prototype255 
 
The three governance forms slightly overlap each other. The NAO governance 
mode emphasizes the management of the overall network structure and the 
interorganizational PR network, with specific focus on the joint- and service-level actors. 
The lead organizations from each service primarily govern their own service network, the 
                                                 
255 Prototype model built by the author. Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
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intraorganizational PR network. At the squadron and unit level, the self-governace mode 
is used, and the PR officer or SERE instructor is the link to the upper echelons of the 
governance structure. This governance prototype is assessed to provide the most efficient 
governance structure for the NPRN and cover all actors in the PR system.256 Each 
governance mode is placed at a level, the interorganizational, the intraorganizational, and 
the unit or squadron level, which seeks to exploit the governance models’ strengths and 
avoid their weaknesses. The NPRN governance prototype recommends a two-stage 
process: stage one builds the interorganizational NAO governance structure; stage two 
builds the intraorganizational lead organization governance structure in each service. 
1. Network Administrative Organization (Interorganizational) 
In stage one, the idea behind the NAO model is to set up a separate administrative 
entity to manage the governance of the network as a whole with a specific focus on the 
interorganizational level.257 Kenis and Provan depict the varying size of the NAO as 
“modest in scale, consisting of only a single individual, often referred to as the network 
facilitator or broker, or it may be a formal organization.”258 The design team 
recommends that the NAO, as a network hub, be set up by a CHOD mandate. In addition, 
since the RNoAF is, as of 2014, the executive agent (EA) in charge of PR for the whole 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the design team recommends that the RNoAF set up the 
NAO to serve the overall management of the NPRN, coordinate with the 
interorganizational stakeholders in each service, and identify their PR network actors and 
their responsibilities. The NAO would be linked to the PR lead organizations in each 
service, as seen in Figure 36. 
                                                 
256 For additional information on network efficiency and key predictors, see Patrick Kenis and Keith 
G. Provan, “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness,” Journal of Public 





Figure 36.  NPRN and the NAO at the Interorganizational Level259 
 
The NPRN PR OPRs in this prototype are those organizations that hold the 
current de facto lead position on PR competence in each service. As of 2016, the RNoAF 
has an established service OPR in LFTS, also known as the Royal Norwegian PR and 
SERE School, which is also the acting EA for PR in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The 
Army and the School of Winter Warfare hold the OPR for SERE for the Army. The 
Intelligence services’ OPR is FSES and their Conduct after Capture unit, which is also 
the EA for all conduct after capture training in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The design 
team recommends that NORSOF designate the OPR PR where they see fit in their 
organizational structure and identify the actors assigned to the NAO and the NPRN. The 
Navy has a strong OPR in their education and training institution MJVTS, and it is 
recommended that MJVTS be designated as an official OPR PR. For the Territorial Army 
(the Home Guard), one option is to place the responsibility on one of their educational 
institutions or potentially combine the OPR PR with the regular Army OPR PR. 
                                                 
259 Prototype model built by the author. Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
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Given its mission, the NPRN needs to build ties with coalition partners. Figure 37 
shows that the NAO at the interorganizational level of the network could also build 
connections with relevant PR actors outside of Norway. 
 
Figure 37 illustrates the external links to PR actors outside of Norway here represented 
by some of the key actors: The European Union, NATO, JPRA as the U.S. EA for PR, 
and the newly established EPRC. 
Figure 37.  NPRN and the NAO and the External PR Network260 
 
There exist some current connections with external PR actors, and it is 
recommended that the NAO and the services’ lead organizations continue to build on 
these connections and work to formalize the most important ones, like with the newly 
established European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC)261 and the long standing EA of 
PR in the United States, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA).262 
                                                 
260 Prototype model built by the author. Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
261 The European Personnel Recovery Centre was inaugurated on July 8, 2015. For information on the 
establishment of the EPRC, see “The European Personnel Recovery Centre,” accessed June 8, 2016, 
http://www.euroairgroup.org/project/european-personnel-recovery-centre-eprc/ and “European Personnel 
Recovery Centre,” accessed June 8, 2016, http://eprc.it/   
262 “Joint Personnel Recovery Agency,” accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.jpra.mil/  
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2. Lead Organization (Intraorganizational) 
In stage two, the NPRN governance prototype calls for each service to designate a 
lead organization to manage the internal service PR network. Figure 38 illustrates the 
RNoAF PR and SERE School, and the Army Winter Warfare School, as examples of lead 
organizations. 
 
The left side of the figure shows the RNoAF PR and SERE OPR, the Royal Norwegian 
Tactical Flying Squadron, as a lead organization where the members are squadrons. On 
the right side, the Army Winter Warfare School is the OPR and the lead organization 
where members are Army battalions. 
Figure 38.  NPRN Example Service OPRs263 
 
The lead organizations are major PR and SERE resource providers. Their primary 
focus is on service tactical squadrons and battalion-size units. The lead organizations also 
have the primary responsibility for PR and SERE education and training and as such are 
central to the NPRN in maintaining PR and SERE knowledge and competence. The 
primary governance responsibility of the service’s lead organizations is the management 
in networks, in contrast to the NAO’s management of networks.264 Though the focus of 
governance is in the NPRN network, each service’s lead organization must also address 
the management of their internal service network.  
                                                 
263 Prototype model built by the author. Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
264 Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 19.  
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3. Self-Governance (Tactical Unit Level) 
The PR officer or the senior SERE instructor is the NPRN network node that is 
the link to the self-governed network at the unit or squadron level and all unit PR-trained 
individuals. The self-governance option is also called shared governance or participant 
governance and illustrated in Figure 39. 
 
On the left side, the figure shows the RNoAF 338 squadron and its members at the 
tactical level. On the right is the Army Intelligence battalion. 
Figure 39.  Air Force and Army Unit-Level Self-Governance265 
 
The NPRN participants at the tactical level have the best possibility to see pop-up 
PR and SERE education and training events at their local unit, as well as finding the best 
way to integrate the annual PR and SERE training requirement into daily training. 
4. NPRN Governance and the Network Design Continuum 
To conceptualize how the prototype governance model fits in the network design 
continuum, I have merged the two models. In Figure 40, I have placed the NPRN 
                                                 
265 Prototype model built by the author. Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22. 
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prototype onto Roberts’ design continuum to show how each governance type relates to 
four dimensions of network design. 
 
Figure 40.  NPRN Governance from Joint to Indivdiual and Strategic to 
Tactical266 
 
Figure 40 illustrates the merging of Roberts’s concept of the network design 
continuum with Kenis and Provan’s work on alternative forms of network governance. 
The NAO is placed to the right on the continuum where membership is more formal and 
bounded to the key PR network actors at the strategic and service levels plus key network 
nodes. Interactions are more formal, and coordination is through a hierarchical network 
structure of nodes. The centralized decision-making form resonates with what Kenis and 
                                                 
266 Prototype model built by the author. (Governance models adapted from Kenis and Provan found in 
Milward and Provan, Manager’s Guide, 22; and network design continuum found in Nancy Roberts, 
“Design Continuum Analysis Tool” [PowerPoint presentation, Network Design course, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, 2015].)  
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Provan state as the advantages of the NAO form, which is the efficiency of day-to-day 
management, the strategic involvement by key members, and its sustainability.267  
To mitigate what Kenis and Provan state as the disadvantages of the NAO, the 
“perception of hierarchy, cost of operation, complex administration,”268 the NPRN 
governance prototype delegates the responsibility for network management at the service 
level to each of the service OPR PR, as illustrated by the RNoAF OPR PR in Figure 40. 
The services’ lead organizations also have a core membership, but they are better 
positioned to decide on network membership than the NAO because they have a better 
visibility and flexibility to identify and collaborate with a more diverse group of network 
members who serve the network purpose. The services’ OPRs also make centralized 
decisions, and their advantage is, according to Kenis and Provan, “efficiency [and] clear 
network direction.”269  
The shared governance form might mitigate what Kenis and Provan state as the 
lead organization’s problems of “domination by lead organization, lack of commitment 
by members.”270 By opting for a shared governance structure at the tactical level, it is up 
to all members to include and pursue both ideas and members whom they see fit for their 
own network at the local level. The link to the hierarchy of the service OPR and the NAO 
is maintained by the PRO or SERE instructor as a trusted network agent who represents 
the NPRN. 
In sum, the NPRN governance model’s intent is to exploit the advantages of each 
form of network governance while mitigating the disadvantages. As Kenis and Provan 
state, “None of these structures turns out to be universally superior. Rather, we argue here 
that each form has its own particular functionality or, in other words, each differs in what 
it can do well.”271 
                                                 




271 Kenis and Provan, “Towards an Exogenous Theory,” 446. 
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5. Management of and in Networks 
For the NPRN to operate efficiently, it will be essential for the prototype that the 
work process of managing the network is addressed by the NAO and the services’ OPRs. 
For the governance model to succeed, the nuance of management of network and in 
networks must be addressed properly. In Figure 41, Milward and Provan provide five 
essential management tasks that differ depending on whether one focuses on management 
of networks or in networks. 
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Figure 41.  Management of and in Networks272 
 
Each of the five essential tasks, management of accountability, management of 
legitimacy, management of conflict, management of design, and finally management of 
commitment, are important aspects to the NPRN. For the NAO, the task is management 
of networks as it is the reason for its being. That said, the NAO also could be connected 
to the larger global PR network and be concerned about its participation in a network. 
                                                 
272 Milward and Provan, Managers’s Guide, 19. 
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The service OPRs need not only to provide management of their service PR network as a 
lead organization, but also as an actor in network as they collaborate across the service 
network boundaries.  
Built upon the governance structure, the capstone provides a detailed description 
of the core membership network structure based on the key actors: commanders and 
staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. This structure is provided in Appendix E. 
D. THE NPRN COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE 
The NPRN CoP prototype links network members so they can tell their story and 
create the “personal ties that assure loyalty and trust.”273 The CoP and its work processes 
also contribute to create what McChrystal describes as “Shared Consciousness—an 
emergent intelligence that is created by a holistic understanding of the operating 
environment and a high level of internal connectivity,” and “trust—faith in the intent and 
competence of one’s colleagues.”274 The CoP prototype also operates as a knowledge 
network to keep the members current on the latest developments in PR. 
Theorists of knowledge management highlight the CoPs as essential for the 
development of a domain of knowledge through member interaction that merges theory 
with practice and drives the innovation and development of knowledge.275 Three 
fundamental elements of a CoP are a domain of knowledge (what they know), a 
community of people who care about this domain (who they are), and a shared practice of 
this knowledge which for the NPRN is PR (what they do).276 To facilitate the education 
and training necessary to perform the network roles and tasks, the NPRN prototype calls 
for a CoP that creates what Anklam labels network “locus.” She further states that “a 
network must both ‘live’ somewhere and have a repository for its history.”277 The locus 
                                                 
273 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 324. 
274 McChrystal, “What Is Crosslead?”  
275 See Etienne Wenger’s work on communities of practice: Etienne Wenger, Richard McDermott, 
and William M. Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2002); and Etienne Wenger-Trayner et al., Learning in Landscapes of 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
276 Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice, 27.  
277 Anklam, Net Work, 81. 
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dimensions are “place, space, and pace—a real place, information space, and interaction 
pace, or rhythm.”278 
1. NPRN Community of Practice Real Place 
The physical real place should represent the history of PR in general and the 
NPRN in particular and support the narrative level, the story being told, which is an 
important part of an efficient network organization.279 The primary place is where the 
educational institutions are located, but is also at the unit level where the actors are 
situated in the day-to-day activity. These places are arenas for a continuous development 
of knowledge through the interaction of the members of the PR and SERE community of 
practice.280 In addition, one should both be aware of and utilize the learning arena of the 
outdoor physical exercise space where the education and training are conducted on a 
regular basis as an important arena for the development of the PR knowledge in the field. 
It is recommended that the responsible agency be the services’ PR and SERE training 
institutions. 
a. Create a Physical Place for PR Knowledge and History 
To enable the CoP to learn and develop its knowledge and PR skillset and bring 
forward the PR narrative, a collection of knowledge and history should be made available 
in both a real and virtual space with which the PR actors can interact while developing 
their PR situational awareness. Through its discovery phase, this capstone has built an 
extensive bibliography of PR historic literature as well as official doctrine and academic 
PR knowledge. A physical place where this knowledge is stored in the form of a PR 
library that provides PR subject matter experts with a single point of access to PR 
literature which is not available online. The capstone bibliography can serve as a starting 
point to build the PR library illustrated by Figure 42 and is listed in Appendix A. 
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
279 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 324. 
280 Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice. 
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Figure 42.  Physical PR Knowledge Space281 
 
2. NPRN Community of Practice Virtual Space 
To enable an active CoP, the design team highly recommends a virtual space to 
provide an overview of the network’s activities and various exercises. All NPRN actors 
should be able to post planned and upcoming opportunities for joint training on the 
NPRN virtual space webpages, to coordinate and collaborate with all members of the 
community.  
A network as large and as geographically separated as the NPRN needs to have a 
well-developed “virtual space” with proper Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) to support the PR narrative, knowledge creation, and information sharing. The 
NAO, in collaboration with the services, should be responsible for establishing lead 
organizations and both an unclassified web page and a classified web page. It should 
build an online library of relevant PR literature to facilitate the access to PR knowledge 
and NPRN activities. The virtual space should be made available to as many actors as 
                                                 
281 Prototype model built by the author. “Atlases of the Clementinum,” 500px, December 18, 2012: 
https://500px.com/photo/35988964/atlases-of-the-clementinum-by-sean-
yan?ctx_page=1&from=user&user_id=2329539, book covers from Amazon.com and Time magazine.  
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possible in the unclassified space, while at the same time, the distribution of classified 
material to those with granted access privileges must be managed. 
3. NPRN Community of Practice Pace 
According to Anklam, the interaction pace of a network balances “connections in 
both place and space.”282 The intensity and frequency of the network members’ 
interactions, its pace, and its rhythm, are what enables the membership to synchronize 
their activities.283 Since the members consist of several sub-networks, attention to their 
integration is essential. The most frequent interaction between NPRN members occurs at 
various PR events. The core NPRN events in peacetime that have the most potential for 
the integration of core PR actors, commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel 
and practice in the execution phase, are the services’ SERE level-C certification 
exercises. Figure 43 illustrates how the NPRN actors and the NAO can provide an 
overview of the network interaction pace, namely its events, to all participants in the form 
of a NPRN PR event “wheel.” 
                                                 




The PR event wheel should be built to display the opportunities that exist to interact 
between network members, where and when they occur, and how to gain access and 
participation. The example above illustrates, counterclockwise, events available from 
January to December and a quick symbol explanation on the right.  
Figure 43.  NPRN CoP PR Event “Wheel”284 
 
The purpose of the event wheel is to display to all NPRN members PR events 
where and when there is an opportunity for the CoP to physically interact. The PR wheel 
should display the aggregate of PR events as they unfold throughout the year and the 
availability for members to join and to benefit. To maximize PR resources and achieve 
the most interaction and collaboration, the NAO and the lead organizations should 
emphasize and maximally make use of planned events to increase the NPRN interaction 
frequency. Core events are the full-scale PR and SERE exercises, visualized in Figure 43, 
with the PR model of the execution phase. PR and SERE OPR symbols are smaller scale 
events, and unit symbols display local events as they are scheduled. The interaction pace, 
as displayed by the PR event wheel, becomes an important arena for the CoP to meet and 
develop their knowledge and keep the PR conversation going. Each event becomes an 
important place to build network ties. The network governance structure should seek to 
include a diverse CoP at each event. 
                                                 
284 Prototype model built by the author.  
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Figures 44, 45, and 46 illustrate how the network interaction pace is an important 
arena for the development of network actors’ PR knowledge as they join one of the core 
PR events, here represented by participating in an RNoAF SERE level-C course. 
 
Figure 44 illustrates an example of participants at a NPRN event, represented by a 
RNoAF SERE level-C course and certification exercise. From top left and clockwise, 
participants include Conduct after Capture instructors (CACIs), from the Intelligence 
Service OPR for CAC, SERE instructor from the Army PR and SERE OPR, the RNoAF 
OPR with its instructor cadre, planners representing the NJHQ and the NAOC, forces 
from several RNoAF squadrons, isolated personnel from the Army and RNoAF, as well 
as international participants and squadron SERE instructors. The Home Guard 
participates and represents enemy forces.  
Figure 44.  NPRN Example of PR and SERE PACE and CoP285 
                                                 
285 Prototype model built by the author.  
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Figure 44 illustrates the diversity of PR actors at the beginning of a PR event. 
Network members are participating from all services and all levels of the PR organization 
including isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staffs, as well as the education 
and training institutions of more than one service. Network governance awareness of the 
importance of the network pace represented by its interaction events is critical for the 
CoP’s abilty to keep PR development going, as these events are their primary meeting 
place. Figure 45 illustrates the potential to build and expand NPRN connections as the 
SERE C course unfolds and participants collaborate, in this case, towards a common 
purpose of producing SERE level-C certified isolated personnel and educating and 
training commanders and staff, as well as forces. 
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The NPRN event serves as a key event for many of the various actors in the NPRN to 
come together, collaborate, hone, and develop PR skills and situational awareness and 
most important, to build trust and social capital that cross service and hierarchical 
boundaries. 
Figure 45.  Communities of Practice: Creating Ties, Trust and Social Capital I286 
 
Figure 46 illustrates new ties created by the interaction and collaboration of the 
NPRN event. 
                                                 
286 Prototype model built by the author.  
 118 
 
The NPRN event creates new ties between the various PR actors..287 
Figure 46.  Communities of Practice: Creating Ties, Trust and Social Capital II 
 
There are only limited opportunities available for the NPRN to physically meet 
and collaborate. Therefore, it is important that the NPRN leadership uses these occasions 
to their fullest advantage to broaden the interactions with all the network members. 
Virtual interactions, in addition to the physical interactions in space, also are needed. 
They can provide PR information and knowledge and through a formal web-based 
communication system, support the CoP activities and interactions. 
E. PROTOTYPE TESTING 
Thus far, the iterative process of prototype development and prototype testing has 
been conducted with the design team and a limited number of Norwegian key PR actors. 
                                                 
287 Prototype model built by the author. 
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The full and detailed prototyping-testing phase will continue with a larger group when 
the author returns to Norway. The prototype-testing phase is expected to continue from 
August to December 2016 as a sponsored project of the RNoAF EA PR. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
When we create new things—technologies, organizations, processes, 
environments, ways of thinking, or systems—we engage in design. To 
come up with an idea of what we think would be an ideal addition to the 
world, and give real existence—form, structure, and shape—to that idea, is 
at the core of design as a human activity. 
Harold G. Nelson and Erik Stolterman288 
 
Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion. 
Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and 
consequently mutual aid, will attack resolutely. 
Ardant du Picq289 
 
A. PERSONNEL RECOVERY FOR VALUE OR VALOR 
I began the capstone introduction with four stories that, for me, serve as a telling 
narrative of what humans are willing to do in order to come to the rescue of a fellow 
human being. From WWII, the Vietnam War, a crash site in Somalia, and a hostage 
rescue mission in Kabul, these stories represent numerous other tales of valor. The value 
our society places on such valor is demonstrated through the awards of the highest honors 
to those who display acts of altruism in the face of danger to themselves. On February 26, 
2016, I quite accidentally got to watch another historic PR event. President Obama 
presented the Medal of Honor to Navy SEAL Edward C. Byers for his actions in a 2012 
hostage rescue in a remote part of Afghanistan that led to the successful recovery of Dr. 
Dilip Joseph, reuniting him with his family. The successful recovery did not come 
without a cost, because Nicolas Checque, another SEAL, died in the same operation, at a 
great loss for his family, colleagues, and friends. As such, the ceremony became both a 
celebration and recognition of valor and a life saved, but also the remembrance of a life 
                                                 
288 Nelson and Stolterman, Design Way, 1.  
289 Charles Jean Jacques Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern (Harrisburg, PA: 
Military Service Publishing, 1947), 110. 
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lost. What made the ceremony even more connected to PR was the fact that two other 
Medal of Honor recipients were also present. Navy SEAL Tom Norris, who saved Bat-
21, the Air Force navigator Iceal “Gene” Hambleton, in Vietnam 1972—the story told in 
the introduction—was also present. Also present was another SEAL, Mike Thornton, 
who received his Medal of Honor for the rescue of Tom Norris and became the only 
Medal of Honor recipient to have rescued another Medal of Honor recipient. In essence, 
in one room, the history of PR and its value were represented by three living SEALs and 
three successful recoveries, as well as the cost involved, by the absence of Checque, 
whose life was lost in a rescue operation. 
1. Bigger Ideas 
I began the capstone introduction with “Personnel Recovery for Valor or Value,” 
but after watching the ceremony, it occurred to me there must be something bigger and 
deeper that motivates people to display such acts of altruism. My studies at NPS have 
provided many perspectives on warfare, but one class on “Psychological and 
Anthropological Perspectives on Fairness, Identity, and Terrorism,” taught by Professor 
Siamak Naficy, suggested that there is more to PR than value or valor that is relevant to 
this capstone. The anthropology perspective provided a hint at the bigger ideas on why 
people display such altruistic acts at great risk to themselves. The answer may reside in 
an evolutionary perspective, as stated by evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson, that 
is an important aspect of the PR narrative: “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. 
Altruistic groups beat selfish groups. Everything else is commentary.”290 
If altruistic group behavior and survival are linked to our existence today and 
prompt such acts as those seen in PR, then our narrative has to change. Currently there is 
a growing distance between society and the groups doing the fighting. The division is 
such that warfighting is outsourced to the professional military as society’s insurance 
policy. In such a situation, it becomes harder to see the direct link between group altruism 
and the survival of a society that pays for such altruism as insurance. PR within the 
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military can be understood as an extension of that insurance policy as it serves as the 
military’s own insurance policy. But as the direct link between group survival and the 
forces doing the fighting becomes more tenuous, it becomes harder to understand why we 
should fund such a force in the first place. This could be one reason why the PR force 
throughout history has seen so many ups and downs and why its lessons learned are 
subsequently forgotten between wars. 
Today, the PR system is fragmented and consists of many independent groups 
that need to coordinate to achieve their missions. The PR actors and entities must, like 
Ardant du Picq’s four less brave men, come together, know each other well, and be sure 
of their reliability and mutual aid in order to act as one. 
B. CAPSTONE SOLUTION 
At its core, the capstone prototypes and their recommendations are devoted to the 
design of the NPRN’s governance structure with its ability to coordinate and expand its 
reach to all members, provide expertise and leadership at all levels, and to build 
relationships that improve network performance.  
The NPRN CoP is expected to serve as a repository of PR knowledge and 
competence. It would be responsible for keeping PR competence alive and making sure 
the NPRN learns from previous PR mistakes, draws benefits from best practices, and 
enables adaptations as conditions change. In other words, the CoP retains the learning 
that people have paid in blood and treasure to aquire.  
At the technological level, the information system’s design is expected to afford 
access to all critical actors so they can share PR knowledge and participate in all PR 
community of practice activities. In addition, the PR CoP’s narrative is expected to 
evolve via the information system to signal PR’s important function for its warfighters, 
the impact it has on the will to fight, and the moral imperative we have to rescue those 
who become isolated and potentially captured. 
Written policy and doctrine, when developed, should provide the NPRN 
community with clear guidance to commanders and staffs of their responsibilities to 
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ensure that all critical actors are aware of their role in the PR system and provide 
necessary support during peacetime, crisis, and war. 
C. DESIGN PROCESS AND CAPSTONE APPLICABILITY 
A design philosophy approaches the love of wisdom as a devotion to the 
reconstitution of sophia—in other words, the reunification of inquiry and 
action, or more specifically, inquiry for action. Actions creating the right 
thing, for the right people, at the right time, in the right place, in the right 
way, for the right reasons is design wisdom. 
—Harold G. Nelson and Erik Stolterman291 
 
1. Design Process 
It was difficult to adhere strictly to the Design Thinking model which calls for a 
close collaboration among a core design team of diverse members who meet in person for 
each phase of the process. Despite several travels to Norway to meet the other members 
of the team, the geographical distance and a nine-hour time difference between Norway 
and NPS did hamper communication. Therefore, as the lead for the project, I had to 
synthesize inputs and make many of the design decisions.  
The challenges of communication experienced during this capstone are likely to 
be similar to other projects that find it difficult to gather team members in the same place 
at the same time, especially for those projects that have a diverse cross-disciplinary team 
located in different organizations. Despite this limitation and the less than perfect 
conditions, I nonetheless would recommend design as an inquiry for action to be taught 
to a broader audience of future leaders at NPS and elsewhere. It was possible to develop 
work-arounds to adjust for the time delays and distance, which did not substantively 
affect the development of the prototypes and hamper movement through at least four of 
the five phases of the design process. 
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2. Capstone Applicability 
This capstone has proposed the creation of a cross-boundary network, the design 
of its governance structure, and the development of a community of practice to support 
the NPRN activities. These prototypes, if successfully tested and implemented, will have 
the ability to cross traditional service boundaries and link hierarchical silos. They also 
have the advantage of being empowered by the traditional hierarchy while at the same 
time taking advantage of the flexibility that a network affords.  
For the NPRN specifically, the prototypes offer advantages, not the least which is 
the preparation of network members to participate in any PR activity either as 
Norwegians or as members of any NATO or a U.S.-led coalition. By creating a shared 
understanding of the PR network, its functions and tasks, PR actors will be better 
prepared to coordinate and work together when they deploy. 
3. Areas for Future Studies 
I believe these prototypes are applicable to other professional organizations, 
although follow-on research would need to establish their applicability in other areas 
besides PR and in other military organizations. The study of how to build communities of 
practice in the military and how to manage the development of knowledge, skill, and 
competence also are important for many knowledge areas in the military, such as forward 
air controllers, medics, operators, and subject matter experts in other fields.  
The NPRN participants in the NAO and lead organizations will benefit from 
further study of the management in networks and the management of networks. As our 
world becomes more networked, we need to understand how to lead, design, and manage 
these connections. This capstone is one step in that direction. 
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APPENDIX A. PR BIBLIOGRAPHY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following chronological bibliography of PR-related literature is the result of a 
human-centered approach to the topic of PR over the time frame from WWII to the 
present day. The method of using the Design Thinking approach to this capstone and the 
initial Discovery phase calls for a human-centered approach in the effort to understand 
the needs of the people involved. I have had this in mind, and the result is the following 
list of PR-related literature, chronologically grouped. The list covers the abstract 
theoretical perspective as a baseline with empirical cases studies on PR and includes the 
individual actor–specific literature of the people involved. The chosen literature, in each 
time period, is a result of the author’s effort to understand and gain insight from various 
groups to include (or, “with special emphasis on”) the isolated personnel who have had to 
survive, escape, and evade the enemy, and who in many cases, endured captivity and 
resisted interrogation and enemy POW treatment when the rescue forces were not able to 
get them out of harm’s way. To gain insight into the challenges faced by rescue forces, I 
have sought insights from the wide variety and types of rescue forces involved. To 
understand the commanders and staffs of rescue operations, their perspective was also 
sought where available. In addition to the education and training effort of these groups of 
people, both technological and organizational doctrinal descriptions and development are 
also listed as they evolved through time. 
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APPENDIX E. NPRN CORE STRUCTURE  
The prototype draws the Norwegian Armed Forces PR Network structure, based 
on the main actors involved in PR: isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staffs. 
This prototype first draws each of these actors as a separate subnetwork of the NPRN to 
illustrate the parts of the whole network, then merges them together as a whole. 
This first category of PR commanders and staffs “includes commanders and staffs 
trained to integrate and synchronize PR planning and operations into all operational 
activities.”292 The Joint Force Commander (JFC) “prepares for, plans and executes PR 
within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JFC establishes a PR architecture within the 
JOA, command relationships and procedures for PR operations, and the identification of 
intelligence requirements for PR, and assures that PR is an integral part of planning and 
training.”293  
The JFC exercises his PR responsibility through his PR command and control 
architecture as seen in Figure 47.  
                                                 
292 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 2-1. 
293 Ibid., 4-1. 
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Figure 47.  Notional Personnel Recovery Organization Structure294 
 
The PR network, as illustrated in Figure 47, provides a hierarchical chain of PR 
commanders and staffs to facilitate the reporting of PR events. The PR architecture 
provides a network of PR-competent planners and operations officers who have the 
necessary education and training to support the five PR tasks of report, locate, support, 
recover, and reintegrate.  
I have drawn the NPRN prototype based on the 2016 NATO Allied Joint Doctrine 
for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment’s295 notional personnel recovery 
                                                 
294 Ibid., 4-4. 
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organization structure, as seen in Figure 47 To depict the network forces, I have used the 
Strategic Defense Review 2015’s Overview of Norwegian Armed Forces Operational 
Structure as recommended by the CHOD, illustrated in Figure 48.296 
 
Figure 48.  Overview of Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Structure297 
                                                                                                                                                 
295 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel. 
296 Norwegian Armed Forces, Norwegian Armed Forces in Transition: Strategic Defence Review by 
the Norwegian Chief of Defence (Oslo: CHOD, 2015), 15: 
https://forsvaret.no/en/ForsvaretDocuments/Strategic_Defence_Review_2015_abridged.pdf. 
297 Ibid.  
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The NPRN spans the whole of the Norwegian Armed Forces operational 
structure; for the prototype, however, I have used the RNoAF as an example. The 
RNoAF subnetworks are illustrated one by one and merged in the end to show the 
RNoAF aggregate network structure as an example for all services. First, I present a 
prototype of the PR command and control (C2) architecture for commanders and staffs. 
Second, I develop the forces’ network structure. Third, I present the isolated personnel 
network structure. Finally, I merge all RNoAF subnetwork structures into one to visualize 
what an NPRN service structure could look like. 
a. PR Commanders and Staffs 
I begin illustrating the commanders and staffs subnetwork by drawing the RNoAF 
PR C2 architecture. Figure 49 provides a visualization of the PR C2 network structure as 
it starts at the top with the JFC and his Joint Personnel Recovery Centre at the Norwegian 
Joint Headquarters.  
  
This illustration uses the RNoAF as an example to show the PR commanders and staffs 
tracing the network from the JFC to the individual SERE level-C trained aircrew at each 
example squadron as per the NATO notional PR architecture. 
Figure 49.  RNoAF PR C2 Architecture298 
 
                                                 
298 Prototype model built by the author, adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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From the JFC and his JPRC, the PR C2 structure branches out to the various 
services’ tactical commands. As illustrated on the left side of the figure, the network 
starts at the joint level with the JFC and the JPRC, connects to the service level and the 
Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC), spreads out to five airwings and their 
headquarters. Then the network continues down to the various squadrons and finally 
terminates at the individual PR and SERE trained aircrew. PR planners and operations 
officers, labeled 5 and 3 according to their staff functions, are the network nodes at the 
joint and service levels. At the squadron level, the node is labeled PR Officer, which can 
be represented by a person that is either a PR planner, operations officer, SERE 
instructor, or a SERE trained aircrew. In Figure 50, the same network is shown in a 
cleaner configuration where only the human nodes in the network are visualized from the 
JPRC to the individual aircrew at the squadron level. 
 
 
Figure 50.  RNoAF PR C2 Architecture Clean299  
 
The membership in the commanders and staffs PR subnetwork as illustrated in 
Figures 49 and 50 is criteria-based. The network actors hold specific functions as a PR 
planner or an operations officer in a JPRC, a service PRCC, or in an air wing HQ staff, as 
a PR officer at the squadron level as well. The RNoAF PR C2 network structure 
highlights the need for PR-competent planners and operations officers especially at the 
JPRC and PRCC organizational nodes. PR planners are especially important actors at the 
                                                 
299 Prototype model built by the author. 
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joint and service levels, as they are responsible for producing important PR plans and 
annexes to any operations orders, either for peacetime exercises or, most importantly, for 
real operations. PR operations officers are critical in order to act on any PR event based 
on PR plans and their own current operation’s situational awareness.  
Figure 51 illustrates and adds the network, in blue, that is created by the education 
and training of PR planners and operations officers by the RNoAF office of primary 
responsibility for PR (OPR PR). 
 
Figure 51.  RNoAF PR C2 Architecture with Education and Training300 
 
The education of PR planners and operations officers is most important for their 
capability to execute their PR preparation, planning, and execution functions in the PR 
system. The education and training organization and network OPR should support these 
functions by providing initial training of PR planners and operations officers thereafter to 
serve as a reachback source of PR knowledge and competence for the PR officers. 
b. PR Forces 
The second subnetwork prototype is drawn based on the RNoAF PR-dedicated 
and capable forces. Figure 52 illustrates the network of forces as shown by the chain of 
command from the JFC, through the National Air Operations Centre (NAOC), to the 
RNoAF flying squadrons. 
                                                 
300 Prototype model built by the author. 
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Only the 330 Squadron with its national search and rescue mission is a PR-dedicated 
force; the other squadrons are considered PR-capable based on how they can contribute 
and support PR execution tasks like report, locate, support, and recover. 
Figure 52.  RNoAF PR Forces301  
 
Figure 53 adds the education and training network, in blue, to the operational 
command and control network. 
 
Figure 53.  RNoAF PR Forces with Education and Training302 
  
                                                 
301 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4.  
302 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4.  
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In sum, Figure 53 depicts both the operational network from the NAOC and the 
added network created by the RNoAF OPR PR and the education and training they 
provide to the forces in their roles as either a PR-dedicated force or a PR-capable force.  
c. Isolated Personnel 
The final RNoAF PR subnetwork depicts isolated personnel. The network 
membership criteria is based on the role as isolated personnel, or as a SERE instructor, or 
as the OPR training institution. The PR education and training network of isolated 
personnel originates at the RNoAF OPR PR and flows down to the individual aircrew at 
the squadron level through the local squadron SERE instructors, as seen in Figure 54.  
 
Figure 54.  RNoAF Isolated Personnel with Education and Training303 
 
d. NPRN and the RNoAF PR Network 
In sum, the RNoAF PR subnetworks have been created based on three groups of 
actors. The core nodes that create the foundation of the RNoAF contribution to the NPRN 
are the RNoAF OPR PR, commanders and staffs, forces, and isolated personnel. The core 
network prototype is depicted in Figure 55. 
                                                 
303 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4.  
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Figure 55.  RNoAF Aggregate of the NPRN304 
 
The network, when fully developed, will add additional nodes that originate from 
each of these core actors as they are identified in the construction of the network and as it 
continues to develop its connections. The aggregate RNoAF PR network illustrates key 
nodes that are located at all levels from the JFC all the way down to the individual 
aircrew. The PR system model also illustrates the importance of addressing all levels of 
the system and depicts this in the preparation function of the model, as seen in Figure 56. 
 
Figure 56.  PR System Levels 
 
The PR system model labels the levels: strategic national, strategic theater, 
operational, and tactical. 
                                                 
304 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figures 57–77 provide the same network structure prototypes for the Norwegian 
Army, Navy, and the Norwegian Special Forces, as previously illustrated by the RNoAF 
example.  
 
Figure 57.  Norwegian Army PR C2 Architecture305 
 
 
Figure 58.  Norwegian Army PR C2 Architecture Clean306 
                                                 
305 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
306 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 




Figure 59.  Norwegian Army PR C2 Architecture with Education and Training307 
 
Figure 60.  Norwegian Army PR Forces308 
                                                 
307 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
308 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 61.  Norwegian Army PR Forces with Education and Training309 
 
 
Figure 62.  Norwegian Army Isolated Personnel with Education and 
Training310 
 
                                                 
309 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
310 Prototype model built by the author adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure found 
in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 63.  Norwegian Army Aggregate of the NPRN311 
 
 
Figure 64.  Norwegian Navy PR C2 Architecture312 
                                                 
311 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
312 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 65.  Norwegian Navy PR C2 Architecture Clean313 
 
 
Figure 66.  Norwegian Navy PR C2 Architecture with Education and Training314 
                                                 
313 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
314 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 67.  Norwegian Navy PR Forces315 
 
 
Figure 68.  Norwegian Navy PR Forces with Education and Training316 
                                                 
315 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
316 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 69.  Norwegian Navy Isolated Personnel and Education and Training317  
 
 
Figure 70.   Navy Aggregate of the NPRN318 
                                                 
317 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
318 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Generic NORSOF PR C2 Architecture. Number of squadrons and individuals for 
illustration only. 
Figure 71.  NORSOF PR C2 Architecture319 
 
 
Figure 72.  NORSOF PR C2 Architecture Clean320 
                                                 
319 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
320 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 73.  NORSOF PR C2 Architecture with Education and Training321 
 
 
Figure 74.  NORSOF PR Forces322 
 
 
                                                 
321 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
322 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 75.  NORSOF PR Forces with Education and Training323 
 
 
Figure 76.  NORSOF Isolated Personnel with Education and Training324 
 
                                                 
323 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
324 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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Figure 77.  NORSOF Aggregate of the NPRN325 
 
With all the services’ intraorganizational sub networks of the NPRN drawn, 
Figure 78 merges all subnetworks into the NPRN at the interorganizational level: 
 
Figure 78.  NPRN Aggregate326 
                                                 
325 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
326 Prototype model built by the author is adapted from the Notional PR Organizational Structure 
found in NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel, 4-4. 
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For prototyping purposes, Figure 78 illustrates the NPRN with all its core actors, 
commanders and staff, forces, isolated personnel, and the services’ education and training 
institutions. From this core NPRN structure, the network can be expanded with additional 
members as each service and the PR community of practice see fit and as the prototype 
meets real life in its implementation.  
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APPENDIX F. PR DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION 
This Appendix on PR Doctrine provides an overview of the evolution of PR 
doctrine and views the PR system with a doctrinal lens and perspective as it provides 
guidance for PR to isolated personnel, forces, and commanders and staffs. 
To understand policy and doctrine from the perspective of the actors and 
stakeholders in the PR system, I follow the evolution from WWII and onward and how 
PR doctrine has evolved from the individual to the strategic level, from the isolated 
personnel to the president. First, the initial development in WWII from 1940–1945 is 
covered. Second, the development caused by the Korean War is addressed. Third, the 
Vietnam War and its influence on doctrine is shown. Fourth, Operation Desert Storm 
caused further development, and finally the last decade and a half of fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror’s impact on PR is summed up.  
WWII (1940–1945). The first PR doctrine available for the preparation, 
education, and training of isolated personnel was provided by the British Military 
Intelligence 9 (MI9). The objectives of MI9 were, among others, to “facilitate escapes of 
British prisoners of war,” to “facilitate the return to the United Kingdom to those who 
succeeded in evading capture in enemy occupied territory,” and to “collect and distribute 
information.”327 The principal doctrinal publication, the classified MI9 Bulletin which 
was the “Bible” of Evasion and Escape, contained everything that could assist personnel 
who found themselves cut off in enemy territory or captured in Europe. The bulletin was 
updated as new information and experiences from escapers and evaders became available 
after successful recovery operations and debriefings.328 The U.S. equivalent to the MI9 
was the Military Intelligence Service-X (MIS-X), which produced a similar publication 
called The M.I.S.-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival.329 In addition to the main 
                                                 
327 War Office, Attachment “A,” 4. 
328 For the recently declassified WWII MI9 documents, see War Office, MI9 Bulletin; and War Office, 
Attachment “A.”  
329 For the U.S. equivalent to the MI9, see War Department, MIS–X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and 
Survival (Washington, DC: War Department, 1944). 
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doctrinal publications of MI9 and M.I.S.-X, several unclassified survival guides covering 
land and sea survival in climates like the arctic, desert, and jungle were produced.330 The 
focus of WWII doctrine was on briefing the individual on personal survival skills and 
escape and evasion tactics.331  
Korea (June 25, 1950–July 27, 1953). When the Korean War broke out in June 
1950, the available doctrine was still focused on the isolated personnel level and survival, 
and escape and evasion.332 During the Korean War, several documents based on the 
experiences and lessons learned from the thousands of WWII escaper and evader 
debriefing reports were published by the Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center at the 
Air University (ADTIC) .333  
Of the 1,600,000 U.S. service members that participated in the conflict, 7,190 
became POWs, and of those, only 4,428 survived.334 The POW situation received a great 
deal of negative publicity in the United States, and the Defense Advisory Committee on 
Prisoners of War was tasked by the secretary of defense to investigate the situation, 
identify lessons learned, and initiate any necessary changes. Their recommendations are 
summarized in the opening remarks of their report.335 
                                                 
330 For examples of the various survival guides, see Office of Naval Intelligence, Survival on Land 
and Sea (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943); Air Ministry, Health Hints for Warm 
Climates, A.M. Pam 160 (London: Air Ministry, 1943); and Headquarters Army Air Forces, Survival: On 
Land Jungle-Desert-Arctic, AAF Manual No. 21W (New York: Army Air Forces Tactical Center, 1944). 
331 The individual survival doctrine focused on topics like first aid, fire-making, signaling, and water 
and food in general and specifically how the various environments influenced the same topics. The escape 
and evasion doctrine covered how to Escape and Evade in specific countries and how to break out of prison 
camps. 
332 After WWII, the focus continued to be on survival and Escape and Evasion techniques with 
updated and new publications based on the WWII experience, like Department of the Army, Behind Enemy 
Lines, DA Pam 21-46 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951). 
333 The ADTIC at the Air University researched and produced a range of lessons-learned documents 
based on actual survival stories from WWII to mitigate the risk to future isolated personnel in the same 
environments. Examples of this effort are found in Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center, It’s the Little 
Things: Evasion and Escape during World War II (S), ADTIC Publication No. G-100 (Maxwell, AL: Air 
University, 1950); Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center, 999 Survived: Survival Experiences in the 
Southwest Pacific, ADTIC Publication No. T-100 (Maxwell, AL: Air University, 1950); and in Arctic, 
Desert, Tropic Information Center, Afoot in the Desert: A Contribution to Basic Survival, ADTIC 
Publication No. D-100 (Maxwell, AL: Air University, 1951). 
334 Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW: The Fight Continues after 
the Battle (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 79. 
335 Ibid. 
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In concluding, the Committee unanimously agreed that Americans require 
a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for our prisoners of war 
backed up by a first class training program. This position is also 
wholeheartedly supported by the consensus of opinion of all those who 
consulted with the Committee. From no one did we receive stronger 
recommendations on this point than from former American prisoners of 
war in Korea—officers and enlisted men.336 
The Korean POW experience triggered a major doctrinal change at the strategic 
level addressing the needs of the individual, when in August 1955, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower signed into effect Executive Order 10631, Code of Conduct for Members of 
the Armed Forces of the United States.337 The executive order stated:  
All members of the Armed Forces of the United States are expected to 
measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while in 
combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, 
members of the armed forces liable to capture shall be provided with 
specific training and instruction designed to better equip them to counter 
and withstand all enemy efforts against them, and shall be fully instructed 
as to the behavior and obligations expected of them during combat or 
captivity.338  
 In sum, the Korean War experience and the immediate aftermath left the 
following PR policy in place by 1959. The doctrine was aimed at the individual level and 
the isolated personnel’s SERE training and education. In order of publication: Exec. 
Order No. 10, 631--Code of Conduct for members of the Armed Forces of the United 
States, 3 C.F.R. (1954-1958); Department of the Air Force. Survival (AFM 64-5). 
Washington, DC: Air Training Command, 1954; Department of the Air Force. Survival 
Training Edition (AFM 64-3). Washington, DC: Air Training Command, 1956.; 
Department of the Army. Survival (FM 21-76). Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1957 C1, 1959; Department of the Army. Evasion and Escape (FM 21-
77). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, and Department of the 
                                                 
336 Ibid, vii. 
337 For Executive Order 10631, see Executive Order 10631, “Code of Conduct for Members of the 
Armed Forces of the United States,” August 17, 1955, as amended, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/10631.html. For an in-depth study of the origins and meaning of the 
Code of Conduct, see Geoffrey S. Moakley, “U.S. Army Code of Conduct Training: Let the POWs Tell 
Their Stories” (master’s thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1976). 
338 See Executive Order 10631, “Code of Conduct.” 
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Army. (C) Evasion and Escape (U) (FM 21-77A). Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1959. 
Vietnam (1961–1975). During the Vietnam War, service-level PR doctrine 
evolved, and by the end of the war, several PR doctrine publications were updated, and 
new service-level doctrine for CSAR was established. Individual level doctrine to support 
the isolated personnel was updated several times in all services, covering topics on 
survival and escape and evasion skills.339 
The new education and training in support of isolated personnel relied on doctrine 
that established a new Department of Defense–level directive to Code of Conduct 
training in the Department of Defense, Training and Education Measures Necessary to 
Support the Code of Conduct (CoC).340 
The development of combat search and rescue in Korea and Vietnam finally also 
led to a new service-level doctrine aimed at PR forces and commanders and staffs when 
the Department of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, Wartime Search and Rescue 
(AR 525-90, AFM 64-3, NWP 19-2), was established.341  
Desert Storm (1991–2000). Not until PR lessons learned from Desert Storm in 
1991 did PR doctrine develop more than just updates from previous doctrine. The next 
step up the doctrine ladder came out of the Iraq conflict. By 1996, the first PR Joint 
Publications were established. In 1996, both the Joint Staff, Joint Doctrine for Evasion 
                                                 
339 The AFM 64-3 was updated twice as seen in Department of the Air Force, Survival Training 
Edition, AFM 64-3 (Washington, DC: Air Training Command, 1962), and in Department of the Air Force, 
Survival Training Edition, AFM 64-3 (Washington, DC: Air Training Command, 1969). The same update 
was made to AFM 64-5, as seen in Department of the Air Force, Survival; and in Department of the Air 
Force, Survival: Search and Rescue, AFM 64-5 (Washington, DC: Air Training Command, 1969). The 
Army also updated both the unclassified and the classified version of Field Manual 21-76 and FM 21-77, as 
seen in Department of the Army, Survival Evasion and Escape, FM 21-76 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963); Department of the Army, Survival Evasion and Escape, FM 21-76 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969); and the classified versions of Department of 
the Army, Evasion and Escape, FM 21-77 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965); and 
the multiservice, Department of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, (S) Joint Worldwide Evasion and 
Escape Manual (U), FM 21-77A (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy, 
1967). 
340 Department of Defense, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of 
Conduct (CoC), DOD Directive 1300.7 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1964). 
341 Department of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, Wartime Search and Rescue, AR 525-90, 
AFM 64-3, NWP 19-2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971). 
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and Recovery (JP 3-50.3) and the Joint Staff, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and 
Rescue (JP 3-50.2) were published. In 1998, they were followed by the Joint Staff, Joint 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Search and Rescue (JP 3-50.21).342 
These joint publications provided a common anchor point and an authoritative doctrinal 
framework that embraced all the services.  
The joint publications were soon followed by a DOD Directive343 and DOD 
Instruction,344 as well as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction345 that 
introduced the term Personnel Recovery (PR) for the first time as an umbrella term, 
defined it, and expanded upon PR as the following: 
Personnel Recovery (PR). The sum of military, civil, and political efforts 
to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile 
environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or 
isolated. That includes U.S., allied, coalition, friendly military, or 
paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command 
Authorities (NCAs). PR is the umbrella term for operations that are 
focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel 
from danger. PR includes, but is not limited to, theater search and rescue 
(SAR); Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR); Survival, Escape, Resistance, 
and Evasion (SERE); Evasion and Recovery (E&R); and the coordination 
of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR may occur through 
military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other U.S. 
Government–approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through 
any of those options.346  
The responsibilities for PR outlined in these documents were further expanded 
and updated in 2000, when DOD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, updated policy 
                                                 
342 In order of appearance, see CJCS, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue; CJCS, Joint 
Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery; and CJCS, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat 
Search and Rescue. 
343 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Personnel Recovery, DOD Directive 2310.2 (Washington, DC: 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1997).  
344 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures, 
DoD Instruction 2310.3 (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, June 30, 1997). 
345 CJCS, Personnel Recovery within the Department of Defense, CJCS Instruction 3270.01 
(Washington, DC: CJCS, January 1998). 
346 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures, 6. 
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and realigned important responsibilities for PR.347 The DOD Directive for PR designates 
the commander in chief (CINC), United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as 
the DOD executive agent (EA) for PR and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) 
as the OPR for DOD-wide personnel recovery.348 The directive provided a detailed 
account of the responsibilities of a number of important PR actors like the under secretary 
of defense for Policy, the assistant secretary of defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict, the secretary of the Air Force, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the commander of the Combatant Commands, and many more. 
Personnel recovery policy and doctrine have evolved from the early days of 
WWII, but it took over six decades before President George W. Bush established a 
whole-of-government approach to PR. On December 4, 2008, he established Annex 1 to 
National Security Presidential Directive 12 (NSPD-12), United States Policy on 
Personnel Recovery and the Prevention of U.S. Hostage Taking and Other Isolating 
Events, and thereby lay the foundation for the development of a holistic government 
approach to PR. 349 According to Lieutenant Colonel William J. Rowell, Annex 1 was a 
watershed effort in that it “[established] a comprehensive policy concerning personnel 
recovery with enabling objectives and specific tasks, guiding every department and 
agency toward three strategic personnel recovery objectives: prevention of, preparation 
for, and response to isolating events.”350 Rowell further highlighted that the strategic 
objective of response to an isolating event “is to energize the personnel recovery network 
and quickly recover isolated personnel and manage their reintegration into normal 
operations.”351 The continuing efforts to improve the whole of government approach to 
PR was restated and reaffirmed when President Obama, in his press release on PPD-30 
and the subject of U.S. nationals taken hostage abroad and personnel recovery efforts, 
stated, 
                                                 
347 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Personnel Recovery, DOD Directive 2310.2 (Washington, DC: 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2000).  
348 Ibid., 1. 
349 Rowell, “Whole of Government Approach to Personnel Recovery.” 
350 Ibid., 9. 
351 Ibid., 10. 
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The policy directs a renewed, more agile United States Government 
response to hostage-takings of U.S. nationals and other specified 
individuals abroad. It establishes processes to enable consistent 
implementation of the policies set forth in this directive, to ensure close 
interagency coordination in order to employ all appropriate means to 
recover U.S. hostages held abroad, and to significantly enhance 
engagement with hostages’ families. It also reaffirms the United States 
Government’s personnel recovery policy, which seeks to prevent, prepare 
for, and respond to hostage-takings and other circumstances in which U.S. 
nationals are isolated from friendly support.352 
In sum, the evolution of U.S. PR doctrine can be traced back to its origins in 
WWII, and through a continuous evolution, the U.S. military and finally the President has 
gradually produced doctrine that ranges from the individual level through service, joint, 
and DOD-level guidance and finally has resulted in a whole of U.S. government 
approach to PR with strategic policy and guidance.  
NATO doctrine on PR has been evolving through numerous study drafts since 
2004. The fist Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP) that discussed PR as an overarching system 
was the AJP-3.3.8 Initial Discussion Draft titled Personnel Recovery Policy/Doctrine. 
From 2004 until 2008, NATO PR doctrine evolved and changed names and numbering 
several times until it was called AJP-3.3.9 (SD-8) Allied Joint Doctrine for Personnel 
Recovery.353 The development of NATO PR TTPs followed a similar evolution of study 
drafts from 2005 until 2010 when it was called Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 3.7.1 
(SD-2) NATO Personnel Recovery TTPs.354 Because the study drafts were not formally 
approved NATO doctrine and awaited agreement on policy, a Joint Operational 
Guideline (JOG) was created that enabled NATO nations to educate and train according 
to an interim document until a final NATO PR policy emerged.355 Several NATO nations 
                                                 
352 Barack Obama, U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts, PPD-30 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2015); White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential 
Memorandum: Presidential Policy Directive—Hostage Recovery Activities,” The White House, June 24, 
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/presidential-policy-directive-hostage-
recovery-activities. 
353 See Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to Return 
with Honor, A Primer (Kalkar, Germany: JPCC, 2011), 14, Figure 2. 
354 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Personnel Recovery, 19, Figure 4.  
355 NATO, BI-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational Guidelines. 
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and other European countries have updated their PR documents, represented by Great 
Britain356 and Sweden.357 In addition to NATO work on PR, the European Air Group 
(EAG) has also been working European Union (EU) PR issues to foster PR collaboration 
among EU nations. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) has published two 
major analyses on NATO PR to support the advance of NATO PR doctrine.358 Finally on 
February 23, 2016, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile 
Environment (AJP-3.7) was approved and put into effect.359 In addition to AJP-3.7, 
Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 080-101, Personnel Recovery in NATO 
Operations, established responsibilities for PR for NATO-led operations.360 To prevent 
an operational void, the ACO Manual 080-071, Personnel Recovery in NATO 
Operations, bridged the gap in NATO TTPs and served as a frame of reference until an 
ATP for PR could be written, ratified, and promulgated throughout NATO.361 
To sum up, in 2016, NATO finally has an overarching PR doctrine in place as 
AJP-3.7. It provides the fundamental principles of PR and aligns itself with the U.S. PR 
system model with minor modifications. Such an overarching doctrine is necessary for a 
multinational force to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR efforts and provides a 
central NATO PR reference that allows NATO nations to develop their own national PR 
doctrine in accordance with a NATO-approved doctrine. 
  
                                                 
356 Ministry of Defense, Joint Personnel Recovery. 
357 Forsvarsmakten [Swedish Armed Forces], Handbok Joint Personnel Recovery [Joint personnel 
recovery handbook] (Stockholm: Forsvarsmakten [Swedish Armed Forces], 2014). 
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359 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel.  
360 NATO, Personnel Recovery in NATO Operations, ACO Directive 080-101 (Mons, Belgium: 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2015). 
361 Ibid., 1. 
 
193 
APPENDIX G. ROBERTS NETWORK DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
194 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 195 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, Thomas K. U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. 
Air Ministry. Health Hints for Warm Climates. A.M. Pam 160. London: Air Ministry, 
1943. 
Alexander, Paul. “Fallout from Somalia Still Haunts U.S. Policy 20 Years Later.” Stars 
and Stripes, October 3, 2013. http://www.stripes.com/news/fallout-from-somalia-
still-haunts-us-policy-20-years-later-1.244957.  
Anderson, William C. Bat-21. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980. 
Anklam, Patti. Net Work: A Practical Guide to Creating and Sustaining Networks at 
Work and in the World. New York: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. 
Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center. 999 Survived: Survival Experiences in The 
Southwest Pacific. ADTIC Publication No. T-100. Montgomery, AL: Air 
University, 1950. 
Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center. Afoot in The Desert: A Contribution to Basic 
Survival. ADTIC Publication No. D-100. Montgomery, AL: Air University, 1951. 
Arctic, Desert, Tropic Information Center. It’s The Little Things: Evasion and Escape 
during World War II (S). ADTIC Publication No. G-100. Montgomery, AL: Air 
University, 1950. 
Ardant du Picq, Charles Jean Jacques. Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern. Harrisburg, 
PA: Military Service Publishing, 1947. 
Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. Networks and Netwars. Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 2001. 
Baldwin, R. E., and Thomas McGarry. Last Hope: The Blood Chit Story. Atglen, PA: 
Schiffer, 1997. 
Berg-Knutsen, Espen, and Nancy Roberts. Strategic Design for NORSOF 2025. Naval 
Postgraduate School Technical Report No. NPS-DA-15-001. Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, September 2014.  
Bishop, Edward. The Guinea Pig Club. London: Macmillan & Co, 1963. 
Bishop, Edward. McIndoe’s Army: The Story of the Guinea Pig Club and its Indomitable 
Members. London: Grub Street, 2001. 
 196 
Bottoms, Mike. “USSOCOM Celebrates Its 20th Anniversary.” Tip of the Spear (April 
2007): 4–10. 
Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 1999. 
Brinton, William Cope. Graphic Presentation. New York: Brinton Associates, 1939. 
Brome, Vincent. The Way Back: The Story of Lieut.-Commander Pat O’Leary G.C., 
D.S.O., R.N. London: Casel and Co, 1957. 
Brown, Tim. Change by Design: How Design Thinking Transforms Organizations and 
Inspires Innovation. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. 
Bush, George W. United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad. NSPD-12. Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2002. 
Caine, Philip D. Aircraft Down!: Evading Capture in WWII Europe. Washington, DC: 
Brassey’s, 1997. 
Cambridge, Darren, Soren Kaplan, and Vicky Suter. Communities of Practice Design 
Guide: A Step-by-Step Guide for Design & Cultivating Communities of Practice 
in Higher Education. Washington, DC: EDUCAUSE Learning Initiative, 2005. 
http://www.educause.edu/library/resources/community-practice-design-guide-
step-step-guide-designing-cultivating-communities-practice-higher-education.  
Carney, John T., and Benjamin F. Schemmer. U.S. Special Operations Forces. Tampa, 
FL: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 2003. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue. JP 3-
50.2. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1996. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JP 1-
02. Washington, DC: CJCS, 2016. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Personnel Recovery. JP 3-50. Washington, DC: CJCS, 
2007. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Personnel Recovery. JP 3-50. Washington, DC: CJCS, 
2011. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Personnel Recovery within the Department of 
Defense. CJCS Instruction 3270.01. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, January 1998. 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Special Operations. Joint Publication 3–05. Washington, 
DC: CJCS, July 2014.  
 197 
Cohen, Don, and Laurence Prusak. In Good Company: How Social Capital Makes 
Organizations Work. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001. 
Couch, Jon. Caged Heroes: American POW Experiences from the Revolutionary War to 
the Present. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. 
Denning, Peter J. and Robert Dunham. The Innovator’s Way: Essential Practices for 
Successful Innovation. London: The MIT Press, 2010. 
Department of the Air Force. Survival. AFM 64-5. Washington, DC: Air Training 
Command, 1945. 
Department of the Air Force. Survival: Search and Rescue. AFM 64-5. Washington, DC: 
Air Training Command, 1969. 
Department of the Air Force. Survival Training Edition. AFM 64-3. Washington, DC: Air 
Training Command, 1962.  
Department of the Air Force. Survival Training Edition. AFM 64-3. Washington, DC: Air 
Training Command, 1969.  
Department of the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy. (S) Joint Worldwide Evasion and 
Escape Manual (U). FM 21-77A. Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 
the Army, and the Navy, 1967. 
Department of the Army. Behind Enemy Lines. DA Pam 21-46. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1951. 
Department of the Army. Evasion and Escape. FM 21-77. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1965. 
Department of the Army. Survival Evasion and Escape. FM 21-76. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.  
Department of the Army. Survival Evasion and Escape. FM 21-76. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.  
Department of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. Wartime Search and Rescue. AR 
525-90, AFM 64-3, NWP 19-2. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1971.  
Department of Defense. Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the 
Code of Conduct (CoC). DOD Directive 1300.7. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 1964. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Personnel Recovery. DOD Directive 2310.2. Washington, 
DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2000. 
 198 
Doll, John G. Cloth Maps, Charts, and Blood Chits of World War II. Bennington, VT: 
Merriam Press, 1988. 
Dorl, Thomas R. “Personnel Recovery and the DOTMLPF Changes Needed for the 
Twenty-First Century.” Master’s thesis, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 
2005. 
d.school. “The Design Process Mini-Guide.” d.school. August 2, 2012. 
https://dschool.stanford.edu/groups/designresources/wiki/36873/Design_Process_
MiniGuide.html  
Dumais, Lucien. The Man Who Went Back. London: Leo Cooper, 1975. 
Durant, Michael J. In the Company of Heroes. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2003. 
Everton, Sean F. Disrupting Dark Networks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012. 
Fields, Kenny Wayne. The Rescue of Streetcar 304: A Navy Pilot’s Forty Hours on the 
Run in Laos. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 
Foot, M. R. D. SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations 
Executive in France 1940–1944. London: HSMO, 1966. 
Foot, M. R. D., and J. M. Langley. MI9 Escape and Evasion 1939–1945. London: The 
Bodley Head, 1979. 
Forsvaret [Norwegian Armed Forces]. Direktiv for luftmilitær virksomhet [Directive for 
air operations]. Oslo: Forsvarssjefen [Chief of defense], 2014.  
Forsvarsmakten [Swedish Armed Forces]. Handbok Joint Personnel Recovery [Joint 
personnel recovery handbook]. Stockholm: Forsvarsmakten [Swedish Armed 
Forces], 2014. 
Fowler, Will. Certain Death in Sierra Leone: The SAS and Operation Barras 2000. 
Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2000. 
Franks, Norman. Another Kind of Courage: Stories of the UK-Based Walrus Air-Sea 
Rescue Squadrons. London: Patrick Stephens Limited, 1994. 
Freeman, Gregory A. The Forgotten 500: The Untold Story of the Men Who Risked All 
for the Greatest Rescue Mission of World War II. New York: NAL Calibel, 2007. 
Galdorisi, George, and Tom Phillips. Leave No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search 
and Rescue. Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008. 
 199 
Gargus, John. The Son Tay Raid: American POWs in Vietnam Were Not Forgotten. 
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007. 
Guilmartin, John F. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang. 
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 
Headquarters Army Air Forces. Survival: On Land Jungle-Desert-Arctic. AAF Manual 
No. 21W. New York: Army Air Forces Tactical Center, 1944. 
Hemingway-Douglas, Reanne, and Don Douglas. The Shelbourne Escape Line: Secret 
Rescues of Allied Aviators by the French Underground, the British Royal Navy, 
and London’s MI9. Anacortes, WA: Cave Art Press, 2014. 
Holohan, Anne. Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Beyond. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
Holte, Nils Johan. “Norske spesialstyrker i støpesjeen—hva innebærer reformene?” 
[Norwegian Special Forces in development—what are the implications of 
reform?] Speech, Oslo Militære Samfund [Oslo Military Society], Oslo, March 
31, 2014.  
Howarth, David. The Shetland Bus: A WWII Epic of Escape, Survival, and Adventure. 
Guilford, CT: The Lyon Press, 2001. 
Howarth, David. We Die Alone: A WWII Epic of Escape and Endurance. Guilford, CT: 
The Lyon Press, 1999. 
Hutton, Clayton. Official Secret: The Remarkable Story of Escape Aids—Their Invention, 
Production—and the Sequel. New York: Crown, 1961. 
Hutton, Clayton. Per Ardua Libertas. London: War Office, 1942. 
Ideo.org. The Field Guide to Human-Centered Design. San Francisco: Ideo.org., 2015. 
Ideo.org. The Field Guide to Human-Centered Design: Design Kit. Palo Alto, CA: 
IDEO.org, 2015. http://www.designkit.org/resources/1. 
Jackson, Mike, and Tara Dixon-Engel. Naked in Da Nang: A Forward Air Controller in 
Vietnam. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004. 
Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Enhancing NATO Joint Personnel Recovery 
Capability: Education and Training. Kolkar, Germany: JPCC, May 2014.  
Joint Air Power Competence Centre. Personnel Recovery: That Others May Live to 
Return with Honour, A Primer. Kalkar, Germany: JPCC, 2011. 
 200 
Joseph, Dilip, and James Lund. Kidnapped by the Taliban: A Story of Terror, Hope, and 
Rescue by Seal Team Six. Nashville: W Publishing Group, 2014. 
Keeney, L. Douglas. Air-Sea Rescue 1941–1952. Campbell, CA: Premiere, 2013. 
Kenis, Patrick, and Keith G. Provan. “Towards an Exogenous Theory of Public Network 
Performance.” Public Administration 87, no. 3 (July 2009): 440–56. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01775.x. 
Krippendorff, Klaus. The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design. Boca Raton, FL: 
CRC Press, 2006. 
Kyle, James H., and John Robert Eidson. The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran 
Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander. New York: Orion 
Books, 1990. 
Lineberry, Cate. The Secret Rescue: An Untold Story of American Nurses and Medics 
behind Nazi Lines. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2013. 
Linstone, Harold A. Multiple Perspectives for Decision Making: Bridging the Gap 
between Analysis and Action. New York: Elsevier Science, 1984. 
Marrett, George J. Cheating Death: Combat Air Rescues in Vietnam and Laos. New 
York: Smithsonian Books, 2006. 
Martin, Roger. The Design of Business. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009. 
Matlary, Janne Haaland, Tormod Heier, and Ola Bøe-Hansen. Strategisk Sukksess?: 
Norsk Maktbruk i Libya og Afghanistan [Strategic success?: Norwegian use of 
force in Libya and Afghanistan]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget [University Press], 
2013. 
Mayhew, E. R. The Reconstruction of Warriors. London: Greenhill Books, 2004. 
McChrystal, Stanley A., Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell. Team of 
Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. New York: 
Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 
McDermott, Richard. “Why Information Technology Inspired, but Cannot Deliver 
Knowledge Management.” California Management Review 41, no. 3 (1999): 103–
17. 
McNab, Andy. Bravo Two Zero. London: Bantam Press, 1993. 
McNab, Chris. Storming Flight 181: GSG-9 and the Mogadishu Hijack 1977. Oxford: 
Osprey, 2011. 
 201 
Mercer Delta Consulting. The Congruence Model: A Roadmap for Understanding 
Organizational Performance. New York: Mercer Delta Consulting, 2004. 
Milward, H. Brinton, and Keith G. Provan. A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using 




Ministry of Defence. Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile 
Environment. Edition A, Version 1 with UK National Elements, AJP-3.7. 
London: Ministry of Defence, February 2016. 
Ministry of Defence. Joint Personnel Recovery. JWP 3-66. London: Ministry of Defence, 
2003. 
Moakley, Geoffrey S. “U.S. Army Code of Conduct Training: Let the POWs Tell Their 
Stories.” Master’s thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff 
College, 1976. 
Neal, John A. Bless You, Brother Irvin: The Caterpillar Club Story. Ontario: General 
Store, 2005. 
Neave, Airey. Little Cyclone. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954. 
Neave, Airey. Saturday at MI9: The Classic Account of the World War Two Allied 
Escape Organisation. Barnsley, England: Leo Cooper, 2004. 
Nelson, Harold G., and Erik Stolterman. The Design Way: Intentional Change in an 
Unpredictable World. 2nd edition. London: The MIT Press, 2012. 
Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision-Makers. New York: The Free Press, 1986. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a 
Hostile Environment. AJP-3.7, Edition A, Version 1. Brussels: NATO 
Standardization Office, 2016.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. BI-SC Joint Personnel Recovery Joint Operational 
Guidelines. BI-SC JPR JOG. Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Commander, 
Transformation, 2011.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO Survival, Evasion, Resistance and 
Extraction (SERE) Training Standard. STANAG 7196 SD 05. Brussels: NATO 
Standardization Office, 2014. 
 202 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO Survival, Evasion, Resistance and 
Extraction (SERE) Training Standard. STANAG 7196 SD 06. Brussels: NATO 
Standardization Office, 2016. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Personnel Recovery in NATO Operations. ACO 
Directive 080-101. Mons, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe, 2015. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Personnel Recovery in NATO Operations. ACO 
Manual 080-071. Mons, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 
2016. 
Norwegian Armed Forces. Norwegian Armed Forces in Transition: Strategic Defence 
Review by the Norwegian Chief of Defence. Oslo: CHOD, 2015. 
https://forsvaret.no/en/ForsvaretDocuments/Strategic_Defence_Review_2015_abr
idged.pdf. 
Obama, Barack. U.S. Nationals Taken Hostage Abroad and Personnel Recovery Efforts. 
PPD-30. Washington, DC: The White House, 2015.  
Office of Naval Intelligence. Survival on Land and Sea. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1943. 
O’Grady, Scott, and Michael French. Basher Five-Two: The True Story of F-16 Fighter 
Pilot Captain Scott O’Grady. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell, 1997. 
Pateman, Colin. Goldfish, Caterpillars, & Guinea Pigs: Accounts of Pilots and Air Crews 
from the Second World War. Oxford: Fonthill Media, 2012. 
Pera, Lee, Paul D. Miller, and Darrel Whitcomb. “Personnel Recovery: Strategic 
Importance and Impact.” Air & Space Power Journal (November-December 
2012): 83–112. 
Peters, John, and John Nichol. Tornado Down. London: Signet, 1993. 
Phillips, Richard, and Stephan Talty. A Captain’s Duty: Somali Pirates, Navy SEALs, and 
Dangerous Days at Sea. New York: Hyperion, 2010. 
Pitchfork, Graham. Shot Down and in the Drink: True Stories of RAF and 
Commonwealth Aircrews Saved from the Sea in WWII. Richmond: The National 
Archives, 2005. 
Ratnam, Gopal. “The Islamic State Captures Jordanian Pilot after F-16 Crash.” Foreign 
Policy, December 24, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/24/the-islamic-
state-may-have-just-shot-down-an-f-16-jet/.  
Richardson, Dave. Vietnam Air Rescues. San Bernardino, CA: Dave Richardson, 2010. 
 203 
Riste, Olav. “With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in 
Norway.” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 (November 2007): 997–1024. 
Roberts, Nancy C. “Organizational Systems Framework.” Working paper, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2004. 
Rottman, Gordon L. The Los Banos Prison Camp Raid: The Philippines 1945. Oxford: 
Osprey, 2010. 
Rowell, William J. “Whole of Government Approach to Personnel Recovery.” Master’s 
thesis, United States Army War College, 2012. 
Ryan, Chris. The One That Got Away. London: Century, 1995. 
Scott, Astrid Karlsen, and Tore Haug. Defiant Courage: A WWII Epic of Escape and 
Endurance. New York: Skyhorse, 2010. 
Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. POW: The Fight 
Continues after the Battle. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1955. 
Shoemaker, Lloyd R. The Escape Factory: The Story of MIS-X, The Super-Secret U.S. 
Agency behind World War II’s Greatest Escapes. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1990. 
Simpson, Ross W. Stealth Down: The Loss of the First F-117 Stealth Fighter in Combat 
and the Dramatic Rescue of the Pilot. Charleston, SC: Narwhal Press, 2003. 
Sutherland, Jon, and Diane Canwell. The RAF Air Sea Rescue Service 1918–1986. 
Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2005. 
Taylor, L. B. That Others May Live: The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service. New 
York: E.P. Dutton & Co, 1967. 
Tilford, Earl H. The United States Air Force: Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia. 
Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1992. 
Toliver, Raymond F. The Interrogator: The Story of Hanns Scharff, Luftwaffe’s Master 
Interrogator. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1978. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery in the 
Department of Defense. DOD Instruction 2310.6. Washington, DC: Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, October 13, 2000. 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) 
Procedures. DoD Instruction 2310.3. Washington, DC: Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, June 6, 1997. 
 204 
Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. Perilous Option: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. 
Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Veith, George J. Code Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts 
during the Vietnam War. New York: The Free Press, 1998. 
Verity, Hugh. We Landed by Moonlight: Secret RAF Landings in France, 1940–1944. 
Wilmslow, England: AirData, 1995. 
War and Navy Departments. A Pocket Guide to Netherlands East Indies. Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1944. 
War Department. Norwegian: A Guide to the Spoken Language. TM 30-310. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943. 
War Department. Norwegian Phrase Book. TM 30-610. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1943. 
War Office. Attachment “A”: Historical Record of MI9. London: General Staff, 1945. 
War Office. Enclosure II: Historical Record of RAF Intelligence Course “B.” London: 
General Staff, 1945. 
War Office. MI9 Bulletin. Copy 703. London: General Staff, 1945. 
War Office. MI9 Evasion Reports. London: General Staff, 1945. 
Wenger, Etienne, Richard McDermott, and William M. Snyder. Cultivating Communities 
of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge. Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 2002. 
Wenger-Trayner, Etienne, Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, Steven Hutchinson, Chris Kubiak, 
and Beverly Wenger-Trayner. Learning in Landscapes of Practice. New York: 
Routledge, 2015. 
Wenger-Trayner, Etienne, Richard McDermott, and William M. Snyder. Cultivating 
Communities of Practice: A Guide to Managing Knowledge. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2002. 
Whitcomb, Darrel D. The Rescue of Bat 21. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 
Whitcomb, Darrel D. Combat Search and Rescue in Desert Storm. Montgomery, AL: Air 
University Press, 2006. 
  
 205 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “Presidential Memorandum: Presidential 
Policy Directive-Hostage Recovery Activities.” The White House, June 24, 2015. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/24/presidential-policy-
directive-hostage-recovery-activities.  
Wilson, David Sloan, and Edward O. Wilson. “Rethinking the Theoretical Foundations of 
Sociobiology.” Quarterly Review of Biology 82, no. 4 (2008): 327–48. 
  
 206 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 207 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
